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Catastrophes are usually seen as a threat to a country’s stability and progress. Some countries 
are regarded as prepared to face them and ready to deal with the consequences, but still, a 
disaster is always presented at the very least as an inconvenience. Contrary to this line of 
thinking, this dissertation shows that catastrophes can present an opportunity for state-building. 
Catastrophes, and the profound sense of insecurity they cause, force institutions to demonstrate 
their adeptness, or change. Specifically, catastrophes challenge state power because they test its 
basic role as protector from physical harm. Consequently, when disaster happens the state is put 
to the test. States that arise triumphant from this challenge may use the opportunity to increase its 
strength and develop new capacities.  
However, I will start by acknowledging that the state has not always been regarded as 
responsible for catastrophe and its consequences. Before modernity, responsibility for 
catastrophe was in God´s hands. But as culture evolves, this responsibility has been transferred 
from God to society, and specifically to the state. Today, we understand that disasters are a 
consequence of our own decisions, and therefore we are responsible for its consequences. In this 
context, demands to the state in terms of risk management and recovery have increased steadily 
during the twentieth century. And as a result, the state has been forced to find new ways to 
respond to these new challenges.  
 
 
With this in mind, this project explores the relationship between catastrophes and the 
development of the Chilean state. I understand catastrophe as a type of event, usually 
unexpected and sudden, that prompts widespread destruction in a significant part of the territory 
of a state; sharply affecting most, if not all, everyday social, economic and political functions. I 
understand state-building as the process of increasing the administrative, fiscal and coercive 
capacity of states to interact constructively with their societies and to pursue public goals more 
effectively. My argument is that catastrophes and the process of dealing with their consequences 
can unleash mechanisms of state-building similar to what has been argued for the case of 
Western Europe and the effects of war (Tilly 1985, 1990).  
To prove this, I use historical methods to look closely at Chile’s history of repeated 
catastrophes prompted by earthquakes using theories of wars as an analogy. This allows me to 
build a theory based on cross-case comparison, finding structurally equivalent pairs, instead of 
classical historical comparison that search for similarities and differences across similar cases 
(Vaughan 2014). Catastrophes are similar to wars in that they constitute a threat to the 
population; and also, because they both leave destruction and victims in their wake. Since the 
basic role of the state is to control internal and external threats protecting their citizens from 
harm both wars and catastrophes demand state´s intervention.  
Paraphrasing Tilly, I show that “states make catastrophe and catastrophe makes states.” First, 
the sociology of risk allows us to understand that catastrophes are not an external event but one 
created by society, and specifically, by decisions taken by states. And then, I show that both risk 
management and the process of dealing with disaster´s consequences can led to state building. In 
my example, it is clear that earthquakes have caused the Chilean state to organize, to improve the 
capacity of its administration, to strengthen its control and establish new relationships with 
 
 
Chilean society. Overall, I argue that in the Chilean case catastrophe has led to an increase in 
state capacities; and these institutional developments work for the benefit of the Chilean state not 
only in case of emergencies but in everyday life. 
This happens because catastrophes are windows of opportunity to effect change. They 
present themselves as momentous occurrences; events where decisions matter more than in 
normal times. Destruction means that some things have to start from scratch and, in this context, 
efforts to go “back to normal” rarely mean exactly that. Instead, power-holders have the 
possibility to set institutions in new directions and define the path that the state is going to take in 
the next period. In this line, it is another conclusion of this dissertation that ideas do matter. They 
matter because they define problems, and as a consequence they determine the solutions that are 
open to decision makers. Consequently, the notions and ideologies of power-holders are of great 
importance to determine what happens after disaster, even if they cannot always do as they 
please. Also, the ideologies of money-lenders matter a great deal. As Leander (2003) has shown, 
international organizations have affected the way wars are being held in the developing world. 
Similarly, my research shows that they can have an important role in setting the path 
reconstruction is going to take. 
Taking all this into account, I argue that the effect of catastrophe on state building can work 
through at least two mechanisms: imposing certain needs and being invoked to achieve political 
goals. For one side, the catastrophe has its own agenda. Because of the tragedy, a strong state is 
needed; or as a minimum, a state that is able to manage the emergency and oversee 
reconstruction. Also, the earthquake creates new needs in the areas of infrastructure, health, 
transportation, among others. And this is, most of the times, a task for the state. On the other 
side, the second mechanism is political; catastrophes are used by the government as an excuse to 
 
 
push all kind of agendas ahead. And it is when these two mechanisms work together in the same 
direction that the effect of the earthquake in state capacities will be significantly greater.  
Nevertheless, we know that it takes a minimally strong state to profit from wars; weak states 
might just disappear into chaos. Similarly, if the state cannot survive catastrophe it will not be 
able to strengthen afterwards. For example, this is the case of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake in 
Port-au-Prince. It can be argued, then, that more than a stimulant wars and catastrophes are a test 
for the state. They challenge state power and at the same time generate a strong necessity for 
state intervention. Weak states might just disappear into chaos, but minimally strong states can 
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INTRODUCTION | Catastrophe and the State: Lessons from Chile´s Seismic History  
 
“Earthquakes alone are sufficient to destroy the prosperity of any country. If beneath 
England the now inert subterranean forces should exert those powers, which most 
assuredly in former geological ages they have exerted, how completely would the entire 
condition of the country be changed! (...) England would at once be bankrupt; all papers, 
records, and accounts would from that moment be lost. Government being unable to 
collect the taxes, and failing to maintain its authority, the hand of violence and rapine 
would remain uncontrolled. In every large town famine would go forth, pestilence and 
death following in its train.” 
Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle, 1909: 323. 
 
These were the thoughts of Charles Darwin after witnessing the effects of a catastrophic 
earthquake in Concepción, Chile, in 1835. He stayed in the city for only three days and was not 
able to see that his prediction was deeply mistaken. Government did not collapse in 1835, nor in 
1906, 1939, 1960 or 2010, the worst four years in Chile’s earthquake-prone history. On the 
contrary, after the 1835 ruin of Concepción, order was quickly restored and the Intendencia 
organized rescue from tents in the main square. Afterwards, the national government planned 
much of reconstruction and recovery. In 1906, when Chile suffered an even worst catastrophe in 
its main port of Valparaíso, the state responded with a full reconstruction plan, led by a 
Reconstruction Committee, which designed a new city. By 1939, when Chile suffered its most 
deadly earthquake ever, the government had an even more impressive response. Two new 
agencies were created; first, a state agency in charge of rebuilding infrastructure, and second, one 
in charge of economic recovery and development. The first agency later became the Ministry of 
Housing, while the second one –CORFO- is until today a very important governmental 
organization whose aim is to promote economic growth in the country. By 1960, when yet 
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another catastrophic earthquake destroyed southern Chile, the government once again developed 
a national plan for reconstruction, including a National Plan for Emergencies that could help 
with further disasters. Consequently, when the 2010 catastrophe came, destruction was 
significantly low for such a large shock. Overall, it is clear that Darwin was not correct; 
earthquakes alone are not sufficient to destroy the prosperity of any country. It certainly happens, 
as we have seen recently in the case of Haiti, but it is definitely not a rule.  
In the case of Chile, it can even be said that the state came out stronger from the ordeal, 
which is precisely the argument of this dissertation. It is clear that catastrophes such as 
earthquakes have usually been seen exactly as Darwin saw them: a menace to state power and a 
threat to a country’s stability and progress. Some countries are regarded as prepared to face them 
and ready to deal with the consequences, but a disaster is always presented at the very least as an 
inconvenience.
1
 In this dissertation, I will not argue that catastrophes do not constitute a problem 
for governments and populations who suffer them, but will show how they present, at the same 
time, opportunities for the state to become stronger.  
This dissertation, then, is about disasters. Nonetheless, it does not address the issues raised by 
mainstream Sociology of Disasters. It does not ask about what transpires at the moment of 
catastrophe, nor does it concern itself with the social roots of disasters or how they come to 
happen. Instead, I deal with more general questions on the role of catastrophes in history and 
social change. Specifically, I inquire about the effect that dealing with catastrophic disasters has 
in states’ development and its ability to do what they do: monopolize violence, extract revenue 
                                                          
1
 According to Albala-Bertrand´s study of disasters in developing countries “UNDRO-s publications invariably 
consider natural disasters as formidable obstacles to economic and social development.” (Albala-Bertrand 1993) 
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from a population, deliver social welfare, etc. But mostly, this research is about understanding 
catastrophic events and how they unfold in the political realm.  
With this in mind, I understand catastrophes as a type of event, usually unexpected and 
sudden, that prompts widespread destruction in a significant part of the territory of a state; 
sharply affecting most, if not all, everyday social, economic and political functions.
2
 Although I 
use the term disaster and catastrophe in this dissertation, there are reasons to differentiate them 
and prefer the term catastrophe when analyzing their effect in state capacity. I define catastrophe 
as a sub type of disaster where the characteristics of sudden, destructive and widespread are 
particularly strong and well defined. In contrast, disasters are not only qualitatively less harmful, 
but can be more diffuse and sometimes leave no permanent physical destruction, like in the case 
of a heat wave. For E. Quarantelli and D.W. Perry, two of the founders of the Sociology of 
Disaster, the distinction is fruitful not only in theoretical terms, but because catastrophes require 
different kind of planning and management than disasters (Quarantelli 2006; Perry 2006). In 
catastrophe, most or even all of the everyday functions of society are sharply and simultaneously 
interrupted, most if not all people are victims of the event, and infrastructure is certainly 
impacted. When disasters have catastrophic proportions communities are unable to search for 
help within each other, and handling it is more than ever a task for the state (Quarantelli 2006; 
Perry 2006).
 
 In fact, in catastrophe, the state not only has a bigger problem to deal with, but even 
its existence can be heavily threatened.
3 
  
                                                          
2
 This definition has been adapted from different definitions of disaster in the Social Sciences. However, for 
reasons that will be explained shortly, in this dissertation I prefer the use of the term catastrophe whenever 
possible.    
3
 Even etymologically, catastrophes mean a qualitative jump over disasters. While disaster means having “a bad 
star”, bad luck, catastrophe is a more concrete term; meaning literally “to take down”, to destroy. Also, 
catastrophes imply materiality, and also a certain abruptness, “a sudden damage” to a community. From 
Greek katastrophē 'overturning, sudden turn', from kata- 'down' + strophē 'turning' (from strephein 'to turn'). Mid. 
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I understand state-building as the process of increasing the administrative, fiscal and coercive 
capacity of states to interact constructively with their societies and to pursue public goals more 
effectively.
4
 Hence, I see state capacities as the result of the process of state building. State 
capacity is a core concept in Political Sociology and Political Science, and as such, has suffered 
from conceptual fuzziness. Broadly speaking, it refers to the ability of a state to administer its 
territory effectible (Skocpol 1985; Sikkink 1991). In other words, state capacity is a 
measurement of state strength (Soifer 2008); a state that does not have state capacity is a weak 
state, one that manages to administer the territory effectible is a strong state (Migdal 1988). 
Unfortunately, state capacity (or strength) has been conceptualized very differently in different 
studies (Hanson and Sigman (2001) found no less than 33 different ways to measure the concept 
in Political Science). However, most agree that is better to speak of state capacities, in plural, 
since the state has to achieve goals in different areas. And also, most social scientists agree with 
Weber that the three areas core functions of the state are: coercion, revenue and administration 
(Skocpol 1985; Soifer 2012). By coercive capacity, I mean the state´s ability to protect the 
population from external threats, to preserve its borders and maintain internal peace and tame 
violence. In other words, it refers to the capacity of the state to ensure security to its citizens, 
independently of the existence of challengers to its rule. Revenue refers to the ability of the state 
to impose upon the population it claims to rule and has been one of the most broadly used 
measurements of state strength in social sciences. Third, administration refers to the ability to 
provide basic services to its citizens.  And finally, we must take into account that state power and 
state capacity may be unevenly distributed in the territory, as has been usually shown to be the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16th century (in the sense 'denouement'): from Latin catastrophe. “An event causing great and usually sudden 
damage or suffering” Oxford Dictionary.  
4
 Adapted from: Brautigam, Deborah. “Introduction: Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries”. In 
Brautigam, Deborah; Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge; Moore, Mick. Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008.  
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case for Latin America (O´Donnell 1993). This unevenness is related to the notion of state reach, 
the “actual penetration throughout the country and its capacity to govern society” (Yashar 2005, 
6) or as Herbst has put it, the ability “to project power over distance” (Herbst 2000: 173). These 
are the four dimensions of state strength I will be looking at when analyzing the effects of 
catastrophe in the Chilean state.  
My argument is that catastrophes and the process of dealing with their consequences, can 
unleash mechanisms of state-building analog to what has been argued for the case of Western 
Europe and the effects of war (Tilly 1985, 1990). According to Charles Tilly’s highly influential 
theory “states make war and war makes states” (Tilly 1985, 1990); centralization of power is 
essential to have a strong state, and only strong states win wars. Also, institutions that are crucial 
to the modern state –such as taxes- were created for war-making. The dynamic is one in which 
war-making, extraction and bureaucracies interacted to shape state-building. In this dissertation, I 
use the analogy to show how other type of battles and threats can have a similar effect on the 
state. Catastrophes prompt new efforts to increase state revenue, along with the development of 
new bureaucracies and administrative bodies to administrate such revenue and implement the 
policies required to win the war (in this case “against nature”) and to make reconstruction, and 
ultimately recovery, possible. The analogy would allow us to understand better the mechanisms 
by which both phenomena occur and have an outcome in common: state building.  
To do so, I will use a Historical Sociology approach and look closely at Chile’s history of 
repeated catastrophes prompted by earthquakes. At least ninety seven “major quakes” (more than 
7 Ms in magnitude) can be counted in the country’s territory since independence from Spain 
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(1810); eighteen of them considered “great earthquakes” (more than 8 Ms).
5
 But despite this 
prominence of earthquakes, Chilean history has never been told taking earthquakes as a starting 
point. Studies on earthquakes are for the most part a description of the moment of emergency, 
people’s recollections and testimonies. Few studies have dealt with long-term consequences and 
none from the perspective proposed here. Hence, while focusing on developing a theoretical 
approach on the effects of catastrophe in the state, this dissertation is at the same time an 
historical recollection of these events and their importance in Chilean history.   
STUDYING CATASTROPHE AND THE STATE 
There is not a concrete literature on catastrophe´s effect on the state in sociology. In truth, the 
topic has barely been addressed at all. Researchers tent to focus on explaining disaster centering 
on pre-disaster conditions and extend little of their questioning to post disaster politics. As 
example, only one out of five Annual Reviews of Sociology on Disasters since 1977, has 
included a section on the long-term consequences of disasters. G.A. Kreps (1984) tried to 
highlight what has been done in the topic, but found very little. Still, he concluded that studies 
suggest that disasters have the power to change existing trends and this should be studied further 
(Kreps 1984). E. Quarantelli, founder of the field, pointed this out more recently in his Agenda 
for Disaster Research in the 21
st
 century, arguing that disasters must be understood as occasions 
that offer an opportunity to the creation of “short term correctives or long term adaptations” 
(Quarantelli 2005). Conclusively, what mainstream disaster studies have failed to appreciate 
fully is that catastrophes are moments when institutions and social arrangements are put to the 
                                                          
5
 Data from the Chilean Seismological Service www.sismologia.cl // There are different scales to measure 
earthquakes. Data from the National Chilean Service of Seismology presented here use the Mw Magnitude scale, 
same as the United States Geological Survey (USGS). This scale has succeeded the 1930s-era Richter magnitude 
scale (ML) that only measured earthquakes up to 6.9 ML.  For all values below 6.9 Richter scale ML and Ms Magitude 
scales have basically the same values for the same earthquakes, even if the formulas are different.  
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test, and consequently, they present themselves as an opportunity to design new institutional 
arrangements.  
Case studies made by historians have shown results in these lines, even if not explicitly 
addressing the issue. The two most notable examples are L. Perez´s history of hurricanes in Cuba 
(Perez 2001) and G. Clancey´s account of earthquake history in Japan (Clancey 2006). In Winds 
of Change, Perez argues that hurricanes should be highlighted as a key factor in the development 
of Cuba. He shows that the storms played a decisive role in shaping the economy, the culture, 
and the political economy of the island. Among the most relevant changes that he names are land 
tenure reforms, labor organization, and the modification of systems of production. Similarly, 
Clancey has approached the case of Japan, focusing on how its seismic history has defined the 
country´s relationship with the West. In Earthquake Nation, he argues that earthquakes have 
been both Japan´s biggest challenge for nation building and a source for it. This is exemplified 
by the conflict between “Western” and “Japanese” architecture. There are other cases to learn 
from, but they do not deal with repetitive disasters in the same country but are one case study. 
One of the most known cases is the aftermath of the Lisbon 1755 earthquake, where the state’s 
concern with the economic and political consequences of the earthquake became central to the 
development of modern mentality in Europe. The state assumed for the first time a collective 
responsibility for the consequences of the earthquake (Dynes 2000). More recently, M.A. Healey 
shows in The Ruins of the New Argentina how it took an earthquake to launch future President 
Juan Domingo Perón to the national political scene. He argues that Perón was an obscure colonel 
in a recently installed military regime when he organized the relief campaign and rapidly 
commissioned plans to rebuild the city of San Juan. Perón would gain exposure thanks to his role 
in earthquake relief and reconstruction, and soon found a movement, reach the presidency, and 
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transformed the politics and social structure of the country. By exploring the process of 
rebuilding and the complex social processes underneath, Healey shows how this played a crucial 
role in forging, testing, and ultimately limiting the Peronist project that transformed Argentina 
(Healey 2011). Also, the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City has gained lots of attention as an 
economic and political turning point due to its subsequent social unrest, challenging decades of 
PRI´s de facto monopoly of the political arena (Olson and Gawronski 2003; Walker 2009). And 
lately, the sociology of hurricane Katrina has brought new light to Disaster Studies, with several 
projects studying political and policy change after the event, even if in this case changes are at 
city or regional level (Brunsma, Overfelt and Picou 2007; Squires and Hartman 2006).   
Like the cases exposed above, there are several other studies that lead us to believe that the 
state is an important player in understanding of the effect of catastrophe in the long term. They 
point out that after disasters, especially those with catastrophic proportions, we should expect 
repercussions in the political arena because disasters challenge state power, somehow putting it 
to the test on its ability to monopolize violence. Protection from physical harm is the state’s basic 
role, especially from external sources. Is nature supposed to be one of those forces? Can citizens 
hold the state accountable for disaster’s harm? Cases show that the answer of citizens has been 
yes. David A. Moss has researched this topic and shown that in the last century the state has 
increasingly been held accountable for disasters’ destruction. In consequence, he calls the state 
“the ultimate risk manager” (Moss 2002). When everything fails, he says, we turn to the state; 
not only the insurer of uninsurable risks but also the insurer of insurances. Also, the declining 
role of religious explanations for disasters has reverberated in the state, not only as an effective 
source of relief to victims but also as a protector from harm. If the gods are not deciding on 
disaster, and on who dies and who lives, then it is the lack of hazard’s regulation or the state’s 
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inability to enforce this regulation what is commonly pointed out as the root of disasters, 
especially natural disasters. Consequently, when things go wrong the state is put to the test. And 
after the crisis is over, recovery and reconstruction ensue, which is indisputably a goal for the 
state. Of course, civil society, private corporations and other actors are known to play a crucial 
role in reconstruction, but for the most part, it is the state that must organize and set the 
conversation on how this process is going to be. Public policy reports mostly understand 
recovery as a process to restart production and put it back to pre-disaster levels. However, 
reconstruction is not just a physical endeavor, even if it is shaped by the need to reconstruct. 
Recovery is a process driven also by the desire to bring back to life the social and cultural world 
that the disaster endangered, as much as it can be driven by the interest in doing something 
totally or somehow different. Catastrophes, and the profound sense of insecurity they cause, 
force institutions and social agreements to demonstrate their legitimacy and adeptness, or 
change. Even if new buildings and structures can be rapidly rebuilt, new meanings and 
expectations can be restructured in the institutions those buildings hold.  
Summarizing, we can say that studying catastrophes in the long term means understanding 
that catastrophes usually mean change. This is not a controversial idea at all. But for the most 
part, it is a line of research that has been taken for granted in Sociology.  
METHODS 
To explore these ideas further, I look at disasters through the lens of Historical Sociology. 
Even though for those working in the fields themselves history and sociology have clear limits, it 
is also true that most will readily agree that the areas overlap (Griffin 1995; Abrams 1980; 
Skocpol 1987; Abbot 1991). The study of disasters is a good example of this; they are both 
historically relevant and sociologically significant. But it is also true that sociologists and 
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historians will work with them in dissimilar ways; the difference, it has been argued, is not in the 
methods employed but in the kind of questions asked (Cahnman and Boskoff 1964). History 
deals with what is idiographic and particularizing, while sociology likes nomothetic and 
generalizing principles. Sociologists’ questions, then, are thought to be theoretically relevant, 
while historians’ questions should be relevant to particular cases. But I do not think this is 
entirely true anymore (if ever). Historians have long ago reached to theory, in sociology and in 
other social sciences, to understand their cases. And sociologists have discovered the power of 
case studies to fully understand the mechanisms through which structure works. Nonetheless, an 
emphasis in detail is still the mark of the historian, whereas generalizing principles continues to 
be the obsession for us, sociologists. In this context, Historical Sociology, as a bridge between 
the disciplines, “intends to render a conceptualized account of societal processes as they actually 
occur, meaning that the occurrences are considered as ends in themselves, though illuminated by 
theory” (Cahnman 1976). For the sociologist, looking into the past is an effort to understand the 
present, by way of explaining large-scale social transformations (Barkey 2009).  
A point of encounter between the disciplines is the study of events. Events are contingent and 
unique happenings; consequently, most social sciences have looked down on them as 
unscientific. Disaster Studies are a very good example of this, actively fighting the notion of 
disasters as events in order to make them “more sociological.” But historical sociologists have 
shown that by studying events we get to know structure better. And I will argue that the notion of 
event, as defined by Historical Sociology, is a crucial analytical tool to understand catastrophes’ 
effects on the state. As William Sewell describes for the French Revolution, events are not 
defined by one moment alone; there is a sequence of occurrences that shape an event such as the 
Storming of the Bastille, followed by a cascading series of further ruptures that might result in 
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structural transformations (Sewell 1996). Likewise, catastrophes are not just a sudden occurrence 
unrelated to the community or society in which it happens, they eventuate from the past. But 
more importantly for this dissertation, catastrophes signify for the future, they mark a before and 
after in history and social life. And this whole sequence of occurrences constitutes the disaster-
as-an-event worth of social science inquiry. As a result, I do not want to treat history as a source 
of additional cases. Instead, I see history as an opportunity to study the mechanisms as they 
work, and to understand under what circumstances and contexts they are more fruitful. With this, 
I seek to gain greater analytical leverage, not by the number of cases, but by choosing cases that 
will allow me to see the effect of catastrophe in the state.   
Also, since the main cases under study occur all in the same country, it is crucial to 
understand the role played by temporality. It is not only about what happens, but also about when 
it happens. Social processes such as state-building unfold over time, and the difference in 
sequences or simultaneity of two processes can produce critical consequences (Pierson 2004). 
Catastrophes have hit Chile repeatedly, during different moments in its history, with different 
cultural paradigms reigning and diverse governments and ideologies governing. This allows for 
fruitful comparisons between cases, but at its core, it shows the development of a process, in 
which past events affect decisions that might be taken in the next event. Comparisons between 
cases cannot leave that aside. I believe that by analyzing the different cases in sequence I will be 
able to see the process, its continuities and changes. However, I will not attempt to develop an 
eventful analysis as a quantitative technique, but will rather use eventful sociology as an 
analytical guideline to understand social transformations prompted by catastrophes.  
Moreover, the analogy with wars will allow us to build a theory based on cross-case 
comparison. Thinking analytically using analogy means to find structurally equivalent pairs, 
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instead of classical historical comparisons that search for similarities and differences across 
similar cases (Vaughan 2014). Despite variation in both phenomena –wars and catastrophes- 
each one presents a similar pattern, which combined to the differences between cases it help us 
to drive the theory forward. As Vaughn has richly explained, to do so we shall “being research 
with a starting theory, concept, or definition in mind that shapes our selection of a case. So from 
the beginning, we are making a comparison between our cases and what we expect to find, based 
on a theory, concept, or characteristics of other cases” (Vaughan 2014: 65). In this case, the 
analogy will be made with bellicist theories of war, for which my case is and hypothesis. In other 
words, it is wars what will serve as a deep comparison.  Therefore, Tilly´s theory will 
accompany every part of this dissertation. For this, I have reduced the theory to a set of key 
concepts (explained in Chapter 1) and tested it for my case. The result is organized in five 
chapters that will be described at the end of this introduction.  
Data Used in this Dissertation   
The most important sources used for this dissertation are: 
 Newspapers. Both National and regional, newspapers have been at the center of this 
dissertation. They allowed me not only to understand the happenings of the first days 
after the quake, but to comprehend the worries and demands of the population to the 
authorities after the emergency had passed. Also, they were crucial to trace the different 
plans and ideas for reconstruction and their groups of interest. Most of the newspapers 
were found in Chile´s National Library (Biblioteca Nacional) but Columbia Libraries was 
also of great help locating them in the United States.    
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 Parliamentary Discussions of the bills designed to deal with reconstruction allowed me to 
understand the views of the different parties, their worries and proposed solutions. 
Especially, it allowed me to understand the different options for reconstruction that were 
on the table for a while but never happened. These parliamentary discussions are found in 
the archives of the Chilean Library of Congress (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile).  
 Presidential Speeches. Every 21st of May the president of Chile addresses congress to 
report on the events of the past year. Like the U.S “State of the Union,” the address 
reports on the condition of the country and allows the President to outline his present and 
future legislative agenda and national priorities. This speech is accompanied by a written 
report on the development of every state agency, ministry and office during the previous 
year. These reports were very helpful for understanding the work that the executive had 
done on reconstruction, the vision of the president for the future of the country and the 
role the earthquake had played in changing or maintaining those plans. Most of this 
speeches and reports are available at the website Memoria Chilena.  
 Personal correspondence, journals and letters. This type of source is more necessary for 
19
th
 century catastrophes. Newspapers were not out on a daily basis at the beginning of 
the century. Parliament did hold a remarkably organized record, but very brief and with 
the most important information. Also, for my analysis of this century I center on the ideas 
that were more prominent during the time, and how this changed. For this I need to check 
on private and public letters and journals, all available at the Chilean National Library. 
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 Statistics: Chile has a good tradition of record-keeping. Different sources were used, and 
are all specified in due moment and in the Reference section.  
 Secondary Sources: As I mentioned before earthquakes are not a prominent topic in 
Chilean historiography. However, secondary sources were used to understand the 
political context of earthquakes and later development of the institutions created after 
earthquakes.  
Cases and a note on Chile´s Seismic History  
According to the data provided by Chile´s National Seismological Center (Centro 
Sismológico Nacional, CSN), at least a ninety seven destructive earthquakes (Magnitude (Ms) 
>7) have been counted in the country’s territory since independence (1810); eighteen of them 
considered “great earthquakes” (Ms>8) (CSN 2015).
6
 Also, Chile is one of the few countries that 
tremble all over; no region of the country is free of the possibility of a major earthquake.
 
Not 
surprisingly, Chile is regarded as the most highly seismic country of the planet, with the possible 
exception of Japan (Lomnitz 1970; Lomnitz 2004).
   
Figure 1 shows distribution of major earthquakes and catastrophes in Chilean territory.
7
 The 
first maps show the epicenter of all quakes of magnitude 7 or more, the second map shows the 
                                                          
6
 This data changes constantly. It is difficult to keep track since earthquake magnitude > 7Ms happen very often. 
Data from Chile´s National Seismological Center presented here use the Ms Magnitude scale. This scale has 
succeeded the 1930s-era Richter magnitude scale (ML). For all values below 6.9 Richter scale (ML) and Ms 
Magnitude scales are the same. (The original Richter scale did not measure earthquakes more than 7 ML.). The 
magnitude scale compares amplitudes of waves on a seismogram, not the strength (energy) of the quakes. 
However, we can get a sense of the strength of the quake looking at the magnitude (or calculate it): a change of 
0.1 in magnitude means a change in about 1.4 times the energy release. Therefore, and earthquake of magnitude 8 
is ten times bigger than a 7 Ms quake, but 31.622 times stronger. Since it is really the energy or strength that 
knocks down buildings, this is really the more important comparison. (Based on the information provided by US 
Geological Survey http:// http://earthquake.usgs.gov/) 
7
 The country’s territory has changed during the 200 years since Independence but the Chilean Seismological 
Service counts all earthquakes that have ever happened in what is Chile today. This is, it includes earthquakes in 
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epicenter of the most destructive ones. To differentiate major catastrophes from smaller disasters 
is not always easy, especially since what might constitute a minor earthquake in Chile would be 
a disaster in another country. Scientific measures based on magnitude are deceptive since for an 
earthquake to be a major catastrophe there has to be vulnerable population to suffer them, an 
earthquake with epicenter in the middle of the dessert will hardly constitute a major catastrophe. 
Therefore, the location of the epicenter and the vulnerability of the population are more crucial 
than magnitude when trying to account for historical events.  
Illustration 1: Distribution of Earthquakes in Space
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
territories that were Peruvian or Bolivian at the time. Also, data on this point can change any moment. There had 
had been 3 quakes of more than 7 Richter after 2010 when I wrote my previous draft, now there have been 4.  
Source: Compiled by author based on data from the Chilean Seismological Center 
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There are scales that measure the intensity of the earthquake in terms of human and material 
losses. The most famous of these scales is the Mercalli scale, originated in 1884. But in the case 
of Chile there is not enough historical research to present geologists with the information they 
need to attribute a degree to old earthquakes and these calculations have not been done (Lomnitz 
2004).
8
 Also, these scales are problematic because one hundred deaths in nineteenth century 
Chile meant something different in the twentieth century. In fact, an earthquake causing at least 
900 deaths in 1922 was regarded as a minor disaster at the time, while the 1835 earthquake was 
nicknamed “the Ruin of Concepción” when only 120 bodies were counted in the city. The fact 
that the country was smaller and population was spread in the countryside certainly accounts for 
this difference.  
Illustration 2: Distribution of earthquakes in time (1810-2016) 
 
Illustration 2 shows the distribution of major earthquakes in Chilean history since 
independence. The first that comes to light is that the amount of catastrophic earthquakes is 
higher in the 20
th
 century than in the 19
th
. Is the earth becoming more agitated? That is not what 
seismologists think. What happens is that as Chile becomes more populated and urbanized the 
likelihood of an earthquake becoming a major catastrophe increases. Also, there is a certain 
                                                          
8
 An even now the USGS has guided its analysis by the worst-observed damage in a locality, while Chilean 
engineers make an average of observed damage to assign intensity to the locality. The difference is usually of one 
degree of Mercalli intensity (Lomnitz 2004). It is, in the end, a scale based on judgment.      
Source: Compiled by author based on data from the Chilean Seismological Center 
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degree of randomness; the depth of the hypocenter, the type of land in that area, the time of day 
of the quake and, specially, if it is followed by a tsunami or not.  All these things matter when 
accounting for the intensity of an earthquake instead of its magnitude.  
Taking all this into account, geologists’ and historians’ opinions coincide that three 
earthquakes constitute the major catastrophes in Chilean history:  Valparaíso 1906, Chillán 1939 
and Valdivia 1960. Each of these years, a significant part of the Chilean territory was left in the 
ground and for a moment the state was completely paralyzed by catastrophe. The earthquake in 
Maule in 2010 will certainly be added to this list. No other earthquake in Chilean history is 
comparable to this four in terms of the disruption that meant to social order, and consequently, 
the challenge that signified for the state. Yet, some other disasters are relevant for this 
dissertation and will be taken into account if they enrich the argument. In particular, it would not 
be wise to dismiss earthquakes during the first one-hundred years of the republic; even though 
they seem small with today´s eyes they certainly meant “the ruin” at the time: the 1822 
earthquake in Valparaíso and the 1835 ruin of Concepcion.  
Chart 1 Major Disasters and Catastrophes in Chilean History
9
 




The earthquake was accompanied 
by fires and tsunamis, Valparaíso –
Chile´s most important harbor- 
was completely destroyed.   
Bernardo O’Higgins was 
supreme director of the 
country. He was in the middle 
of a crisis. He resigned soon 
after the event.  
Interpretation of disaster as “the wrath 
of God” starts to lose ground.  The state 
crumbled afterwards but managed to re 
build churches and state offices. No 




The ruin of Concepción, the 
second most important city at the 
time. The area from Concepción to 
Valdivia was completely destroyed 
by earthquake and tsunami.    
President José Joaquín Prieto. 
He was the first president of the 
period called “Conservative 
Republic.”  
The state commissioned a group of 
natural scientist to study the reasons of 
the quake. Tried to move some towns. 
Could not move Concepción.  
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Accompanied by fires and a 
tsunami, it completely destroyed 
Chile´s most important port. All 
central Chile was affected, 
including Santiago. The most 
destructive and deadly single event 
in Chilean history at the time, with 
at least three thousand casualties, 
and probably around 7,000. 
President Pedro Montt  
Parliamentary Republic. 
Cabinets were formed by 
ministers of all parties. Montt 
was a National, a center party 
supported by businessmen. But 
political cleavage was almost 
nonexistent. It was more an 
oligarchy than a republic.  
Reconstruction of Valparaíso was 
organized by a state-led Reconstruction 
Board.  State took control of politics in 
the city. A moment for the state to assert 
some autonomy. 
Institutional developments: National 
Seismic Institute and Bureau of 
Worker´s statistics.  
Tax: Increased in city taxes, that were 
now collected by the state 
1939.  
Chillán  (8.3 
Ms) 
The most deadly earthquake in 
Chilean history ever, with at least 
5,600 casualties directly from the 
earthquake, and probably 15000 
when counting those affected by 
diseases. All central Chile was 
greatly affected, including 
Santiago.  
Pres. Pedro Aguirre-Cerda.  
Radical Party (left). Governed 
with the popular front, a center 
left coalition. He wanted the 
Chilean state to intervene in the 
economy and the earthquake 
was perfect excuse.   
Reconstruction of Chillán and 
Concepción in the hands of new 
corporation, CRA. Creation of CORFO. 
CRA and CORFO complete changed 
the path in economic development and 
the role of the state in the economy. 
This inaugurates Chile´s interventionist 
state. It was founded by loans and taxes. 
Tax increase was important.  
1960.Valdivia 
(9.5 Ms) & 
Concepción 
(8.2 Ms) 
Two catastrophic earthquakes, two 
days in a row.  The first one alone 
is counted as one of the most 
relevant earthquakes in history, but 
the second one is the strongest 
ever recorded in the world (9.5 
Ms). Even so, there were less 
casualties that in 1939, around two 
thousand deaths were recorded. 
All southern Chile was heavily 
affected. 
Pres. Arturo Alessandri (Right) 
He called himself a political 
and a technocrat, but was 
elected with the right vote. He 
did not want to make the state 
bigger, on the contrary, he 
wanted to put a stop of the 
popular front politics. 
This earthquake was managed by giving 
more power, money and personal to the 
Economic Ministry, that was re named 
Ministry of Economy and 
Reconstruction. It was a way to hide 
state growth. Also, we see the arrival of 
foreign agencies, the World Bank and 
the Export-Import American Bank and 
later the Alliance for progress. There is 
a tax reform to pay for reconstruction. 
 
DISSERTATION´S ORGANIZATION 
This dissertation analyses more than two hundred years of history. Also, this research deals 
with a comprehensive definition of state-building, putting together theories of war and the state 
Source: Compiled by author based on data from the Chilean Seismological Center and research done in this dissertation. 
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in a new light, which includes several analytical dimensions. To arrange all this data and theory I 
organize chapters in a way that each chapter uses two or more cases to explain one particular 
analytical dimension. Overall, each chapter always compares more than one case to explore a 
theoretical point, sometimes reaching to cases in other countries to enrich the argument.  
In Chapter 1, Theorizing Catastrophe and the State I present the research that informs my 
own work. It is design to present what we know about the relationship between catastrophe and 
the state. Also, I will clearly show how I propose to address the issue taking bellicist theories of 
state building as a cross-case analogy.  
In Chapter 2, Cultural Shifts, I describe paradigm shifts in beliefs about earthquakes that are 
crucial for forthcoming demands on the state. As theories of war have explained, it is not only 
about war but also about what kind of wars (Centeno 2002) and when they are located in a 
developmental process (Eartman 1997; Leander 2003). Similarly, catastrophes have had different 
interpretations in different epochs, and this has meant a different approach from the part of the 
state. Today, we understand that it is because of bad planning and bad decision making that 
catastrophes happen, but before modernity disasters where considered God´s punishment and 
therefore there was nothing to be done to prevent them. This chapter is about how this change 
happened and what its consequences for the state are.  
In Chapter 3, Political Aftershocks I analyze the three major earthquakes of twentieth century 
Chile from the perspective of its political consequences. For this I reach to the notion of critical 
juncture. What are the changes that earthquakes have brought to the Chilean political system? As 
we know from theories of war, these events have the power to change political equilibriums both 
internally and externally (Barkey 2011). This happens because they are all encompassing events, 
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affecting all aspects of social life. Similarly, I will show in this chapter that catastrophes can 
stress political systems in a way that allow changes not only to be possible, but necessary. Also, I 
will analyze changes at the city level, and show that for communities that suffer disaster they 
always constitute a critical juncture.  
In Chapter 4, Institutional Legacies I go deep in the case for state capacities being the result 
of catastrophe. I explore the legacies of the three major earthquakes in Chilean history and argue 
that this shows how the Chilean state has become stronger after every one of these catastrophes. 
These institutional legacies are also similar to that described by the bellicists for the case of war 
and state capacities; concretely, these outcomes are new state institutions, new bureaucracies and 
new taxes.      
In Chapter 5, called Epilogue, I analyze the 2010 Maule earthquake from the light of this 
dissertation. This analysis is not as deep as the other four earthquakes but it allow us both to 
close the story of Chile´s seismic history and to use what has been found in this research to 
analyze a new case.  Also, I reach to the case of Haiti to better explain what the conclusions of 
my research are.  
Finally, on the Conclusions, I summarize the findings of this dissertation, explicating what is 





Chapter 1 | THEORIZING CATASTROPHE AND THE STATE  
 
“We know far too little about the process of recovery, but recent studies in developing 
societies are proving useful leads. They suggest that disasters must be interpreted not 
only in terms of immediate damage and disruption but also of the degree in which they 
change already existing trends.” 
 
 G.A. Kreps. 1984. “Sociological Inquiry and Disaster Research”  
Annual Review of Sociology 10:322.  
 
The study of disasters is not the monopoly of any discipline, not even Disaster Studies. 
Anthropologists, economists, political scientists, sociologists and historians, among others, have 
subfields that focus on disaster.  Disaster Studies could be thought of as a bridge between all of 
these subfields, a place where all of this research is gathered. But in practice the groups of 
researchers that devote their careers to this particular field tend to be strongly linked to the public 
policy sphere. Since the field came into existence, most studies that are labeled Disaster Studies 
have been funded by state agencies, and today research is highly dependent on development 
agencies such as the World Bank and the International Development Bank. As a consequence, 
theoretical work on disasters –in any discipline- tends to be labeled as something else: Disaster 
Anthropology, Macroeconomics of Disaster, or Environmental History, among others.
10
 
Nonetheless, the Sociology of Disasters has particularly strong links with Disaster Studies, since 
                                                          
10
 A few years ago, I did a small study using a ProQuest dataset from 2007 to 2012. Looking at the categorization of 
research in Sociological Abstracts, I concluded that the labeling of research in the social sciences is very 
complicated, and that the research considered Disaster Studies does not constitute all of the research on disasters 
in the field. In fact, only 50.4 percent of the articles with the words disaster, catastrophe, earthquake or hurricane 
in the title are labeled as Disaster Studies. Instead, those articles are labeled: sociology of health, urban sociology, 
social psychology, cultural sociology, gender studies, history and theory, and social capital, among many others.  
Also, when research has more than one label, Disaster Studies is almost never (less than 1 percent of the time) 
labeled in the company of theoretical concepts such as: social change, state role, markets, race, or political 
sociology. Instead, the most common labels are groups (15 percent), risk, vulnerability, disaster relief, Katrina and 
disaster preparedness (8 percent).  
22 
 
the founders of the first Disaster Research Center were both sociologists: Enrico L. Quarantelli 
and Rusell R. Dynes, from Ohio State University. Regrettably, this has meant that, for the most 
part, research in the Sociology of Disaster has echoed the applied focus of mainstream Disaster 
Studies (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977; Kreps 1984; Comfort 2005; Quarantelli 2005; Tierney 
2007). The field has also been fairly isolated from other areas of sociology, with most of its 
research lacking the assumptions, theories or even concepts of sociological literature (Quarantelli 
2005). As Quarantelli himself has argued recently, this approach has accomplished much, but it 
cannot be said to be truly sociological (which is probably not its aim) (Quarantelli 2005; Watts 
1983). 
Unfortunately, this means that there is no concrete literature that links disasters and the state 
in sociology, beyond a broad collection of public policy advice on hazard reduction and disaster 
management. And yet, the possibilities for linking sociology and the study of disaster are, in my 
opinion, limitless. Sociology of Health, Urban Sociology, and Economic and Political Sociology, 
just to name a few, would have something to say about these events. Furthermore, I will argue 
that disasters should be seen as an exceptional place to test broader sociological theories. Despite 
frequent characterization of disasters as natural windows into the broader forces that shape 
societies, there has been little exploration of this by sociology. With this I mean that we can not 
only enrich the disaster field by including new theories, but that different areas of sociology 
could also be further developed if they took disasters into their field. I echo here Rudel’s critique 
of environmental sociologists, claiming that “studies of ‘business as usual’ conditions do not 
capture the ways in which single events or aggregations of events transform societies” (Rudel, 
2012: 751). Likewise, other fields of sociology could take this advice and pay renewed attention 
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to the challenge of integrating unruly, disordered sequences of historical events into the recurrent 
social patterns that our training has taught us to emphasize most (Rudel 2012).  
This project suggests that the best place for sociology to begin to account for the effects of 
disasters in social change is by analyzing their impact on the state. To do so, I have had to put the 
Sociology of Disasters in conversation with other areas of sociology and the social sciences. In 
this chapter, I will present what I have found that is useful for the topic at hand and discuss how 
we can study catastrophes and their relationship with state building in a fruitful way. I will start 
by acknowledging what the Sociology of Disasters has contributed to the framework of this 
dissertation. Then, I will develop a view of catastrophe as events using the tools developed by 
Historical Sociology. Finally, I will propose a way to look at catastrophe’s consequences for the 
state in the long term, taking as a starting point bellicist approaches to state building.  
DISASTERS  
The origin of the term disaster is Greek; literally meaning that an event was ‘ill-starred.’  It 
suggests that when something bad happens it is a punishment of the gods.
11
 Some of this aura of 
misfortune has been preserved in modern views of disaster, including pioneer research in 
Disaster Studies. For the first sociologists in the field, disasters were defined by a rapid and 
unexpected shock that caused widespread destruction (Fritz, 1961). The focus of their research 
was to understand how people reacted in these unexpected moments of intense stress 
(Quarantelli 1987). Disasters were understood as originating outside of social life, very much 
like a sentence sent from Olympus. But just as sociology has devoted itself to revealing the 
social roots of those gods, disasters have been unmasked as a socially constructed phenomenon. 
Today, we understand that disasters are foreseeable manifestations of the larger forces that shape 
                                                          
11
 From Greek δυσ- (dus-) "bad" + ἀστήρ (aster) "star." 
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society, reflecting the characteristics of the community in which they occur and dependent on 
decisions made by humans (Kreps 1984; Tierney 2007). Even when the onset agent is natural 
(like in an earthquake), the scope, depth and character of the disaster in itself will depend on the 
vulnerability (physical and social) of the communities affected. 
The Social Roots of Disaster 
The framework and ideas established by the first researchers in Disasters Studies not only 
shaped the field’s beginnings, but they continue to dominate a significant part of it today 
(Tierney 2007). Most research is still practically minded and addresses disasters as external 
shocks. However, for sociologists in the field this was identified as problematic early on. The 
second annual review on the topic, done by G.A Kreps in 1984, argued for a reversion in the 
argument; he claimed that disasters originate in society. This is, they are dependent on decisions 
made by humans (Kreps 1984) (Turner 1978). Even if most research presented by Kreps did not 
follow this notion, most sociologists shared it and argued in favor of emancipating the field from 
physical notions of disasters in order to instead emphasize their social features (Quarantelli 1998; 
Tierney 1999; Kreps 1998; Dombrowsky 1995).  This meant a new approach to disaster research 
from the perspective of the Sociology of Risk, as the 1993 annual review on the topic explicitly 
acknowledges (Clarke and Short 1993). If before disasters were seen as problems where people 
are the unintended victims of destructive events beyond ordinary human control, under the 
framework of risk the problem is reshaped into one in which human actions and social, economic 
and political conditions are responsible for creating disasters (Comfort 2005). In the words of 
disaster sociologist K.J. Tierney, “while other disciplines may merely assume that ´risk happens´ 
sociologists know better than that. Earthquakes are acts of nature, but earthquakes disasters –the 
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death, injuries, economic losses, and social disruption that result when the earth trembles- are 
social in origin” (Tierney 1999: 26).   
Consequently, if we assume that the causes of disasters are social in origin, we must focus on 
studying these causes to truly understand disasters sociologically. This means introducing the 
idea of vulnerability to the study of disasters; although different groups may share a similar 
exposure to a natural disaster, the consequences for each group may differ because they have 
diverging capacities to handle the impact. This notion was introduced by Hewitt in his influential 
book Interpretations of Calamity (Hewitt 1983). Later, the idea of social vulnerability was 
developed further by Wisner et al. (1994) who took a truly social perspective on it, arguing that 
disasters are a kind of negative externality of larger political and economic trends. The topic was 
further developed by Mileti in his book Disasters by Design (1999), where he argued that 
unsustainable practices in development have predictable disastrous consequences. Consequently, 
disasters happen as direct consequences of bad planning and decision making. They can no 
longer be seen as a punishment of the gods, instead they constitute a crime (Mileti 1999).  
Also, much of the research done in disasters has come from the Sociology of Organizations. 
Early on, Turner (1976) observed the manner in which organizational structures are patterned to 
cope with unknown events, such as disasters. He concludes that disasters are a collapse of 
precautions that had hitherto been accepted as adequate, which means that disasters are in the 
making long before they happen. In his book, Man-Made disasters (1978) he expands in this 
issue and shows that organizational failure does not arise random or accidental, but rather the 
expected consequences of certain decisions. Similarly, in Normal Accidents Perrow (1984) 
analyzed the social side of technological risk. He refers to a certain kind of accidents as normal, 
since the system's characteristics make it inherently vulnerable to such accidents. A normal 
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accident occurs in a system with so many parts (complex) that it is likely that something is 
wrong with at least one of those parts at any given time. A well-designed complex system will 
include redundancy. However, unexpected interactions may lead to failure. Diane Vaughan 
(1997) has discussed this in a more applied manner, studying the Challenger launch decision and 
presenting disasters as one facet of the dark side of organizations. She shows how because 
NASA’s scientists and engineers were so good at rapidly integrating and acting on huge amounts 
of information, they failed to catch the high pitch of the serious signals when something was 
wrong. Many of the aspects of the technological disaster’s framework have been useful for study 
of disaster’s in general, especially the focused on organizational decisions. We can appreciate the 
relevance if this in the studies on Katrina that have endeavored to show the institutional, 
organizational and cognitive factors that produced the catastrophe (Brunsma, et all. 2007).   
Another notable example of disaster studies following the risk paradigm is Klinenberg’s 
(2002) study of Chicago’s heat wave. In his book Heat Wave, Klinenberg (2002) brings to our 
attention an invisible disaster, but also explains how the disaster exposed the disparities, 
vulnerabilities and effects of isolation in communities. Most likely, classical approaches to 
disasters would have failed to appreciate the insights these researchers presented. Recently, and 
particularly in light of Hurricane Katrina, these constructivist notions have taken hold in the 
research done by sociologists in the field. There is an ample consensus that the hurricane in itself 
was a natural phenomenon, but it was the neglect of the embankment, the destruction of the 
surrounding wetlands and bad decisions about evacuation that caused the disaster per se. This is, 
the catastrophe was not natural at all, rather it was the consequence of the state’s poor decisions 
(Brunsma et.all 2007; Squires and Hartman 2006).  
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Overall, it is clear that the risk perspective has enriched the field of Disaster Studies 
enormously by making it more sociological. In the case of disasters triggered by natural 
phenomena, it has permitted researchers to untangle the analysis of the onset agent from disasters 
themselves, placing the disaster as the dependent variable. In a more practical vein, it has 
prompted the development of useful frameworks of vulnerability and hazards, frameworks that 
enable us to better understand how disasters happen and increase our capacity for prevention. 
Also, disasters that are not marked by a sudden onset and physical destruction (such as heat 
waves) have only been identified as disasters by sociology after a more constructivist notion was 
developed. Finally, constructivist notions have also helped sociology link the study of disasters 
with core sociological questions such as gender, inequality and race (See for example: (Peacock 
1997; Enearson and Morrow 1998; Bolin et all. 1998; Fothergill 2004).  
For this dissertation, the notion that disasters are socially constructed and dependent on 
society’s decisions is crucial. It shows us that catastrophes are not external phenomena but rather 
the product of society’s decisions, and, more specifically, state and political decisions. In other 
words, today we understand that nature makes the earth shakes, but society make catastrophes. 
Yet, the risk approach has its own drawbacks for the objectives of this research.  In focusing on 
disasters as the consequence of certain social circumstances and decisions, the risk approach sets 
aside the question of how circumstances might change because of disaster.  For the Sociology of 
Disasters, change following catastrophe has usually been taken for granted; it is not a 
controversial idea at all, but it has not been systematically studied. Classical focus on the impact 
period has been complemented by new research on the pre-impact period, but studies on the 
aftermath of disaster do not populate the field. Moreover, most research on disasters still deals 
with applied topics; the focus has only shifted from crisis management to disaster prevention. A 
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focus on the long term consequences of catastrophes has seldom been addressed by this field. 
What mainstream disaster studies have failed to appreciate fully is that catastrophes are moments 
when institutions and social arrangements are put to the test, and efforts to “go back to normal” 
rarely mean exactly that. Instead, catastrophes present themselves as an opportunity to design 
new institutional arrangements. E. Quarantelli pointed this out recently in his Social Science 
Research Agenda for Disaster Research in the 21st century, arguing that disasters must be 
understood as occasions that offer an opportunity (or perhaps actually demand) the creation and 
adoption of short-term correctives or long term adaptations (Quarantelli 2005). In effect, I will 
argue here that only when analyzed as events are disasters revealed as key moments for social 
change, including changes in the state.  
Catastrophes as Events  
Outside of the Sociology of Disaster, there are other areas of sociology that might prove 
more useful to understanding catastrophes’ effects on the state. To start, we need to position 
catastrophes in a process in order to understand continuity and change. To achieve this, this 
dissertation reaches back to historical notions of structure and events. For historical sociologists 
it should be obvious that earthquakes or tsunamis constitute ‘big events;’ however, constructivist 
notions in the Sociology of Disaster have openly rejected this assessment full force. Hewitt 
(1983) criticizes the idea of disasters as events as a “convenient fiction” that operates primarily 
to bolster institutions concerned with the control of nature and human societies. Dombrowsky 
(1995) complains that the notion of event freezes a complex social context into a static actor or a 
“thing” and does not adequately express its dynamic complexity. More recently, in the last 
annual review of the field, Tierney (2007) criticized the “event-based approach” claiming that it 
separates disasters from their social contexts. Disasters, the argument goes, are intrinsic to social 
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life, and the idea of them as unexpected and extraordinary is misleading. In Tierney´s words: 
“disasters should be understood as normal, common occurrences that reflect the characteristics of 
the societies in which they occur” (Tierney 2007: 518). Thus, the notion of event has been 
rejected to highlight that disasters are socially constructed (events supposedly are not) as well as 
that disasters are the consequence of pre-disaster social structure (again, events supposedly are 
not).  
Instead of “events,” new constructivist notions have encouraged the study of hazards, risks 
and vulnerability. Accordingly, definitions of disasters per se have become more diffuse, both in 
terms of time (e.g., famines) and space (e.g., global warming). I have even encountered the term 
“permanent disaster” when confronting epidemics (Crimp 1992; Lezaun 2012). Thus, new 
conceptions of disaster are not quite distinguishable from the notion of “social problem,” even if 
they are accepted as “non-routine social problems” (Kreps and Drabek 1996). From a Sociology 
of Risk perspective, social problems and disasters have many similar features; mainly they are 
both something society wants to avoid. But if we are looking to study disasters themselves, 
together with their subsequent consequences, these diffuse notions are not helpful at all. For the 
Sociology of Risk disasters have become epiphenomena, secondary or byproduct to other more 
important phenomena, this being hazards (Quarantelli 2005). The problem is not what words to 
use but rather that disasters are different from hazards. Both phenomena deserve research, and 
unless we manage to completely avoid disasters we are not enriching the field by leaving their 
study aside.  
I will argue that, contrary to recent trends, we need to take disasters seriously as a theoretical 
category of its own in order to recognize their power over history. To do so we need to rescue the 
notion of disasters as events. There is a reason why practically all definitions of disasters have 
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assumed they are somehow extra-ordinary; they can be identified as distinct from daily life, even 
if they reflect the same social conditions than those of daily life. This exceptionality allows us to 
perceive catastrophes as events and differentiate them from ordinary social problems: they are 
focused occasions, even if not objectively delimited. This does not mean that catastrophes are 
unrelated to “the larger forces that shape society.” It is true that classical analyses of disasters as 
events failed to consider the social conditions and processes that shape disasters; but we do not 
need to reject the idea of event in order to include this additional aspect. It is our understanding 
of what is an event that should be revisited, and for this we need to examine Historical 
Sociology.  
Philip Abrams was the first to claim the event as a useful category for sociology. Abrams 
argued that it is clear that the idea of a process is arrived at only by way of the idea of events, 
therefore sociologists interested in processes and structure should not leave them aside (Abrams 
1982). For him “an event is a portentous outcome; it is a transformation device between past and 
future. It has eventuated from the past and it signifies for the future” (Abrams 1982: 191).  
Sewell (2005), who is probably the best known defender of the event in sociology, argues that 
events are not an objective reality, but an observed reality that depends on cultural schemes (he 
follows anthropologist Sahlins (1976) in this). And finally Abbot, in a recent defense of the 
event, also argues that events are abstractions, opposing its definition to occurrences, the actual 
happenings that we use as reference points to indicate that an event has taken place (Abbot 2001: 
8). In order to recover the notion of events, then, we do not have to go back to classic 




To approach catastrophes as events in this dissertation I rely specially on the ideas of 
historical sociologist William Sewell, who defines events as “sequences of occurrences that 
result in transformations of structures” (Sewell 2005: 227). This means that there is a whole 
sequence of occurrences that constitutes the disaster-as-an-event worth of social science inquiry.  
However, not any kind of occurrence may constitute an event, but only those that significantly 
transform social structures (Sewell 2005: 100). Events studied by those who follow this eventful 
sociology approach have rarely been disasters but instead are typically revolutions and political 
unrest.
12
 However, the potential of the study of disasters for this type of research is clear. 
Interestingly, the very first sociologists to study disasters saw them exactly like this. Samuel 
Prince’s study on the Halifax catastrophe, aptly called Catastrophe and Social Change, describes 
a ship explosion in the Canadian town of Halifax, but also provides a detailed account of the 
recovery and changes after the event. He argues that people are intrinsically conservative and 
reluctant to change, but that disaster creates a “state of fluidity” that opens social life for change. 
He concludes that catastrophe always means social change, even if there is not always progress 
(Prince, 1920, p. 21). Second, Lowell Carr published a pioneer paper entitled “Disaster and the 
Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change” (Carr 1932) where he argued that a disaster “is not 
a single event or even a single kind of event: it is a series of events, linked one with another 
(…)”, and thus connected disasters directly to social change, arguing that: “social change is not 
an episode, a protrusion, so to speak; it is a series, a cycle of events no one of which is competent 
to represent the whole” (Carr 1932: 215-216). Unfortunately, although mentioned now and then 
as pioneers of the field, no one has built on Prince or Carr’s ideas on disaster. As usually happens 
with scientific fields, certain ideas and frameworks fail to develop due to the larger social 
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 While I have not found a single study on eventful sociology that specifically deals with a natural or technological 
disaster, the closest case is Wagner-Pacifici’s study on 9/11.   
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context, and in this case it was the World Wars and the Cold War that set the direction of the 
field on a different path.
13
  
Going back to Sewell and Sahlins, there are several points of their studies of eventful 
sociology that are of great importance for understanding catastrophes as events.  First, we need 
to re-think the relationship between events and the recurrent patterned arrangements that 
sociology calls structure. Sahlins critiques that “for a certain anthropology, as for a certain 
history, it seemed that ‘event’ and ‘structure’ could not occupy the same epistemological space. 
The event was conceived as anti-structural, the structure as nullifying the event” (Sahlins (1976) 
in Sewell 2005: 199). This critique could be directed at disaster studies without changing a 
comma; turning from disasters to structure (where the “larger forces that shape society” rest) has 
made them blind to disasters themselves. But for Sewell, as for Sahlins and Abrams, each 
category implies and requires the other; events are transformations of structure, therefore they 
presuppose structure. Because events are not just any occurrences but rather the specific type of 
occurrence (or sequence of occurrences) that produces change, they can be easily recognized as 
those occurrences that violate the expectations generated by structure. Moreover, their 
consequences can only be interpreted within the terms of the structures in place. If this is so, it is 
true that structures define events, that is, that disaster’s causes are within society. But, it is also 
true that events have the power to re-define and reshape such structures (Sewell 2005: 200). In 
the beautiful words of Phillip Abrams, “an event is a moment of becoming at which action and 
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 As I mentioned before, sociological research on disasters only took force after the 1950s, when the US Military 
started to fund it. Prince’s serious argument in his book that suffering was the medium for progress because it was 
inspired by the suffering of Christ may have also contributed to the lack of interest in his work. In the case of Carr, 
he was a systemic (System’s theory) and we all know what happened to those views in American sociology (they 
went nowhere).   
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structure meet. The designation of a happening as an event indicates that the meeting has been 
judged peculiarly forceful.” (Abrams 1982: 192).  
Second, Sewell’s eventful temporality assumes that events are normally path dependent, that 
what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of 
events occurring at a later point in time. However, events must be assumed to be capable of 
changing not only the balance of causal forces in operation, but also the very logic informing 
how consequences follow from occurrences; “because the causalities that operate in social 
relations depend at least in part on the contents and relations of cultural categories, events have 
the power to transform social causality” (Sewell 2005: 101). It is also fruitful to understand the 
relationship between catastrophic events and path dependence. Because of catastrophe, new 
options may become cheaper or easier due to destruction of previous infrastructure or sources of 
power, allowing decisions or negotiations to be made from scratch. Consequently, it has been 
argued that disasters should be seen as precipitants of critical junctures, loosely defined as a 
period of significant change that leads to new institutional legacies or sets the entire political 
system onto a new trajectory (Stuart-Olson and Gawronski 2003).  
Third, Sewell points out that one of the key features of events is that they are usually 
unexpected.  Change, says Sewell, tends to be clustered into relatively intense bursts. Events 
begin with a rupture of some kind, a “surprising break with routine practice” (Sewell 2005: 226).   
Risk sociology and its emphasis on disasters as a kind of social problem has failed to see this. It 
is precisely the fact that catastrophes violate the expectations of structure that makes disasters so 
empowered to change it. Most happenings, even if strange, can be absorbed by the existing 
structure and, rather than change it, they simply reproduce the structure in place. They can be 
explained as exceptions, repressed or simply disregarded, in which cases they reproduce 
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structure and should not be considered events. When this cannot be done, these happenings (or 
sequences of happenings) result in durable transformations of structure and become events. In 
these cases, events are also interpreted in terms of the previous structure, but they are so 
traumatic that by doing so they change the structure that provided the initial context for the 
occurrence. Therefore, moments of accelerated change are initiated and carried forward by 
historical events. Sometimes the events are culminations of processes long under way, but they 
typically do more than just carry gradual and cumulative social change to its end. They tend to 
transform social relations in ways that could not fully be predicted from the gradual changes 
before them. Therefore, if we want to understand a disaster as an event, we need to ask whether 
the unexpected rupture generated, accelerated or redirected structural change or not.  
Of course, we must take into account that disasters may effect changes in some spheres of 
social life and not others. Here Sewell’s view on events is also useful because he believes it is 
important to recognize structures as multiple. All happenings have the potential to reproduce and 
change structure, even at the same time. Multiple notions of structure allow us to follow the areas 
in which a disaster is more likely to produce change. Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
determine when a happening should be regarded as an event, rather than simply as an incident 
that reproduced existing structure. For example, an earthquake can reaffirm notions of gender, 
and nonetheless change patterns of class by destroying private property. Studies on eventful 
sociology have concentrated on tracing changes in symbolic and cultural schemas and modes of 
power, but we can also use this approach to understand changes in other areas as well, such as 
the political arena and institutions such as the state.  
In fact, assuming that events are normally path-dependent does not mean that causal 
structures are uniform. Radical contingency seems essential for an eventful view. “Contingent, 
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unexpected, and inherently unpredictable events, this view assumes, can undo or alter the most 
apparently durable trends of history” (Sewell 2005: 102).  However, contingency should not be 
confused with randomness. Contingency simply means that something is neither impossible nor 
necessary; it means accepting that things could have been different. To assume contingency does 
not mean that everything is always changing; on the contrary, even the most radical ruptures are 
interlaced with remarkable continuities. And structures that are transformed by events are always 
a transformation of previous structures (Sewell 2005: 103). But still, research in this dissertation 
will show that change is contingent on decisions and choices selected during these unexpected 
events.        
Closing on this issue, it is by looking to historical sociology that disaster studies can enrich 
our understanding of catastrophes’ relationship with social change, and specifically changes in 
the state. To focus on this aspect of catastrophe we need to recover the concept of disasters as 
events. Understanding disasters as events means it is necessary to place disasters in time, which 
can greatly enrich our understanding of how disasters are related to broader social processes, 
such as state-building.  
The Role of Physical Destruction 
Another important insight of Sewell’s theory for the study of disasters is the importance of 
the material world. One of the critiques that Sewell offers to Shalins’ theory of eventful change 
is that it does not treat material resources as part of the structure. For Sewell, resources are both 
human and nonhuman, virtual (symbolic) and non-virtual, even if their condition as resources 
capable of producing and reproducing structure is not wholly intrinsic in their material existence. 
“Nonhuman resources have a material existence that is not reducible to rules of schemas, but the 
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activation of material things as resources, the determination of their value and social power is 
dependent on the cultural schemas that inform their social use” (Sewell 2005: 135). Here Sewell 
is referring to the possibilities of, for example, a rock to become a talisman, therefore becoming 
an object of power. But I will argue that the same can be said of the environment (both natural 
and built) in which a community lives. Material things are resources for notions of race, gender, 
class, and power; including buildings, landmarks, urban spaces, etc. (Gieryn 2000). Sewell 
argues that the transformation of cultural schemas results from unexpected changes of resources 
(Sewell 2005: 217), which means that structural change does not appear on a purely cultural 
level, it is inextricably wrapped up with the marking, use, and dynamics of resources. Resources 
are dragged into new constellations of meaning when the course of action does not go as 
expected. This can be said of a talisman, but also of a whole city. As we will see in Chapter 3, 
once destroyed, the possibilities for new meanings and new distributions of power in space are 
endless.  
The spatial reality of disasters appeared to pioneer researchers as something obvious, but it 
has been obviated by notions that see disasters as socially constructed and allow a more diffuse 
definition for it. The Sociology of Risk in particular, has repeatedly argued that “nature no longer 
exists” (Beck 1995; Tierney 1999), implying that modernity means a type of control over nature 
that is, or could be, total. For sociologists, there is simply no such a thing as a natural disaster, 
since they are seen as completely dependent on human decisions (Squires and Hartman 2006). 
Quarantelli himself has argued that without vulnerable communities “an earthquake is simply a 
movement of land” and therefore “a disaster is not a physical happening, it is a social occasion” 
(Quarantelli 2006: 343). But there is really nothing simple about an earthquake; it is a sudden, 
unpredicted and highly destructive “movement of land.” Even if population is prepared to face it, 
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it involves a strong recognition of the uncertainty of human relations with nature, technology, 
and the physical world in general. Only someone who has never gone through one could argue 
that there is not a physical component to it. Of course, I understand that what radical 
constructivists want to highlight is that disasters reflect the social characteristics of the 
communities involved more than the characteristics of the onset agent. But there is no need to 
completely deny the role of the physical world in order to make such a claim. I will argue that 
the real issue is not whether earthquakes are either a natural or a social event; neither concept is 
broad enough to comprehend the whole complexity of the issue. Paraphrasing Abrams (1982) we 
could say that a disaster is an event is in which society and its environments (natural and built) 
meet; and the designation of a happening as a disaster indicates that the meeting has been judged 
peculiarly forceful.  
Conclusively, it might be a misnomer for sociologists to speak of “natural disasters”, but it is 
also true that a purely sociological (constructed definition) of disaster is unattainable.  In 
practice, a disaster always has a physical (non-social) component (Stallins 1995). This does not 
mean a return to old ideas about disasters as external shocks, but rather recognizing that the 
social is embedded in a material world and that physical or non-social factors are sometimes 
necessary for understanding human action and social processes (even if not sufficient) (Goldman 
and Schurman 2000; Pellow and Nyseth 2013). 
Unfortunately, sociology has shown little concern for the physical world, with the notable 
exception of environmental sociology.  Most of the body of sociological research is caught up in 
an anthropocentric ontology that is stubbornly resistant to the possibility that something different 
than “the social” can shape or influence human societies. However, Thomas Gieryn (2000) in his 
annual review “A Space for Place in Sociology” has revealed that social studies still show, 
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indivertibly, how materiality matters to social life: stabilizing and giving durability to social 
categories, arranging patterns of network-formation and collective action, embodying and 
securing otherwise intangible cultural norms, identities, memories and values, spawning 
collective action, among others functions.  “These consequences” – claims the author – “result 
uniquely (but incompletely) from material forms assembled at a particular spot” (Gieryn 2000: 
474). Gieryn does not deal in depth with the destruction of space, but he does explain how 
important space is to feel security and well-being and adds as a conclusion that “the loss of place, 
it follows, must have devastating implications for individual and collective identity, memory, 
and history” (Gieryn 2000: 482).  
Anthropologists in the field are the most conscious about this aspect of disaster. They see 
disasters as a “constructed feature of humans systems”, but are more sensitive to the fact that 
“disasters occur at the interface of society, technology and environment, and are fundamentally 
the outcomes of the interactions of these features” (Oliver-Smith 1996). And it is this scope of 
the role of the physical world in societies that has allowed anthropologists to relate disaster with 
the possibilities for cultural change (Oliver-Smith 1996; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999). In 
fact, physical destruction should be at the core of any study of catastrophes and social change. 
When we discuss the long term effect of disasters the real issue is whether this “forceful 
meeting” significantly alters the relationships between society and its environments, how people 
interpret and experience the changes in those environments, and how this change affects social 
structure. The fact that in catastrophe destroys infrastructure can have a vast impact on networks, 
culture, psychological health, family relations, etc. The sudden lack of bridges and highways can 
completely change the economy of a region. Scarcity of basic products can generate strong 
tension between competing groups. The lack of communications can affect the ability to control 
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parts of the territory. Overall, the sudden destruction of the physical space in which social life 
develops means either significant effort to go return to the prior status quo or the arrangement of 
a new normal, at least in certain aspects.  
Conclusively, when studying the roots of disaster a purely social definition might be 
sufficient, but one that examines its consequences must incorporate destruction. The 
environment (again, physical and built) might be a social construction, but it is one in which the 
physical world is crucial. Therefore I will argue that catastrophes should be seen as social 
occurrences as well as physical occurrences. Or, in other words, a social event in which the 
environment is crucial. The reality of destruction, debris and rubble is testimony enough of this. 
As I will show in the next chapters, decisions made after the moment of destruction will be 
embedded in this physical reality and therefore it must be taken into account.  
To summarize this section, the main contribution of sociology to the study of disasters has 
been the notion that disasters do not just happen, they are rooted in the structure of society. For 
sociology, there are no natural disasters, all disasters are socially constructed. This means that 
disasters are the consequence of human decisions, and more often than not these are state 
decisions. But unfortunately, this perspective has led sociology to replace the study of disasters 
with the study of risk almost completely (Quarantelli 2006). For the focus of this dissertation in 
particular, the idea that disasters should be seen as a kind of social problem is not useful at all. 
With this I do not mean that disasters are not the expectable product of broader social forces. I 
mean that to study disasters and their consequences we need to recognize them as events that are 
temporally and spatially situated, even if they are rooted in a broader context. Also, this will 
allow us to see the intrinsic connection between catastrophes and changes in the state. 
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CATASTROPHE AND THE STATE  
In this dissertation I will not deal with social change after catastrophe in every dimension but 
rather concentrate on the effect of catastrophe on state capacities and state-society relations. And 
as I have mentioned before, there is no concrete literature that directly concerns itself with this 
topic. However, we can conclude from the previous section that under the risk paradigm states 
are regarded as responsible for catastrophe. In fact, as I mentioned in the introduction, the state 
in the last century has been increasingly held accountable for disasters’ destruction (Moss 2002). 
People blame the failure of hazard management on the state’s inability to enforce appropriate 
regulation. Consequently, when things go wrong the state is put to the test. And what happens 
afterward? Do states become weaker or stronger? To approach this issue, I have taken as a 
starting point bellicist theories of state building.  
Catastrophes as War 
According to Tilly’s highly influential theory, “states make war and war makes states” (see 
(Tilly 1985; Tilly 1990). For him, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the 
central structures of modern states because of the creation of new and better state capacities. In 
this dissertation, I will argue that other type of “battles” and “threats” can have a similar effect. 
Mechanisms, I argue, are similar to war. Catastrophes prompt new efforts to increase state 
revenue, along with the development of new bureaucracies and administrative bodies to 
administer such revenue and implement the policies required to win the war (in this case “against 
nature”) and make reconstruction, and ultimately recovery, possible.  
Analyses of disasters using metaphor of war have been present since the beginning of the 
field of disaster sociology. The military were the first to take an interest in studying disasters; 
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their concern was to understand how people would react to a nuclear attack and saw the analogy 
as obvious. But the metaphor of war lost potential once sociology started to reject visions of 
disasters as external shocks, and moved its interest away from the moment of disaster itself. In 
truth, the comparison was not only forgotten but was strongly opposed by the constructionist 
approach that sees disasters as diffuse and focuses on studying their social roots. But if we 
choose to study catastrophes consequences, an analogy with war might be extremely helpful. 
War has for long been the subject of exploration by social sciences and research has easily found 
patterns and relationships with the building of state capacities. Such patterns are particularly 
relevant for the study of catastrophes. 
The comparison is plausible because wars are, in many ways, catastrophes. Certainly, there 
are important differences in spatiality and temporality; most catastrophes affect certain areas of a 
country while wars involve a whole country, and most disasters are sudden, while wars demand 
certain preparation. However, the two have important things in common. To start, both present 
significant disruption and threat to social order. Just as in wars, catastrophes threaten the state’s 
basic role of monopolizing violence, and hence to protect citizens from physical harm. This is 
especially true where disaster amounts to catastrophe. For survivors, there is a before and after a 
catastrophe; their lives have been turn up side down, sometimes quite literally, and they know it 
has been the end of the world as they knew it. Catastrophes, like wars, are “all-encompassing 
events,” sweeping across every aspect of social life (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999).  
Also, both wars and catastrophes are similar in that both pose the threat of violence for the 
population. Because the desired aim of war and state-making is essentially to provide protection 
to the population from such threats, it becomes plausible to compare the two. Tilly, himself 
claims that "efforts to war" are the first mechanism responsible for this state-building effect, even 
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before war has taken place. And Centeno, who has explored Tilly’s hypothesis in Latin America, 
has concluded that “war itself is not necessary; it is the threat of war that often produces positive 
state-building consequences” (Centeno 2002: 266). For example, Thies (2005) took this premise 
and explored the issue, finding that in Latin America the mere threat of war has had positive 
state-building consequences.  In Latin America, he argues, moments of “interstate rivalry” and 
“perceived threat” have had a positive effect on the state’s extractive capacity, especially in long-
term enduring rivalries. To make use of Tilly in other contexts, he concludes, we do not have to 
apply him literally. The idea of threat, then, is a clear link between wars and catastrophes. In the 
case of disasters triggered by natural phenomena, the threat is permanent and unavoidable. The 
state can manage the effect of earthquakes and volcano eruptions, but it cannot prevent them 
from happening. Also, even if good hazard management avoids one hundred percent of 
casualties, destruction of infrastructure is unavoidable in the case of tsunamis and volcano 
eruptions (at least today).  In this vein, studies have shown that the risks of disasters that have 
never happened to a population (or have not happened in a long time) are harder to construct as a 
believable threat; for example, the possibility of nuclear accident in the United States. In 
addition, we know that people avoid thinking about events whose probability is below a certain 
threshold (Kreps 1984; Stallins 1995; Klinenberg 2002). On the contrary, repetitive disasters 
such as hurricanes and earthquakes can be used consistently by the political system as a threat, 
especially in the period right after they have caused a catastrophe (Stallings 1995; Gill 2007). 
Furthermore, the logics of attribution of responsibility and guilt might work differently for 
different types of disaster agents such as technological versus natural, with natural disasters 
resounding harder on the state (Stone 1997). 
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And finally, another similarity between war and catastrophes is destruction. As in the case of 
wars, after a catastrophe a state must confront both reconstructing infrastructure and recovering 
economic activity. The state plays a pivotal role in both processes, not only by rebuilding 
infrastructure or loaning money to do so, but also by deciding what the framework that will 
guide this activity is going to be. And it is in this area where the similarity has been more 
commonly drawn. The aftermath of disaster is commonly compared to a post war environment. 
In Chile, presidents have used this repeatable narrative in post disaster speeches and it is a 
common place for the press to frame reconstruction (El Correo July 12, 1960; July 14, 1960).  
As this dissertation will show, discussions on how to “get back to normal” rarely mean exactly 
that. What we found is that a new “normal” is discussed, and at the center of this discussion is 
the material reality of debris. As I have argued previously, this destruction is crucial to 
understanding catastrophes’ effect on society. Other types of disasters with diffuse crises and 
without physical destruction may not have the same effect. Klinenberg’s (2002) description of 
the 1995 heat wave is a good example of this. In this case, officials denied there was a disaster in 
process, and it was not treated as one since damage was not visible or accounted for easily.  I 
will argue then, that the real issue is not the nature of the disaster agent per se, but whether or not 
it significantly alters the relationships between society and its environment (both built and 
natural). And, secondly, it is important to see how people interpret and experience the changes in 
those environments, which largely depends on whether they are perceived as a threat to the 
community and the survival of the state or not.
14
  
Of course, interstate competition is not something that wars and catastrophes have in 
common. That is, we do not have different rulers or nation states trying to kill each other, but 
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 A similar argument has been articulated in Kroll-Smith, Couch and Levine. 2001. “Technological Hazards and 
Disasters”, in Handbook of Environmental Sociology. Greenwood. 
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instead only one state facing the aftermath of destruction. Furthermore, in the context of 
competition between warlords, it could be expected that a catastrophe would be detrimental to 
the affected warlord’s odds of winning. In other words, catastrophe is not going to help a state 
fighting a war. Competition then, crucial in Tilly’s theory, is not present in catastrophe, at least 
not in the same way. Hence, Tilly’s framework needs to be rethought in order to truly 
comprehend other types of threats. Because this difference is so crucial that it might be 
considered to render the framework useless for this analysis, another possibility would be 
building a whole new one. I will argue that the resulting theory might end up evidencing 
precisely such a new framework, but to begin thinking about mechanisms for state-building Tilly 
and the bellicists are the best starting point.  
Concluding, using the bellicist framework to understand the effect of catastrophe on the state 
is reasonable because wars are similar to catastrophes in many ways. Certainly, there are 
important differences in spatiality and temporality, but to begin thinking about mechanisms for 
state-building this provides the optimal starting point.  
Catastrophe and State Building, How does it Work? 
As I explained in the previous section, the problems of war and catastrophe are different, but 
the threat is similar: violence and physical destruction. The difference presented by catastrophe is 
that it does not come from another group of humans, it comes from nature. Is it reasonable to 
expect states to react similarly to both? As I have mentioned repeatedly, there is no literature 
answering this question in the Sociology of Disasters. However, historians have dealt with the 
premise that controlling nature seems to be a force for state building in and of itself, even if no 
disaster has happened. For example, both in Germany (Warde 2006) and Spain (Wing 2015) 
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studies have shown that the modern state owes much to forest administration. The systematic 
management of forests grew along with the militarization and expansion of bureaucratic state 
power. The management of rivers has told a similar story of the development of state capacity; 
taming the waters has been regarded as crucial for India (Shah 2009), Taiwan (Ku 2011), and the 
expansion of the American states in the Midwest (Woten 2009). Also, studies show that since the 
nineteen century nation states have accepted an expanding agenda of responsibilities in relation 
to nature, both as a steward of natural areas as well as a protector from nature when it becomes 
threatening to people. Accordingly, the 20th century witnessed a spectacular rise in national 
activities to deal with the environment, many of them created after disasters. In the case of the 
United States, for example, the number of presidential declarations of "major disasters" has 
steadily increased over the past century, “federalizing the costs” of catastrophe (Platt 1999). (See 
also: Frank et al. 2000; Steinberg 2002; Moss 2002).  What this shows is that controlling nature 
is a problem that challenges states to be better states; it is –like wars- a test of state strength in 
which states must become stronger in order to avoid risking collapse.   
But how does this happen? Tilly claims that the central dynamic that links wars and state-
building goes like this: 
“the formation of standing armies provided the largest single incentive to extraction 
and the largest single means of state coercion over the long run of European state-
making. Recurrently we find a chain of causation running from (1) change or 
expansion in land armies to (2) new efforts to extract resources from the subject 
population to (3) the development of new bureaucracies and administrative 
innovations to (4) resistance from the subject population to (5) renewed coercion to 
(6) durable increases in the bulk or attractiveness of the state” (Tilly 1975:74 ).   
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In essence, Tilly’s argument is that war-making, extraction and bureaucracies to organize 
capital accumulation interacted to shape state-building. Wars require money, that is the bottom 
line. Money meant taxation and bureaucracies to collect and administrate this money, as well as 
to organize and fight wars.  I will argue that catastrophes work similarly; overcoming disasters 
and reconstructing infrastructure means money. To prevent catastrophes we also need money, 
but more importantly we need to severely regulate and restrict freedom for the population. This 
means states need to penetrate their societies further and further in increasingly complex ways in 
order to ensure compliance with new regulations. Then, to organize both reconstruction and 
disaster prevention, we need strong and reliable state bureaucracies. State bureaucracies are 
created or strengthened (given new responsibilities) to deal with the aftermath of catastrophes, 
and extraction is necessary to be able to fulfill these new state tasks, including paying for the 
personnel, and the materials, etc. Conclusively, it is plausible to expect that there is an 
interaction between disaster management, coercion and extraction that can also lead to state-
building (Illustration 3). 









Because of this interaction between threats, coercion and extraction, Tilly compares states 
with racketeers; someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction (Tilly 
1985:171). The threats against which a state protects its citizens are consequences of its own 
activities, essentially war risking. Similarly, I showed earlier that catastrophes are the result of 
state policies; vulnerability is socially produced, it depends on choices made by decision makers. 
The difference is that states can choose to go to wars in a way that it is not possible for 
catastrophes triggered by natural agents. But in both cases, the state uses this risk to tax and 
impose new restrictions in its population; all in the name of safety.  This is why wars produce a 
displacement effect that moves the accepted amount of regulation and extraction to a new –
higher- point. In this dissertation, I will show that catastrophes are also similar to wars in this 
way. As with wars, states do not create the threat of catastrophe out of nothing, on the contrary, 
they are mostly responsible for its consequences. But typically, governments are able to use 
catastrophe to be able to construct the notion of needing the state in order to confront it. When 
negotiating with different groups in society, the state has to argue convincingly that the best 
protection society can get from this threat comes from itself. Still, we know very little about tax 
policy changes after disasters. Catastrophes might affect the ability of the state to collect 
revenue, for example. It could prompt the state to create taxes (to pay for reconstruction), 
eliminate taxes (to help people pay for the rebuilding of their homes) or both. Also, rentier states, 
which derive all or a substantial portion of their revenues from the sale of natural resources, 
could see their sources of revenue greatly affected if the catastrophe hurt a critical industry. But 
aside from taxes, we do know that other regulations are usually the legacy of catastrophes; cases 
have demonstrated changes in security, housing, health and social welfare policies. As we saw in 
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many of such cases, catastrophes allow states to increase the level of regulation in all of these 
areas, sometimes forcing it to take control of issues it had no authority over before.   
Additionally, once a new tax is created or a new institution is put into action it is very 
unlikely that its creation will be reversed once the crisis is over. This is what Tilly calls 
displacement effect and others have called ratchet effect: “when public revenues and 
expenditures rose abruptly during war, they set a new, higher floor beneath which peacetime 
revenues and expenditures do not sink” (Tilly 1985:180). War making, claims Tilly, not only 
provides the main stimulus to collect more taxes at a specific moment in time (in Western 
Europe), they also set a new standard for acceptable taxation that remains after war is over.  The 
same happens with institutions and bureaucracies created for the management of these funds and, 
to be able to make war, they remain as active tools for the state. In catastrophes, we should 
expect the same effect. As I have found in the case of Chile, the state has never taken a step back 
after developing new institutions for catastrophe management.
15
    
Finally, like wars, catastrophes’ effect on state development can work through at least two 
mechanisms: imposing certain needs and being invoked to achieve political goals. In terms of 
needs, catastrophes highlight certain problems with security, communications, and construction 
regulation, among others issues. The second mechanism is political; catastrophes are used by the 
government as an excuse for achieving goals. It must be pointed out that these mechanisms are 
not mutually exclusive. CORFO, for example (the biggest institution created after an earthquake 
in Chile) was developed to deal with the recovery of the economy, a need by everyone's 
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 This effect probably happens after all increases in state power, no matter what causes it.  Higgs (1989  )  and 
later Landis (1999) have shown how, in the US, once state spheres of power grow they seldom take a step back. 




standards at the time. Yet, at the time people also remarked that the government used CORFO 
and the disaster to develop an import-substitution industrialization plan, a part of the political 
agenda they had been unable to accomplish prior to the disaster. As I will show in the following 
chapters, the effect of catastrophe on state building is stronger when both mechanisms work 
together. This is, when the earthquake happens during the term or rule of a government that has 
an interest in state building efforts.  
Catastrophes and State-Weakening.  
Unfortunately, we are also aware that sometimes catastrophes lead to chaos and even 
anarchy; Haiti’s 2010 earthquake is a good example of that. How can we explain this difference? 
I will argue that explanations of the failure of the war-state-making connection in developing 
countries will also shed light on the failure of the catastrophe-state-building nexus. There is little 
consensus as to whether the war-making-state-making connection works in other places and 
other moments in history aside from 18th century Western Europe.
 16
 Similarly, it is probably the 
case that the link between catastrophe and state building works only in a certain context. I will 
deal with this in the conclusions of this dissertation.     
CONCLUSIONS 
Catastrophes are social and physical events that have repercussions in the political, economic 
and cultural spheres. In other words, catastrophes are “all-encompassing events” that disrupt 
practically every aspect of social life. On one side, these events are inherently physical, in the 
sense that they involve great amounts of destruction of the environment, both natural and built. 
But on the other side, the causes of catastrophes are -at their core- social; they are always the 
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 To be fair to Tilly, he never claimed that his argument was universally applicable; it is clear that he sees the 
outcome of the processes he describes depend on timing and context.  
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consequence of human actions (or inaction). This is why the state appears as crucial to 
understand catastrophe, since decisions made in the pre-disaster moment are usually state-led. In 
other words, states today are considered the ultimate responsible when disasters happen. And yet, 
we really do not know what effect catastrophes have on the state, and this is what this 
dissertation aims to investigate.   
What I show in the next chapters is that catastrophes can have effects that are similar to what 
has been describe about wars and the state, such as disruption of the existing institutional 
equilibrium (for example, surrounding the state’s ability to extract revenue from society), the 
state’s legitimacy to establish standards (especially in areas related to housing but not limited 
thereto) and the possibilities for the creation of new state institutions. Paraphrasing Tilly, 
because sociology has demonstrated that states make catastrophe, this dissertation aims to show 
that the other part of his theory is also true. Much as states make catastrophes, dealing with 









Chapter 2 | CULTURAL SHIFTS  
 
“The morning of the 20
th
 exhibited a scene of greater distress. Only twenty houses and 
one church remained standing of that large town. All the ovens had been destroyed, and 
there was no bread: the governor had fled, and the people cried out that his sins had 
brought down the judgment. Some went so far as to accuse the government at Santiago 
and to say its tyranny had awakened God’s vengeance.”  
Maria Graham, Journal of a Residence in Chile During the Year of 1822 (1823: 312). 
 
This dissertation is about catastrophes being crucial moments for state building. At the very 
least, it should make it clear that this is the case for twentieth century Chile. But before we go 
deep into that history I will start by acknowledging that the state has not always been regarded as 
responsible for earthquakes and its consequences. As the testimony of Maria Graham shows, 
before modernity responsibility for catastrophe was looked for, quite literally, above the state. 
Disasters were understood as acts of God, and therefore misfortunes were not considered 
manageable. Overall, the assumption was that the disastrous consequences of an earthquake were 
not in the hands of society to prevent, with the possible exception of pious living. This 
interpretation of catastrophe meant a different approach to reconstruction and post-disaster 
management than current interpretations of disasters as ruled by the laws of nature, and therefore 
possible to comprehend and even to elude. As I have mentioned before, today we understand that 
it is because of bad planning and bad decision making that catastrophes happen, and therefore 
responsibility should be looked for on the ground. Disasters are no longer God´s punishment, but 
they constitute society´s failure. And increasingly, they are interpreted as the state´s failure or 
even a state crime (Mileti 1999; Moss 2002). Risk calculation, then, will appear in the twentieth 
century as the secular counterpart to the religious repentance program (Luhmann 1993). When 
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did this change happen? And how did it happen? What are its consequences? That is what this 
chapter is about.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
I will argue that this change of paradigm was carried on by disaster. Not any disaster, but 
some disasters in particular that happened at crucial times in history. It has been broadly claimed 
by disaster research that the “Great Lisbon Earthquake” of 1755 was the event that prompted this 
paradigm change in the West, heavily influencing the debate over modernity and deeply 
changing the history of Portugal. In Chile, this paradigm change starts much later, after the 
destruction of Valparaíso in 1822. This time, the disaster also affected culture at large and 
changed the history of the country. In both cases, the changes were reflected in the meanings that 
were assigned to the earthquake, prompting a reevaluation of existing explanations of God and 
nature. As a result, we see that after these catastrophes nature starts to be perceived as a force on 
its own and Man appears as a subject that can control these natural forces, or at least influence 
them.  
In the following sections I will use these two earthquakes to show the impact that 
catastrophes can have in culture, either prompting cultural changes or accelerating such trends. 
Specifically, both cases show how these catastrophes fueled the process of secularization and 
rationalization of their societies. Second, I will expand on how this paradigm shift is linked to 
changes on the role of the state in catastrophe, making it not only responsible for the assistance 
of victims but also placing it as accountable for risk management. And finally, I will expand on 





THEORIZING CULTURAL CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE 
No matter when or where they happen, catastrophes always occur within a specific social and 
cultural context that determines how they are comprehended (Dynes 2000; Oliver-Smith 1996). 
Survivors, who most of the times are much more abundant than victims, are faced with a 
complete change of their circumstances; their world has been turn upside down. And after the 
dust is down and the water has receded one of the main problems they face is: how to 
comprehend the misfortune of destruction and the fortune of survival? Additionally, in 
catastrophe this search for meaning is a collective endeavor; survivors share a common 
misfortune, they have been damnified.
17
 At that moment, social and cultural context plays a 
crucial role in constructing a narrative that helps make sense of the chaos brought about by 
disaster. Culture gives communities guidelines to deal with different situations, including those 
strange or surprising. In the words of disaster anthropologist Susanna Hoffman: “part of what 
drives a culture is not that new experiences do not enter, but that the lexicon in which to place 
new information captures it and transforms the new into the known” (Hoffman 1999: 302).  
Therefore, most happenings, no matter how shocking, are absorbed by existing cultural 
categories. In fact, research shows that even when confronted with a radical change in 
circumstances, like after major catastrophes, traditions, attitudes and styles of communication 
flow on with surprising normality (Hoffman 1999).  
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 “damnified : “(Law) to cause loss or damage to (a person).  From Old French damnifier, ultimately from 
Latin damnum, harm + facere, to make” (Collins English Dictionary). Unfortunately, the word damnified has almost 
disappeared from modern English, with the exception of rare legal texts and judicial orders. I rescue the word here 
because I find the distinction between been “damnified” and being a “victim” incredible useful in Spanish. While 
Víctima (victim) refers to “person who suffers damage attributed to external causes.”  Damnificado (damnified) 
refers to “those who have suffered collective damage” (www.RAE.es). The fact that damnified is preferred in 




However, cultural change undoubtedly occurs. Most of the time, this change is gradual, 
almost imperceptible and very difficult to command. But sometimes, change is abrupt and 
brought about by particular events. Marshall Sahlins, who rescued the study of events in 
anthropology,  has argue that the great challenge when working with events “is not merely to 
know how events are ordered by culture, but how, in that process, the culture is re ordered” 
(Sahlins 1981: 8). In other words, it is about understanding how certain occurrences change 
culture. The thing is, culture not always has the keys to absorb events and survive unscathed. No 
matter how fluid, paradigms sometimes cannot meaningfully interpret what is going on. “In the 
event they do not” –argues anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1981)- “the received categories are 
potentially revalued in practice. At the extreme, what began as reproduction ends as 
transformation” (Sahlins 1981: 67).  
Catastrophes have a special talent to push paradigms that way. What was once solid and 
reliable can be put off its axis (quite literally) in a moment; and when the Earth has stopped 
quickening and the water has receded, we should expect to see changes in the symbolic order as 
well as the material world (Oliver-Smith 1996; Hoffman 1999; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 
2002).  Anthropologists have repeatedly established this when studying the effect of disaster in 
different communities (Torry 1986; Oliver-Smith 1992; Bode 1977; Hoffman 1999; Germain 
2011; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002). In the words of anthropologist A. Oliver-Smith:  
 “it is frequently in extreme conditions, particularly those characterized by loss and 
change, that human beings find themselves confronted with difficult existential questions. 
The responses of disaster-stricken peoples invariably involve the moral and ethical core 
of the belief system and include a deep delving into concepts of both social and cosmic 
justice, sin and retribution, causality, the relationship of the secular to the sacred, and the 
existence and nature of the divine.” (Oliver-Smith 1996: 308).  
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What we see is that with disaster, the set of meanings and explanations that present sense 
may dissolve into debris as much as has the homes and churches that offered protection of other 
kind (and probably, precisely because of that physical destruction). True events, then, mean 
change. Its effect in culture can be thought in a similar way to the effect of trauma in personality 
(Langer 1958); some occurrences become events because they change us, they are in some way 
“the end of the world as we know it.” Only in this case, we are addressing shared patterns of 
interpretation and conduct, not individual attitudes. Sociologist K. Erikson directly calls this 
“collective trauma” and argues that it is not only due to the disaster itself, but also because of the 
destruction of the community because of disaster. In other words, the shock is also due to being 
ripped of the meaning that community used to hold (Erikson 1978).  
To study these cultural patters social sciences have coined different concepts besides culture, 
such as: mindset, mentality, discourse, paradigm and episteme (just to name a few). Roughly, we 
can say that the main difference between these concepts is the level of analysis; some notions are 
defined as very specific to particular communities (paradigm) or social actions (discourse), 
others encompass a whole civilization (episteme). Because it is a term more commonly 
understood by people of all fields, I tend relay more in the term paradigm. I understand paradigm 
in the broader sense that the word has achieved with time, not merely as a “disciplinary matrix” 
(Kuhn 1962) but as a philosophical or theoretical framework for knowledge. In its more 
straightforward definition, a paradigm is a pattern for thought and action, and that is what I will 
show in this chapter. I will also show that paradigms change when new data is simply not 
absorbable according to old beliefs. It is not that there is no accumulation, but that paradigm 
changes do not occur by accumulating data according to old theories until suddenly it becomes a 
new one. Instead, they happen in intense bursts.  
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Overall, this chapter tells the story of specific communities struggling to make sense of 
something extraordinary, and the consequences of the new paradigms that arise because of this 
“trauma.”  
THE GREAT LISBON EARTHQUAKE OF 1755, THE PARADIGM OF MODERN DISASTER 
It was the catholic holiday of All Saints Day. At around 9.40 am people in Lisbon were 
preparing for the celebrations; candles were being lit in altars and congregations were attending 
church services. Suddenly, the earth violently shook the city and the whole kingdom. The 
panorama was dreadful:   
Dozens were crushed by falling timber and a rain of marble as columns, capitals, 
arches, buttresses, and massive blocks of stone crumbled. Many rushed to escape 
to open ground, but some refused to abandon the church and frantically prayed 
and begged for divine forgiveness amid the turmoil, convinced that the end, the 
long-heralded Apocalypse, was at hand (Shrady 2009: 14). 
People ran for open ground in panic, only to be submerged by giant waves. And the final blow 
was fire, the debris of many buildings were ignited by the remains of candles, given rise to an 
intense inferno that lasted for five days and finished what was left of Lisbon.  At the end of it all, 
one of the largest and most important cities in Europe had been almost completely destroyed 
(Kendrick 1956; Brooks 1994; Braun and Radner 2005; Shrady 2008; Paice 2008).   
Seismologist estimate the 1755 Lisbon earthquake had a magnitude around 8.7 Ms, with 
epicenter in the Atlantic Ocean.
18
 By anyone´s standards this is a huge earthquake, releasing 
almost the same amount of energy that the 2010 disaster in Chile. But it is even more impressive 
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 According to data from de USGS (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1755_11_01.php). A 
report from the National information Service of the University of California (Nisee) argues that it could have been 
even 9.0 Ms. With epicenter in the Atlantic Ocean, about 200 km WSW of Cape St Vincent. (Nisee 1998).   
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for Western Europe, not considered a high-risk area for earthquakes and much less so for 
gigantic tidal waves (BGS 2006).
19
 Also, it is shockingly clear that the Lisbon catastrophe was 
one of the deadliest events in European history until then, with different sources placing the 
death toll in Lisbon alone between 10,000 and 100,000. Recent calculations have estimated the 
lower bound estimate as at least at 30,000 for the city alone (Pereira 2006).
20
 Outside of Lisbon 
the panorama was not much better; destruction and death was widespread throughout the 
country. Predictably, the economic impact of such damage was enormous; destroying between 
32 percent and 48 percent of the Portuguese GDP (Pereira 2006). Overall, it is clear that the 
event was devastating for the kingdom (Kendrick 1956; Brooks 1994; Braun and Radner 2005; 
Pereira 2006; Shrady 2008; Paice 2008).  
But the circumstances that lead the earthquake to be such a significant moment in European 
history cannot be found in the magnitude of the impact alone. In fact, there had been other 
remarkable disasters in the area previous to 1755, most notoriously the 1531 catastrophe that also 
destroyed Lisbon (BGS 2006). According to geologists, the intensity of the 1531 event was 
larger than the one in 1755 (Justo and Salwa 1998; Miranda et al. 2012), and yet, this previous 
earthquake was quickly forgotten. The 1755 disaster, on the contrary, left an imprint not only in 
Portuguese history but European history, arts, sciences, and culture at large. Even today, 
historical research about the event continues to unfold. So, why is Lisbon´s 1755 earthquake so 
important compared to other earthquakes?  
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 The Azores-Gibraltar transform fault (which marks the boundary between the African and the Eurasian 
continental plates) is not remarkably active, and tsunamis are even stranger phenomena in the Atlantic. But three 
or four other major disasters have been counted in the last 300 years that have affected the Lisbon Area (BGS 
2006). 
20
 Attempts to calculate the number of deaths are usually not reliable because of the destruction of almost all of 
the city records by the fire. However, A. Pereira (2006) recently obtained more rigorous estimates by combining 
several sources and correcting them using parish memories and other sources.   
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As eventful anthropologists and sociologists have shown, events will be different from 
regular happenings largely depending on how they are interpreted (Sahlins 1976; Sewell 2005). 
And this interpretation depends primarily on the existing cultural context. The Lisbon earthquake 
of 1755 happened at a moment in European history that we have come to known as the 
Enlightenment; a period characterized by -among other things- a break with tradition, 
particularly religious authority. For Foucault, this is the time right before the classical episteme 
collapses and the modern episteme takes form. It is, indeed, a period of change in the intellectual 
arena, with the birth of positivist sciences and the emergence of the notion of Man, as a factual, 
contingent reality. In this context, the Lisbon disaster was not so much interpreted in a particular 
way, but in light of a particular conflict. And in doing so, it heavily influenced the way this 
conflict moved on, and the following paradigmatic and epistemic changes.  
Philosophical Aftershocks 
At the time of the Lisbon earthquake Portugal was considered a backwater of the 
enlightenment, Lisbon a center of superstition and idolatry, and the young King Dom Jose I of 
Braganca a puppet of the Jesuits. According to Portugal’s historian C. R Boxer, Portugal was 
“more priest ridden than any other country in the world, with the possible exception of Tibet” 
(Boxer 1963: 189). In this context, the immediate reaction of some Portuguese people was to run 
into churches to seek God´s forgiveness, convinced as they were that the apocalypse was at hand 
(Shrady 2008). The King himself turned to prayer and repentance, since he was –apparently- 
completely disconsolate and paralyzed with fear (Brooks 1994; Shrady 2008). Priests, of course, 
took advantage of the situation and the very afternoon of the event found them walking around 
the city exhorting people to repent and confess their sins, in order to placate God’s wrath 
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(Kendrick 1956; Paice 2008; Shrady 2008). “Lisbon, people were told, had been a very sinful 
city indeed” (Kendrick 1956: 123).    
In this context, the Lisbon disaster became the opportunity for enlighten minds to spread 
their ideas, using the disaster as a starting point to question religious beliefs and Church power. 
The event opened a philosophical debate and received great notice by almost every intellectual in 
Europe, including Voltaire, Rousseau and Kant.  The discussion centered in the question of why 
God permits the manifestation of evil (problem of theodicy); and consequently, on the power or 
powerlessness of Men versus Providence (Bassnett 2006; Neiman 2002). The thing is, the 
catastrophe showed that God cannot be both benevolent and omnipotent. If God is able to 
remove evil, why did He let the disaster happen? If it was meant to be a punishment, is He not 
benevolent? Voltaire claimed that the earthquake should force us to accept that evil exists in the 
world, and sometimes prevails (Voltaire 1759). He particularly discussed this point with the 
optimists, Leibnitz and Pope, who thought that “whatever is, is right.” Examining this idea in 
light of the quake he asks: “if this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others?” 
(Voltaire 1759). He concludes that: 
In a world governed by the wisest laws / Lasting disorders, woes that never end / With 
our vain pleasures, real sufferings blend. (Voltaire 1755).  
Alternately, Rousseau believed that if we must choose between a benevolent God and an 
omnipotent one, we should justify His goodness and not His power (Rousseau 2007; Brightman 
1919). He expressed his view on a letter to Voltaire, arguing that “most of our physical ills are 
still our own work” (Rousseau 2007: 51). He then goes on with what is arguably the first 
definition of vulnerability:  
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Admit, for example, that nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to 
seven stories there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been more 
equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would have been much 
less and perhaps of no account. (Rousseau 2007 , 51). 
Hence, an important consequence of these philosophical questioning was that disasters were 
starting to be understood as social events (Dynes 2000). In Kant´s texts on Lisbon, we see the 
same logic undermining optimism but saving providence (Larsen 2006). “If humans are building 
on inflammable material” –asked Kant- “over a short time the whole splendor of their edifices 
will be falling down by shaking. However, is this reason to blame providence for it?” (Kant 
1756). The radicalism of this vision is that it completely differentiates God´s responsibility from 
nature´s responsibility, and most importantly, from Man´s responsibility (Larsen 2006; Neiman 
2002). For philosopher Susan Neiman, this shows that the distinction between natural and moral 
evil was born around the Lisbon earthquake (Neiman 2002). In her book Evil in Modern Thought 
she locates the beginning of “the modern” in the intellectual reactions to Lisbon, precisely 
because of the attempts to divide responsibility clearly. “Modern conceptions of evil” –claims 
Neiman”- were developed in the attempt to stop blaming God for the state of the world, and to 
take responsibility for it in our own” (Neiman 2002: 4). After Lisbon, Man recognizes that every 
single event, in all respects, is produced by himself, and “therefore must accept himself the full 
responsibility for its own hardships” (Kant 1756). After the 1755 earthquake, it will be the 
absence and not the presence of the divine in nature what will define modern philosophy. Instead 
of a divine thelos, it is the enigmatic character of nature what constitutes the condition of 
possibility for the human being to be really human (Larsen 2006: 364). 
With a different framework, sociology has also highlighted this, arguing that modern society 
considers danger from the point of view of risk, and takes it seriously only as risk. Risks are 
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different from dangers in one fundamental way, while danger is something that people undergo 
with no real control over it; a risk perspective assumes that the future depends on decisions to be 
made at the present (Luhmann 1993; Beck 1992). For Luhmann (1993), this means that risk is 
literally the functional equivalent for old sin, inasmuch as it can serve to explain how misfortune 
comes about. An explanation that manages without religion, an explanation that perceives the 
normal in the function of technology, in the conditions permitting rationality, and above all, in 
the dependence of the future in the making of decisions, is the mark of modernity. Risk 
calculation then, is the secular counterpart to the religious repentance-minimization program 
(Luhmann 1993). 
Conclusively, we can even say that what we call today “risk society” (Beck 1992; Luhmann 
1993; Giddens 1999) is born in the philosophical reflections after the Lisbon quake, and in part 
as a consequence of it (Larsen 2006; Neiman 2002). In other words, society –for the first time in 
history- sees itself as responsible for its own fate. The future depends on decisions to be made at 
the present. This, certainly, signifies an important change in the way disasters are viewed. If the 
present is a consequence of decisions made in the past and not God´s will, then who is taking the 
decisions that made the disaster possible or even necessary?  
The State´s Reaction in Portugal 
On top of the philosophical debate, sociologists have remarked that what sets the Lisbon 
earthquake apart from previous European disasters is also the reaction of the Portuguese state. 
Staggeringly rich, Lisbon was also the center of a huge empire, but colonial operations in Brazil 
were also being undercut by Jesuit control and British merchants (Dynes 2003). In this context, 
the earthquake provided a serious threat to the continuity of the empire and its way of life. And 
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yet, the King collapsed in despair. In the mist of all the turmoil one figure emerged: Dom 
Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, soon to be Marquis of Pombal. The earthquake was the 
defining moment in Pombal´s career (Maxwell 1995; Brooks 1994). The days after the disaster, 
he amassed an enormous amount of prestige, assuming a prominent position in the relief effort 
while the King cowered in a tent. Overruling the rest of the ministers, he became de facto 
dictator of Portugal. His immediate policies focused on three areas, to dispose the dead in order 
to avoid disease (which meant to disregard traditional burying rituals), to feed the population 
(which including controlling prices and distribution), and to ensure public order (organizing 
“district leaders”). But beyond emergency management, the earthquake allow him to become the 
facto prime minister, and gave him both the excuse and the power to do what he longed to do: to 
reform the Portuguese state (Brooks 1994; Kendrick 1956). 
First, the situation provided the stimulus (and the pretext) to reform the economy. The burden 
of reconstruction was shared by privates, the Church and the state, under close supervision by 
Pombal. Merchants donated plenty of money to rebuild infrastructure, but they were still forced 
to give 4 percent of their incomes on imports for reconstruction. Britons argued that they should 
be excluded of this tax according to the 1654 treaty, but Pombal denied their request.  Both the 
donations and the tax were used by Pombal for a new policy of industrial development (Maxwell 
1995; Pedreira 2005). From 1755 to 1769 fifteen new industries were established, including 
sugar, ceramics, paper, textiles, cotton and linen. According to Pedreira (2005, quoted in Pereira 
2006) “the afflictions caused by the earthquake of 1755, the fall in the inflows of Brazilian gold 
and the general difficulties of the colonial commerce, combined to make approve a set of 
measures that aimed for a reinforcement of the state, the increase of revenues and the reduction 
of the unbalances of the trade balance.” Conclusively, historians and economists alike agree that 
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the earthquake did not signify a permanent loss for Portugese economy, on the contrary, 
measures taken to revert the situation and the increase in demand for construction goods in the 
years following left Portugal in a better position in the long run (Cardoso 2006; Pereira 2006).  
A second set of policies was implemented by Pombal in order to reform the state´s 
administration. The relief and recovery effort showed the need for a centralization of operations, 
the economic reforms allowed reducing dependency on Britain dramatically (Cardoso 2006) and 
for the state to improve control of the economy (Pereira 2006).  Before the earthquake taxes were 
collected by many institutions with many layers of bureaucracy –the Conselho Ultramarino, the 
Junta do Tabaco and the Courts, among others (Pereira 2006). This allowed for inefficiency in 
revenue collection and did to allow the Crown to have an accurate picture of all its revenues and 
expenditures. The earthquake not only destroyed the main buildings of the treasury but also 
struck the lethal blow to this disordered situation. On December of the same year, the statutes of 
the Junta do Comercio were approved, the Royal Treasury was created and all royal finances 
were centralized. The construction program was also carefully planned from the center, every 
new building needed a permit, rent and wages were regulated (Jack 2005). Thus, while trying to 
take control of the catastrophe the Portuguese state achieved an impressive degree of 
centralization and power in quick speed.  
Third, Pombal aimed to weaken the influence of the Catholic Church in Portuguese politics.  
The fanatical preaching among the clergy announcing apocalyptical doom was increasingly 
irritating for Pombal. According to historians, even the King fell into despair, convinced as he 
was that God was punishing him (Maxwell 1995). And more importantly, the sermons were 
preventing people to go back to Lisbon and people were focused on prayers instead of rescue and 
renewal (Shrady 2008). Still, one third of Pombal´s orders where directed to reestablish the cult 
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and religious practices in the city, where only 5 out of 40 churches remained intact (Cardoso 
2006). This is not explained by any religious fervor but by Pombal´s political vision, he might 
not have been a faithful believer but he understood the power of the priests. However, acting 
against the Jesuits was also part of Pombal´s agenda, and after a serious of intrigues, they were 
expulsed from the kingdom of Portugal. The expulsion of the Jesuits also meant greater power 
for the state; a great part of the education system was now in hands of the state, the Inquisition 
surveillance powers were given to the police and the power to act as tribunal to public courts. 
Lisbon´s impact on broader culture 
It is difficult to believe that most people at the time were aware of this ‘philosophical 
earthquake.’ In fact, it is up to discussion how much of the Enlightenment ideas permeated to the 
population of Europe in general at the time (Chartier 1991; Brewer 2008; Caradonna 2012).
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And we know that superstitions thrived in Lisbon after the quake. Prophecies of further disasters 
abounded in all European cities, and aftershocks helped to maintain these claims. Nonetheless, 
the epistemological crisis was certainly not confined to intellectual circles. Voltaire’s poem on 
Lisbon was incredible popular, it was published six times in French in three months (Araujo 
2006). And other types of literary and artistic reactions abounded; sermons, drawings, theater 
plays, engravings, flysheets and popular songs, to name a few (Nisee 1998; Bassnett 2006). 
Really popular were witnesses’ accounts that were published in almost every European language. 
In them, the sensational nature of the event was heightened by the fanciful style of the writers, 
with highly emotional language (Murteira 2004; Araujo 2006; Bassnett 2006).  Considering it 
                                                          
21
 Chartier describes how Enlightenment thinkers contrasted their conception of the "public" with that of the 
“people”; "the opinion of men of letters" versus "the opinion of the multitude." Mona Ozouf goes beyond that and 
argues that public opinion was in fact defined in opposition to the opinion of the greater population, since ‘the 
public sphere’ was not really public by our standards, but a group of intellectuals that excluded women and lower 
classes. Even for Habermas, the ‘public sphere’ is described as a “reading public.” 
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all, it has been argued that the Lisbon Earthquake was very likely the first event to become major 
international news (Murteira 2004; Araujo 2006).
22
  
In terms of the impact in broader European culture, Neiman (2002) argues that impact of the 
earthquake in both the goodness of God (providence) and the confidence of humanity in the 
meaning of life (transcendence) was so profound that just the word Lisbon, was enough to recall 
the deepest shook and horror. A shock that is only comparable to the effect of the holocaust 
centuries afterwards (Neiman 2002).
23
 What was put into question was the broadly accepted 
assumption that moral and natural evils are causally linked. Sermons by charismatic preachers 
across the continent argued in favor of this link, with rival denominations having different 
explanations for God’s providence. Jesuits argued that it was a penance for Portuguese alliance 
to protestant Britain while Protestants saw the quake as a punishment for Catholic idolatry and 
the continued existence of the Inquisition (Bassnett 2006). These sermons echoed the general 
sensation of despair, the feeling of uncertainty and powerlessness that reign among European 
people. But unlike catastrophes before Lisbon, this time this vision was thoroughly contested. 
Not only had the enlightenment establishment opposed religion´s views through argumentation.  
For lay people, the shock led them to question the intelligibility of the world as a whole (Neiman 
2002). They were living in a world they simply could not understand. For example, something 
that is repeated in several accounts of the Lisbon disaster is the fact that Churches suffered more 
with the quake than bordellos. Reality did not fit their beliefs, their paradigms were crumping.  
                                                          
22
 This is explained in part by the power of the message, but also by coinciding new developments in print media. 
“Event reports” were printed on thick paper, folded into small pamphlets and sold cheaply. To a large extent, 
Lisbon is such a great event in history because of this overlapping with print technology. And, at the same time, 
newspapers and the book industry flourished thanks to the dissemination of Lisbon accounts ( (Araujo 2006a) 
(2006b) (Murteira 2004) (Espejo-Cala 2005) (Cohen 2013)) 
23
 Something that Adorno (1973) had already suggested (Ray 2004). 
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Overall, the earthquake in Portugal was certainly an “all-encompassing occurrence,” 
sweeping across every aspect of social life (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999). In Portugal, the 
tensions brought about by the earthquake shaped the state in a way that all the politics of 
previous years did not. Social and political problems did not change with the event, on the 
contrary, it was the same challenges as everyday life what came to light with greater clarity after 
the shock. With the earthquake, they became even bigger problems and needed a bigger power to 
manage them. After Lisbon the answer for these problems will be the state.  
Interestingly, and according to disaster expert R. Dynes, this and not the intellectual 
discussion caused by the “deepest shook and horror” is the primary lesson of Lisbon.  Disaster 
Sociology has followed Dynes line of thought for the most part. “While ideas always have 
consequences, changes in the structure of society, from whatever source, are more essential for 
change.” (Dynes 2005: 113).  As the argument goes, it is the advancement of the state what 
causes the cultural change on how we interpret earthquakes. In the words of Dynes: “the 
argument will be made that changes in the social structure of Portugal and its modernization was 
a more determinative factor in undermining the interpretation that earthquakes communicate 
God´s wrath than the intellectual and theological arguments which have come to be characterized 
as the Enlightenment” (Dynes 1997:3) This is because the states give us an alternative that is not 
only a narrative, but also substantial. It offers us protection of other kind. However, as I will 
show next, the Chilean case shows us that this is not always true. Even with no state intervention, 





THE VALPARAÍSO EARTHQUAKE OF 1822, THE FIRST CHILEAN DISASTER 
If the 1755 Lisbon disaster meant a change of paradigms to Europeans, it is the 1822 
earthquake that meant the same to Chileans. In a way, the discussion that followed this event was 
a continuation of the discussion of Lisbon, making it a good example of what Wagner-Pacifici 
(2010) has dubbed the “restlessness” of events. Great events, claims the author, are continuously 
transforming, taking on new meanings and traveling.  This will not only affect the meaning of 
new happenings, like the Valparaíso quake, but also add to the meaning of the original event, the 
Lisbon case.  
On the night of November 19, 1822, the officers of the Chilean Navy were making merry in 
Valparaíso on a day off. Around 10.30 pm the earth shook. It started slow, giving a good 
warning to Chileans who, unlike Europeans, live with earthquakes as constant companions. But 
the second shock, soon after, was stronger than any Chilean alive could have felt before. In a few 
seconds the city was reduced to a heap of ruins and screaming. At the shore, the ocean started to 
retreat, then hitting the port with three consecutives tidal waves. And then came the fires, taking 
whatever was left. Finally, when people thought nothing else could add to their wretchedness, an 
unseasonable heavy rain came, and with it came cold, mud, and disease. The ruin was complete 
(Graham 1824; Miers 1826; Vowell 1831; Miquel 1859; Cid 2012; Palacios 2015).   
The quake is believed to have rated a magnitude of 8.5 Ms. and was felt in almost all of 
Chilean territory at the time and even in Mendoza, Argentina (Lomnitz 2004).
24
 It was the 
biggest shock in almost a century, and it completely destroyed the most important port in the 
south pacific at the time (Ortega 1987). Nonetheless, casualties were fewer than what one could 
                                                          
24
 Chilean territory at the time did not include the Atacama Desert or “un-pacified” Araucanía.  
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image of such a large shock, although the exact number remains unknown. Out of roughly 
15,000 inhabitants in Valparaíso the time (Silva and Vargas 2013), the number of casualties 
reported varies from 150 (Miers 1826) to 700 (Adams 1835).
3
 However, eighteen century Chile 
was still eminently a rural country, and destruction in the haciendas (states) was never accounted 
for. As far as I have been able to gather based on different witnesses´ accounts, it is clear that the 
countryside was even more heavily shocked. Almost complete destruction of houses and rural 
infrastructure was reported in all surrounding areas of Valparaíso, including Quintero, 
Casablanca, Quillota, Limache, Illapel and La Ligua (Adams 1835; Miers 1826; Graham 1824; 
Vowell   1831; Bladh 1951; Montessus de Ballore 1912). According to William Bridges Adams, 
who made the trip from Quintero to Valparaíso by horseback the morning of the 20
th
, houses in 
the countryside were on the ground and the nearer the shore “the more frequent the marks of 
desolation” (Adams 1835).  Because of this, no provisions were brought to Valparaíso for several 
days, which caused great distress in the population and further economic loss (Vowell 1831; 
Bladh 1951). In fact, in terms of infrastructure damage was almost complete in the city; no 
church remained standing and some of the most symbolic buildings of the new nation, like the 
Aduana and the Intendencia, were totally destroyed. Most private houses were also in the ground 
(Thurn 1919). Valparaíso was entirely devastated; consequently, commerce in the port was 
totally suspended for the better part of two months (Nile´s Weekly Register 1823). In Santiago, 
chaos abounded and most public buildings were on the ground, but casualties were also low 
(Gazata Ministerial December 2, 1822). Aftershocks continued for months, with at least 36 on 
the first 24 hours. Wounded and homeless, people refused to leave the tents, or the ships, where 
they now lived. All around central Chile, panic and disorder was adamant as aftershocks 
continued for months.  It was Chile´s own “Lisbon.”  
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And yet, like in the case of Lisbon, the relevance of this earthquake cannot be fully explained 
by the physical characteristics of it; we need to incorporate to the analysis the important 
historical processes underneath. In this sense, the similarities between both events are strong, 
even though one was sixty years after the other. But in Hispanic America, the threshold of 
the nineteen century was a moment of dramatic political and cultural changes similar to 
European enlightenment (Collier 1967; Cid 2012). Politically, the earthquake struck the new 
republic of Chile when it was in the middle of a state building process. Unlike other Latin 
American countries, anarchy did not reign in Chile after independence. Supreme Director 
Bernardo O’Higgins was in charge since 1818, and had almost absolute power. Two days before 
the quake, he had just proclaimed Chile´s Constitution. But the independence war continued in 
the southern regions in the form of no-quarter warfare against the last royalist caudillos. Socially, 
Chilean society still maintained the rigid structure of colonial America. A significant but small 
European population gave Valparaíso a slightly less provincial air, but it was still rustic for 
European standards (Collier 1967). Culturally, the country had been almost completely isolated 
from the enlightenment trend; any opinion that was opposed to the official version of the Church 
had to be exposed only in confidence (Silva and Vargas 2013; Jocelyn-Holt 2001). 
Consequently, the Church possessed a “symbolic monopoly” of nature, being the only actor with 
legitimacy to interpret its forces (Cid 2012). So the first big catastrophe after independence did 
not only allow for scientific views to be discussed for the first time, but it also provided a 
momentum for liberals to openly question the Church.   
Intellectual discussions  
Reactions to the disaster among Chileans were largely the same as in the colonial era: the Church 
took over in interpreting the events as God´s wrath and organized processions and public 
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penitence to avoid further disasters (Graham 1824). Europeans in Chile were all very impressed 
by the reaction of Chileans when confronted with the earthquake: ¡Misericordia, Misericordia! 
(mercy!, mercy!), everyone seemed to cry at once, while falling upon their knees beating their 
breast violently. Like at Lisbon, the faithful run into churches to find not shelter, but forgiveness 
(Adams 1835). And after the emergency had passed, processions and penitence followed.  
“Superstition has been busy during this calamitous period,” wrote English traveler Maria 
Graham.
25
 Overall, there was so much catholic fervor that Protestants started to fear for their 
safety (Graham 1824; Adams 1835; Bladh 1951). Of course, we know that the same happened 
after the Lisbon earthquake, but that had been sixty seven years before. Europeans living in 
Valparaíso had a fair notion of the seismic theories circulating in Europe at the time, and were 
even familiar with the work of Humboldt in Latin America.
4
 On the contrary, they account that 
even among Valparaíso´s elite there seems to have been little knowledge of these developments 
(Graham 1824).  
But this dreadful panorama does not mean there was not intellectual activity at all. In 
Santiago, news and knowledge was distributed at the saloons and tertulias (social gatherings in 
private houses) where ideas were discussed and books were read out-loud (Silva and Vargas 
2013; Desramé 2008). Since independence, these “communities of readers” (Desramé 2008) had 
become more enlightened. In these circles, interpretations of calamity followed a very similar 
path than in Europe in 1755; the debate focused on the power of God over nature and whether He 
expressed his ire trough destruction.  
                                                          
25 Maria Dundas, later Maria Graham, and after 1827, Lady Maria Callcott. But because she was Maria Graham 
when living in Chile she will be referred as such in this dissertation.   
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In the center of this debate was Camilo Henríquez, a retired priest and intellectual of 
independence who was a supporter of the government. He tried to restore the spirits with articles 
in his newspaper El Mercurio asking for stopping public displays of penitence “and other 
medieval practices” (Henríquez 1822: 396).  This inspired other intellectuals to publish similar 
articles explaining that earthquakes’ causes were unknown but certainly natural. From this 
article, it is implied that this discussion had started at the tertulias where some of this pamphlets 
had been read as a speech.  The ones that got printed are, probably, the tip of the iceberg. Of 
course, these opinions earned these intellectuals a long time in purgatory according to Church 
officials (Amunategui 1872). But especially to Herniquez and his friend Bernardo Vera y 
Pintado, a poet as well as a philosopher, who in his most “Voltairesque” style expressed these 
ideas ardently in many articles and pamphlets (Vera y Pintado 1822a, 1822b, 1823).  
On the other side, priests were in the pulpits encouraging all kind of acts of penitence, and 
people were listening. According to Graham, Chileans were walking the streets almost naked and 
carrying enormous crucifixes (Grahman 1824). On top of this crusade was Father Tadeo Silva 
who was, like Henríquez, a well-known patriot. But unlike Henríquez, he was also famous for 
his pious personality and conservative views. He argued that the scriptures clearly claim that 
earthquakes are the consequences of God´s will, either as a punishment for human sins or, in 
occasions, as a warning to make amends (Silva 1822: 11).  He was not a fan of bloody penitence 
and fought some of the most horrible practices, but he was also very worried that if people 
embraced “these new indulgent ideas” about the nature of the disaster,  
“they will fall sleep in vice, and those who escaped danger will not think 
to rectify their mistakes, under the impression that they are not related to 
these horrible calamities” (Silva 1823a: 11).  
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At first, Henríquez had praised Vera in an editorial of El Mercurio, claiming that  
“his sermons choose to avoid further saddening and constriction 
to the hearts, already cut into pieces by grief and terror” 
(Henríquez 1822: 396).  
By praising Silva´s call to stop violence, Henríquez probably thought to bring the more 
conservative groups of Chilean population to his way of thinking. But if this was the plan, it 
certainly backfired. Silva was not happy with Henríquez´s interpretation of his sermons, 
especially because in the same issue of El Mercurio there was a speech by a philosopher “as 
sensible as he is pious” arguing in favor of the natural causes of earthquakes; specifically 
locating it in the internal caves of the earth. According to the newspaper, the speech had been 
read among friends and because of its popularity it seemed good to have it publish. The author 
was later known to be Bernardo Vera y Pintado.    
To this manuscript, Silva answered with a pamphlet, arguing that earthquakes were certainly 
the consequence of God´s will. Vera answered with all his poetic vigor, shockingly claiming that 
Silva´s notion of a “cuckoo God” was used by the Church to maintain people subdue (Vera y 
Pintado 1822b).  His essay, also distributed in the form of a pamphlet, was not antireligious in its 
nature, but strongly anticlerical. It argued along Rousseau and Kant that God gives freedom to 
nature and does not use it to punish society. The inevitable consequence of this argument was 
that there was no point in the processions and penitence organized by the Church. In line with 
Rousseau and Kant before him, he argued that people should better  
“take care of staying away from walls and rafters “and do not trust 
that with blood we will make the Sun not burn, or the earth not 
move” (Vera y Pintado 1823).   
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He adds as a note that it is painful to see that “in this century” intellectuals in South America are 
discussing this kind of issue, already solved by “more enlightened minds” in Europe. With these 
strongly anticlerical comments the discussion got passionate. What was at stake was not only the 
tension between the omnipotence and benevolence of God, but also the limits of tolerance in the 
new Republic. “Where this discussions, recently prohibited, going to be permitted in the new 
independent Chile?” asked the priests from their pulpits.  
Camilo Henríquez used El Mercurio to fuel the nature hypothesis. In an extended essay he 
expanded on the issue, quoting Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu, and calling them “The 
Apostles of the Intellect” (Henríquez 1823). Hernandez had read these authors while living in 
Europe. And yet, he does not comment much about what exactly is the natural mechanism of 
earthquakes. More likely, by quoting these authors he was trying to introduce a secular 
foundation for truth, since so far the discussion had mostly used the Bible as proof for this or that 
argument.  
Here, the controversy had reached a boiling point and another response was quick to come. 
Arguing that European philosophers were “The Apostles of the Devil,” Fray Tadeo Silva called 
Camilo Henríquez’s religiosity into doubt, publishing a series of pamphlets that asked for the 
ostracism of Henríquez (Silva 1823). He continued to preach that God was behind the 
earthquake, and that it was only because of the prayers of the religious orders in the country that 
another disaster had been avoided. If, instead, Chileans feel in the ideas of “The Apostles of the 
Devil,” another disaster was sure coming. But Henríquez did not go down, on the contrary, he 
wrote back, this time with the support of different personalities and intellectuals, with even some 
Argentinean writers joining the discussion in his favor (Lafinur 1823). And thus, the discussion 
was very much alive for more than a year (Amunategui 1938; Lafinur 1823).  
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The State´s Reaction in Chile. 
Unlike the philosophical aftershocks, there are significant differences between the Lisbon´s 
disaster and the Chilean case in terms of the state´s response. For one side, it is true that in both 
countries the state was struggling to accommodate to the challenges of modernity while the 
Catholic Church still had an enormous power. And culturally, both countries were going through 
a moment characterized by the emergence of new modern ways of interpreting the world, 
challenging old answers given by traditional religious thinking. But still, by 1822 Chile was a 
republic being created, while Portugal in 1755 was already an old country and a huge empire. 
There is certainly a difference in state capacity. In Portugal, one man –Pombal- had a stronger 
machinery to put into motion, even if this machinery was heavily out of date (for European 
standards). In the case of Chile, O’Higgins had much less to work from. Because of this, and the 
fact that he was seriously injured during the quake, his attempts to control the situation were 
mediocre at best.      
Also, O´Higgins barely survived the 1822 earthquake, having been miraculously dragged out 
of Valparaíso´s Intendencia by his aide-de-camp. Even so, his injuries were the least of his 
problems. The Supreme Director was a hero of the revolution; a soldier, not a politician. He was 
a practical man who did not know how to run the country once it was free of war. He was also a 
highly educated man, with progressive ideas (Collier 1967; Vicuña Mackenna 1860). He 
believed in a strong government that focused on education, protected civil liberties and, over all, 
allowed its citizens to be happy (Collier 1967). He was also a liberal, allowing Protestants to 
settle in the country and energetically fighting the privileges of the aristocracy and the Catholic 
Church. Overall, he had very similar goals as Pombal. But unlike Pombal, by the time of the 
earthquake he had been in power for six years. He was tired, in constant tension with the 
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aristocracy, the Church and the provinces and facing criticism for the bad situation of public 
finances and the fact that he insisted to maintain in his position an unpopular minister for the 
treasury. In the words of historian Simon Collier, by 1822 the libertador was still much loved, 
but his government was not (Collier 1967).  
The crisis generated by the earthquake was just the last drop of discontent among the 
population; people literally blame O´Higgins for it (Vicuña Mackenna 1860). Priests in different 
parts of the country assured that it was his agnosticism and commitment to religious freedom 
what had caused God’s rage. The idea of O’Higgins being guilty of the earthquake itself was 
more important than his ability to manage the chaos afterwards. In this context, social unrest was 
very difficult to separate from religious fervor. Political consequences were not framed in the 
context of responsibility but that of guilt. O’Higgins was not held accountable because he was 
found incompetent, but because he was believed a sinner. Chilean historian Vicuña Mackenna 
was the first to highlight this point in a footnote of his 1860´s biography of O’Higgins, claiming 
that “the catastrophe meant new political complications, not because of the disaster itself but 
because the causes that superstition attribute to it” (Vicuña Mackenna 1860: 460). And the main 
sin that was attributed to O´Higgins was his toleration policies with Protestants (Vicuña 
Mackenna 1860; Barros Arana 1884; Bladh 1951). Now, the priests were putting the blame of 
the earthquake in his door because of these reasons.   
Unfortunately, neither he nor the Chilean state were strong enough to take over the challenge 
of the earthquake. Still, O’Higgins organized the first emergency efforts from a tent in 
Valparaíso´s hills. But he was injured, and in the middle of a political crisis, so he quickly moved 
back to Santiago, leaving the chaos in the hands of Valparaíso´s Intendant. When O’Higgins 
arrived to the capital, six days after the quake, he saw the processions and the show of the 
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penitents on the streets. Under the pressure of the Church, the ministers had decreed a cessation 
of any public amusements, claiming that “it is necessary that everyone that is not in the presence 
of an obstacle to attend services and raise his plea to placate God´s wrath” (Gazeta Ministerial 
Nov 27, 1822). Disappointed, he decided to forbid the worst displays of religious fervor, which 
only fueled those who claimed his known agnosticism was to blame for the whole disaster 
(Barros Arana 1884). Trying to take control of the situation, he decreed that a commission 
should cadaster of the damage in each public building (Gazeta Ministerial Dec 2, 1822). And 
then, he retired to his country house to recover. In the weeks that followed, the crisis only 
augmented. The provinces organized to take over the government at Santiago, and in the capital 
discontent was buoyant. By January 1823 O’Higgins abdicated to his position as Supreme 
Director to avoid a civil war.  
For the new government, led by Captain Ramon Freire from the southern region of 
Concepcion, earthquake recovery was not an issue. In the next months there was nothing done, 
except to comply with the resolution of the commission set by O´Higgins and issue an order to 
demolish every unstable building that the cadaster had identify, even some private buildings. In 
Valparaíso Governor Zenteno organized the cleaning of the streets and asked architect Alberto 
Baeler de Albe to trace a new plane for the port. But six months after the event, British citizen 
Mr. Proctor described: “When we arrived Valparaíso exhibited a most melancholy spectacle, in 
consequence of the late earthquake (…) nearly all public buildings were a heap of ruins” (Proctor 
1895: 107).   
Valparaíso´s Impact on Broader Culture 
It is not easy to grasp the lasting impact of the 1822 disaster and the intellectual discussion 
that followed. Consequently, first we should question if the event was actually such a big event 
77 
 
at all. Following Sahlins, we have established that events will be different from regular 
happenings because they prompt change. So the question to be asked is: what changed after the 
1822 earthquake? Is it comparable with the Lisbon earthquake of 1755? Truth is, there is little 
evidence of how much of this discussion reached outside the “circles of readers.” For instance, 
Europeans in Valparaíso seemed to have been totally unaware of Hernandez´ writings (maybe 
because of the language barrier). But we do know that Silva´s sermons were incredible well 
attended, especially by women, as he is mentioned in letters at the time (Quiroz 1987). Since the 
main aim of Silva´s speeches was to contradict the “apostles of the devil,” we could assume this 
meant that their ideas had spread at least some.  
Also, one important difference with the Lisbon case is that the European event happened at a 
moment where journalism and the press were having a tremendous boost. And to a great extent, 
Lisbon was such a great event because of this overlapping with print technology (Araujo 2006; 
Murteira 2004). On the contrary, in Chile there were only two public prints in the whole country 
by 1822 (Subercaseaux 2010). In this case the earthquake had an effect by developing the press 
and printing materials. After a year of pamphlets two new permanent bulletins had been created 
to defend these ideas; Liberals founded El Nuevo Corresponsal, and Silva created El Observador 
Eclesiástico. Both were short lived bulletins, but they transformed into new ones that defended 
the same ideas. They were not specifically about the nature of earthquakes, but more broadly, 
they were created to discuss the role of the Church in the new republic. For this, the debate about 
the earthquake was crucial since it centered strongly on the possibility of avoiding catastrophe by 
penitence (or not). Therefore, the nature hypothesis not only put into question God´s power over 
nature, but the power of the Church to command how to restore order after the events. This is 
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why liberals fought so hard to keep the discussion alive; in its center there was a negotiation the 
borders of freedom of speech at the new republic.       
And yet, the development of a true social science view as described by Neiman and Luhman 
was slower than in Portugal. Disasters were increasingly seen as a natural phenomenon, but they 
were still considered a force that was not manageable. The consequences of nature´s forces were 
seen as something of manifest destiny or “fateful evolution” (devenir infausto), as historian 
Rolando Mellafe has described Chilean history (Mellafe 1981). However, a risk perspective will 
still emerge, only slower. An example of this is a letter, written by “a concerned citizen” to 
newspaper El Mercurio in 1828, when a smaller quake hit the country again; if earthquakes have 
natural and not divine origins, he asks: “what is the Government doing in respect to 
earthquakes?” (Montessus de Ballore 1912). Then, by 1935, when another earthquake hit the city 
of Concepción, public expressions of penitence and religious fervor shows a significant decline 
(Palacios 2014 2015). Testimonies of this earthquake are significantly void of accounts of public 
religious fervor. Of course, priests continued to argue for the hypothesis of the wrath of God, but 
a greater number of people criticized this interpretation, and authorities were reluctant to 
authorized public displays of penitence (Palacios 2014). In fact, a priest who became famous 
preaching new disasters was denounced to the bishop by some churchgoers and he was ordered 
to keep quiet. Also, at the time of the 1835 earthquake a more scientific view on earthquakes was 
strongly established; for example, a committee of scientists was created by the state in order to 
analyze why Concepción was the focus of so many earthquakes (Campos 1979).  Hence, by the 
next catastrophic earthquake a risk perspective was already being developed more fully. It is 
clear that the enlightenment trend had keep going after the 1822 disaster boost, and largely 
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because of it. And at the end, the state had to consider catastrophes as its full responsibility, as 
the reconstruction plan of Valparaíso in 1906 will show.   
CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this dissertation I argued that catastrophes are true events because they 
have the power to change the structure of society. In this chapter I showed two of the most 
paradigmatic cases of this: the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and the Valparaíso earthquake of 
1822. Both cases are of enormous relevance to understand cultural changes in their respective 
societies. And both point out to the same processes: secularization and rationalization of cultures 
that were highly religious and became less so because of the event. In the long term, this change 
of paradigm will mean the development of a full social science view of disaster that sees them as 
society-made. And, as the next chapters will show, this will also be accompanied with a full risk 
management program that tries to control disaster damage as much as possible and that will 
certainly reverberate in the state.  
Taking this into account we can safely conclude that catastrophes have the power to change 
society in ways that could not have been imagined before. It is true that the timing of the Lisbon 
and Valparaíso quake is crucial to understand the discussion that followed, but changes cannot 
be seen as a mere consequence of the Enlightenment. In both cases, it is not only that events 
were interpreted according to a certain culture, but they were interpreted in light of a particular 
conflict, and thus, they affected how this conflict moved on. In concrete, the earthquakes 
provided an opportunity for the Enlightenment to expand, offering an alternative explanation to 
catastrophe to that presented by the Church. What the cases show is that a previously gradual and 
measured process of secularization explodes after something exceptional happens. The 
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traditional paradigm is suddenly and irrevocably not enough to explain events. And even though 
the Enlightenment is an unrepeatable moment in the history of the West, in the following 
centuries catastrophes disrupted existing beliefs in similar ways. Religion is no longer a major 
ideology but catastrophes are challenging our faith in development in similar ways (Dynes 
2000).  
However, these two cases present some differences, especially in terms of the role of the 
state in reconstruction. Truthfully, both state leaders collapsed –the King and O´Higgins- but 
Portugal´s disaster allowed for Pombal´s leadership to take form. However, it is not the argument 
here that the true event was Pombal himself. I will argue that inasmuch as Pombal´s figure was 
crucial, it is impossible to dismiss the power of the quake. Principally because Pombal´s position 
before the earthquake was shaky at best (Brooks 1994; Maxwell 1995). If we observe the most 
important laws introduced by him before and after November 1755, it is clear then that the most 
important changes occurred after the quake. Even for Pombal, the main argument for these 
politics was not nationalism or the enlightenment but the earthquake. He knew well that he 
owned his momentum to the disaster, and was constantly afraid that laws should be passed fast, 
before the flexibility of the population towards regulation would pass (Brooks 1994; Maxwell 
1995; Dynes 2005).  Also, with the earthquake some decisions could be made from scratch, path 
dependence was broken and new opportunities roused. Conclusively, it is practically impossible 
to separate Pombal from the earthquake since Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo became the 
Great Marquess of Pombal because of it. 
But the fact remains that the Portuguese state dealt much better than Chile after the 
catastrophe. The sociology of disaster, in particular, has argued that it is this aspect of Lisbon 
what marks the changes of mentality in Europe. In other words, authors have claimed that 
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changes in the conception of the meaning of the disaster occurred from the state-led emergency 
response and not the other way around (Dynes 1997). But the Chilean case shows that even with 
no state intervention there is, in fact, a change in mentality in the country. The interpretation that 
God was behind the earthquake lost ground in Chile after 1822; and furthermore, the 
advancement of liberal ideas reverberated on the state in the long term. Therefore, another 
conclusion of this chapter is that ideas matter. As Blyth (2002) has shown in other contexts, 
ideas matter especially in periods of crisis, because they determine the path that will be taken to 
try to fix what has been wrong. “Agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize and impose on 
other their notion of what a crisis actually is before collective action to resolve the uncertainty 
facing them can take any meaningful institutional form” (Blyth 2002: 9). In other words, because 
ideas diagnose “what was wrong” they influence the way people thing “what is to be done.” 
Therefore, in the topic at hand, the interpretation of the earthquake as product of the natural 
forces is in itself relevant for the development of a modern management program on disaster. 
The idea that the laws of nature explain earthquakes may not be as consoling as an all-powerful 
God, but it can give people a different hope for control over nature. And certainly, it explains 
how misfortune comes about (Luhmann 1993).  
In the case of Chile, this was not the immediate reaction to the earthquake, but a process in 
which the state had to deal with increasing demands on disaster response and risk management. 
But, as I mentioned before, by 1835 the state did had another role in disaster management and by 
1906 we will see a full reconstruction plan being led by the state. In the next chapters, I am going 





Chapter 3 | POLITICAL AFTERSHOCKS 
 
“Chile has an earth tremor on the average of once every two days and a 
devastating earthquake every presidential term. The least apocalyptic of 
geologists think of Chile not as a country of the mainland, but as a cornice of the 
Andes in a misty sea, and believe that the whole of its national territory is 
condemned to disappear in some future cataclysm. However, even with that 
skepticism in the background, or maybe because of it, Chileans have achieved a 
natural civilization, a political maturity and a high culture that constitute their 
best exception.” 
Gabriel García Márquez (1974) Chile, el Golpe y los Gringos. Editorial Latina  
 
Shifts happen. Along fault lines, shifts happen every day. They happen with no rationality, no 
agency and no political purpose. And yet, when a shift causes a catastrophic earthquake, the 
aftershocks are deeply political. Disasters multiply social demands and overload political 
systems, all the while disarticulating economies and revealing the administrative and moral 
deficiencies of agencies and governments (Drury and Olson 1998). Because they are “all-
encompassing events” (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999), sweeping across every aspect of social 
life, catastrophes are moments when institutions and social arrangements are put to the test, and 
efforts to “go back to normal” rarely mean exactly that. Instead, catastrophes present themselves 
as an opportunity to design new political and institutional arrangements. In other words, 
catastrophes are usually true events in the political realm, marking a before and after for many 
political institutions and sometimes for whole institutional regimes.  
In Chile, as Nobel Prize winner Gabriel García Márquez has poetically described, the earth 
shifts devastatingly nearly every presidential term. Sometimes, the epicenter is far enough from 
big urban centers that such President has a minor disaster to deal with, but often enough the earth 
has leveled half the country. As I started to show in Chapter 2, these major catastrophes have 
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been pivotal moments for Chilean history; earthquakes have forced Chileans to be strong or to 
face the risk of collapse.  During the nineteenth century the incipient Chilean state was fortunate; 
only two such events happened in major urban centers, the previously discussed destruction of 
Valparaíso in 1822 and the ruin of Concepción in 1835. But twentieth century Chile was more 
populated (the 1907 Census counted 3,249,279 habitants, three times more people than in 1835), 
more urbanized (although 51 percent of Chileans still lived in the haciendas in 1907) and 
economically more diverse (with strong mining and incipient industry). In this context, the 
damage caused by earthquakes was supreme. But, as I will show in the next sections, the state 
responses were also impressive, and were formative in helping it become what it is today.    
In this chapter, I will deal with the political consequences of the three biggest catastrophes in 
the history of Chile. The three cases analyzed are: the “Sad Night of 1906”, the “Big Earthquake 
of 1939” and the “Cataclysm of 1960.” These are the only catastrophes in the country 
comparable to the recent 2010 earthquake in Maule. In each of these instances the country was 
reduced, literally, to rubble on the ground. For the analysis I will use various available sources, 
but I will focus in particular on the proceedings of the Chilean National Congress and reports 
from newspapers, both national and regional. While describing the events and their unfolding in 
the political realm, I will focus in how these catastrophes where handled by the state and the 
social consequences of the options chosen. As we will see next, all three cases are different, but 
in all of them we can see that post disaster politics have been times of contestation, where the 
state was forced to take action and decide important issues in a vacuum. Especially at the local 
level, disasters have meant true critical junctures, a moment when change was not only discussed 
but implemented. Overall, we will see that “going back to normal” never means exactly that. 
Instead, a “new normal” is created.   
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THEORIZING POST DISASTER POLITICS 
For historians, the fact that catastrophes have important political consequences is well 
known. Most of the cases of disaster studied by scholars in this area address this issue in some 
way, shedding light on the topic of this dissertation. But unfortunately, political analysis has 
been downplayed in the field of Disaster Studies to the point that some refuse to believe there 
should be a politics of disasters at all (Pelling and Dill 2009). Disasters, the argument goes, 
should be apolitical and rationally managed. Unfortunately, cases show that the opposite is true; 
catastrophes are deeply political. Even if social solidarity arises in the emergency phase, in the 
reconstruction phase the picture is one of overwhelming social conflict, and different social 
actors competing for power. As a result, the political arena can be greatly shaken. One of the 
reasons this happens is that catastrophes are contexts in which power relations can be more 
clearly perceived, and when these relations are considered unjust or unreasonable it can lead to 
confrontation.  
Examples of how reconstruction processes may become an arena for contestation abound. In 
Shaky Colonialism, historian Charles F. Walker shows how the aftermath of the 1746 
earthquake-tsunami in Lima, the heart of Spain’s territories in South America, affected the 
stability of the crown, as the lower classes were desperate and the upper class saw a chance to 
press for independence. Similarly, Stuart McCook studied an earthquake in revolutionary 
Venezuela (1812) that presented a disaster that generated so much political anxiety and 
economic needs that royalists manage to win the state back from the libertadores (McCook 
2009). The independent government already faced financial pressures before the disaster, and 
then post-disaster was unable to provide relief to victims. On the same theme, the 1985 
earthquake in Mexico City, one of the most studied cases, is widely signaled as a socioeconomic 
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and political turning point due to the subsequent social unrest that challenged decades of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) de facto monopoly of the political arena. There is 
discussion as to whether the earthquake triggered or simply accelerated these processes, but the 
surprisingly limited capabilities of the PRI-state to deal with the event certainly opened the 
political space for contestation (Olson and Gawronski 2003; Walker 2009). And even if not all 
cases studied by historians show the same amount of political contestation, they still show that 
the post-disaster period is usually a time when new political agendas and demands are generated 
or strengthened, empowering some groups and debilitating others. For example, historian Mark 
Healey (2011) demonstrates that the 1944 San Juan earthquake launched Juan Domingo Perón to 
the national political scene, and John Barry (1998) presents a similar argument about the Great 
Mississippi flood of 1927 and Herbert Hoover´s career. Not only people can acquire or lose 
power due to catastrophe; Felix Germain (2011) has shown how churches have gained power in 
post-catastrophe in Haiti and Jon Shefner (1999) has studied the case of environmental groups in 
Mexico after the Guadalajara explosions. All of these cases show how catastrophes most 
certainly call into question prevailing political and social consensus, and can lead to periods of 
re-negotiation of institutional arrangements. 
Furthermore, as this dissertation aims to show, some cases point out that disasters can be the 
perfect excuse for the state to expand, become stronger or affirm its autonomy. One of the 
paradigmatic cases is the previously mentioned Lisbon earthquake of 1755, where the 
Portuguese state responded in a way that increased centralization of power and developed 
important institutional capacities. More recently, Vivian Y. Choi has shown that the Sri Lanka 
government actively used the tsunami threat to take control of the east coast of the island, 
occupied by insurgents (Choi 2015). In a similar vein J. Kreutz has suggested that the Indian 
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Ocean tsunami in 2004 paved the way for the peace agreement that settled the separatist conflict 
in Indonesian Aceh (Kreutz 2012). Kreutz also studied other cases and concluded that natural 
disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks to agree to ceasefires, especially in 
democracies with separatist movements because expectation for relief is more acute. He believes 
that the mechanism for peacemaking is not a “sense of solidarity” but the need to redistribute 
resources from war toward disaster relief (Kreutz 2012). And finally, a small number of studies 
have sought to identify general trends in disaster politics. José M. Albala-Bertrand’s study may 
truly be the only case. After analyzing the political consequences of disaster in developing 
countries he concludes that a highly centralized response to disaster is more efficient and has 
better levels of popular support than decentralized responses. Also, Albala-Bertrand concludes 
that if pre-disaster conditions are fluid, a large disaster may be crucial for deciding which 
direction the political regime will take. The research presented in this chapter supports this claim 
(Albala-Bertrand 1993).     
As I will show next, in Chile, the state changed after every major catastrophe during the 
twentieth century. In these cases the issue at stake was never the winning of a war or the 
definition of some military competition. In other words, in Chile the state has not gained power 
by conquering competing groups, but rather by strengthening its institutional framework. As 
Tilly has described, there are two major dimensions of state-building: one is centralization of 
power at the national level, and the other is the development of new state capacities. 
Centralization of power is essential to have a strong state, and only strong states win wars. But 
also, he describes how bureaucracies that are crucial to the modern state were created for war-
preparation and war-making (Tilly 1990). These capacities allow a state to rule its population 
and territory more effectively even when the threat of war is over. Similarly, in the next two 
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chapters I will show that catastrophes have had this effect in Chile, changing the course of 
development and generating new state capacities. In this particular chapter, we will see that state-
society relations are initially reshaped by the disaster, and in the subsequent period the state 
starts to have a new role in the country.    
Disasters as Critical Junctures  
What I will show in this chapter is that catastrophes are part of unfolding political histories, 
and as such, they can become turning points in history. They are moments of contestation, where 
meanings and arrangements can be permanently altered. As it was clear in Chapter 2, 
catastrophes can certainly affect an entire culture, changing the paradigms by which a 
community understands the world. In this chapter, I will show how this can also happen in the 
political realm, where destruction forces the state to make significant decisions about how the 
country must go on.  
For scholarly use, this is referred to as a critical juncture. Following Capoccia and Kelemen 
(2007), I understand a critical juncture to be a brief phase of institutional fluidity where there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect outcomes (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007: 348). In other words, it is a relatively short moment in history during which 
change is not only possible but actually contemplated. The importance of critical junctures is that 
the impact of choices made during these periods are more dramatic and important than in periods 
of more stability because they generate self-enforcing path dependence processes; that is, they 
place institutional arrangements on trajectories that are then difficult to alter (Pierson 2001: 114). 
Critical junctures are a new starting point, a moment when trajectories are set and decisions 
made by powerful political actors are potentially much more momentous (Capoccia and Kelemen 
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2007: 343).  Contingency then, is crucial to define a critical juncture. By this I do not mean 
randomness, but rather the realization that things can be different than what they are (in the 
framework of what could have happened) (Mahoney 2000). One way to identify a situation as 
highly contingent is by noting that many options have been opened up as possibilities. J. 
Mahoney uses this approach when he defines critical junctures as “choice points when a 
particular option is adopted among two or more alternatives” (Mahoney 2002). The possibilities 
of what could have happened, then, are not infinite; they are determined by the conditions of the 
critical juncture, but even then it is a moment when actors have choices. The whole historical 
picture then, is one of long periods of institutional stability (path dependence) that are punctuated 
occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux. In these phases, actors “can shape outcomes in 
a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances would permit” (Mahoney 2002). This is, 
critical junctures highlight the importance of agency in history, something that is lost when we 
study structure or path dependence mechanisms.  
How do these junctures happen? According to Capoccia (2015) “an event or a series of 
events, typically exogenous to the institution of interest, lead to a phase of political uncertainty in 
which different options for radical institutional change are viable” (Capoccia 2015:6).
26
 Critical 
junctures, then, are a notion very similar to events, even if they come from different traditions 
(Political Science and Historical Sociology). Both refer to happenings that change society and set 
it in a new direction. However, while an event is something that has been usually defined as 
happening to whole cultures or societies, political junctures have normally been defined as 
happening to institutions. Thus, what constitutes a critical juncture for one institution may not be 
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 Of course, we know that catastrophes are not really external events, but rather are produced by the social and 
physical constructions that create vulnerability. But, for the sake of analysis, I will consider earthquakes as external 
shocks in this chapter.  
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critical for another. Also, while events such as the Bastille are not always defined by conscious 
decisions, critical junctures are moments were people have to choose between different options 
that are more clearly laid “on the table.” Finally, events are thought to be unique and 
unrepeatable, while the same critical juncture can happen in two different places producing 
distinct legacies (Collier and Collier 1991). That is why this notion may fit better for the issue of 
this chapter: the changes in the state and the cities more affected. Nonetheless, the meaning of 
events and critical junctures are strikingly similar and cannot be easily separated.   
Taking all of this into account, we can consider the analysis of critical junctures as the 
analysis of decisions made under great uncertainty. However, to fully explain a critical juncture 
we should specify not only the decisions and actions that were taken, but we should reconstruct 
the destabilizing effect (context), the decision making process (contestation), the options 
available (not those hypothetically possible) and the identities of those making the decisions and 
their interests (for the relative institution). Through this analysis, in the following sections I will 
demonstrate that catastrophes in Chilean history have been crucial to set the path that the Chilean 
state was going to take in the next historical period, specifically in terms of political economy. In 
addition, I will argue that disasters have been true critical junctures for the cities most affected 
by them. These are the two units of analysis that will be taken into account. I will show that in all 
three cases, political and institutional options were greatly opened by the event, and for a certain 
period of time, everything seemed possible: a more beautiful Valparaíso, a truly modern Chillán, 





POLITICAL AFTERSHOCKS OF CHILEAN CATASTROPHES 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Church and the landowners had lost some of 
their political power in Chile, and emerging middle and working classes were taking shape. In 
this context, the political arena was eager for social change, with many actors pushing for a 
growing, more subsidiary state (Collier and Sater 2004). As I will show next, earthquakes were 
the perfect opportunity to effect such change. To top it off, twentieth century Chile was affected 
by three of the biggest catastrophes in world history: the “Sad Night of 1906,” the “Big 
Earthquake of 1939” and the “Cataclysm of 1960.” These three events will guide my argument in 
this chapter.  
The Sad Night of 1906 
On the rainy night of August 16, 1906, an earthquake magnitude 7.6 (ML) shocked 
Valparaíso, bringing Chile’s second largest city and most important port to ruins. The quake was 
followed by a tsunami, several destructive fires, and an even stronger shock (8.6 ML) ten minutes 
later.
27
 That sad night, people did not know where to run; they were trapped between falling 
buildings, fires and angry water “converting the streets into rivers of people” (Rodríguez and 
Cruzat 1906: 45). When the sun came up, rain was still falling and the earth was still shaking 
constantly, strong enough to put the taste of fear in everyone’s mouth (Rodríguez and Cruzat 
1906). People were gathered in the hills and the panorama to the coast was dreadful, there 
seemed to be no building standing in what had been a promising city just the day before.  
Because the country was much more urbanized and populated than it had been in the 
nineteenth century, the damage caused by this earthquake was much larger. The event left the 
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 Historical accounts disagree on the number of shocks, and the amount of time between them. In this paper, I 
follow Lomnitz´s (1970) (2004) historical survey of Chilean earthquakes.  
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impressive number of 3,800 (official) casualties, with more than 20,000 injured, and damage to 
properties of more than 30 million English pounds of the time (Zegers 1906). The real number of 
deaths was probably higher, particularly if we count those who died of diseases brought about by 
the disaster.
28
 In Valparaíso what was not ruined by the earthquake had been destroyed by fire. 
The city suffered almost total interruption of public services; drinking water, electric power, and 
telegraphic lines were brought down (Rodríguez and Cruzat 1906). The plano (flat lands) had 
suffered most of the damage, including the port, downtown and the neighborhood of El 
Almendral, which were completely destroyed. In the rest of central Chile the situation was 
similar, if less severe. Between La Serena to the north and Talca to the south the whole country 
suffered with the quake. In Santiago, the capital, casualties reported were very low but some of 
the most important political buildings suffered considerable damage, including the National 
Congress and the Presidential Palace (La Lira 1906). Overall, it was certainly the biggest disaster 
known to Chile up until that date.  
The disruption caused by this earthquake was significant, and can only be comprehended if 
we take into account the characteristics of the period. The Valparaíso disaster occurred in the 
middle of a semi-parliamentary regime in Chile, only days before President Pedro Montt began 
his term.
29
 The parliament was composed of only elite men, with strong family ties among them. 
Alliances between the parties changed constantly, and for the most varied reasons. In this 
context, the President named universal cabinets, with people from all the parties, which were 
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 According to the data I have been able to gather, the National Civil Register registered 7,883 less deaths in 1907 
than in 1906 (in 1905 there was in fact higher mortality than in 1906, but this was due to an epidemic of smallpox). 
The cause of death with the greatest increase is “other trauma” (3954 more cases, an increase of 367 percent), 
followed by diseases of the respiratory system (3710 more cases than in 1905). All of these maladies are linked to 
the destruction brought about by the earthquake (Oficina Central de Estadistica 1909). So, overall, more than 
7,000 deaths can be linked to the earthquake.  
29




intrinsically unstable (Cavarozzi 1978; Castedo 1999; Fernandez 2003; Gazmuri 2012). 
However, stability was assured by a sound economy and a shared understanding of the role of 
the state. The ideology that Chilean “aristocracy” shared was that of liberalism (laissez faire, 
laissez passer); the state should only interfere in society when private entities could not cope 
(Collier y Sater 1996; Fernandez 2003; Gazmuri 2012). Even so, though the Chilean state during 
the parliamentary republic was tiny it was not weak, on the contrary, for the standard of the time 
and particularly in comparison to the rest of Latin American states, the Chilean state was quite 
competent in what it was supposed to do: maintain internal peace and be a bridge between 
Chilean society and its source of money in the nitrate mines (Cavarozzi 1978). In fact, 56 percent 
of the income of the Chilean state depended on the export tax of nitrates alone (Fernandez 2003). 
This means that the state coopted half the surplus of the industry through taxes, making Chile a 
rich, mostly solvent, country (Gazmuri 2012; Castedo 1999; Fernandez 2003). In this context, 
the destruction of Valparaíso in 1906 was crucial, since that is where the commercial houses of 
the companies that run the nitrate business were held, as well as where the men who carried out 
the business lived (Elliot 1907; Pinto 1987). It was also the port where the export took place, and 
therefore where the tax was collected. Taken together this meant that Valparaíso was, albeit 
indirectly, Chile’s largest source of revenue. Thus, the destruction of Valparaíso was a strong test 
for this minimal state: how to deal with the emergency when locals held most of the political 
power? How to influence reconstruction? How to defend the state’s interest (if any)? 
Newly elected President Montt had some ideas in these respects, all pointing to a central role 
for the executive in the reconstruction process. Known for having a “strong hand”, he had been 
elected a month before the earthquake to put some order into the increasingly questioned 
parliamentary system. As head of the Partido Nacional (National Party), a center party supported 
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by businessmen, he did not completely fit with the traditional landowner elite who defended 
local interests. Hence, after Montt assumed the presidency he suffered strong opposition in 
parliament. According to his biographer, this was due to the fact that he had been “cruelly 
assaulted by a dangerous obsession for investing state money in all kind of public works” 
(Ovalle 1918).  As I will show presently, most of this public works “fever” was a consequence of 
the earthquake. Valparaíso’s reconstruction plan was the first grand scale experiment in urban 
development in Chile and Latin America (Paez 2008; Martland 2006). It was led by the state, and 
completely transformed Valparaíso. Also, due to the earthquake, the rest of the country needed 
new roads and railroads, telegraphic lines and police stations. The result of all of this work was 
an increase in state power, especially in Valparaíso, where the state completely took over city 
politics. In the following sections I will expand on these ideas further.  
Taking over Valparaíso 
The government in Santiago was concerned with its own damaged city when the news of the 
destruction of Valparaíso arrived to the capital two days later (Rodríguez and Cruzat 1884). 
Buildings were down –the note read- and most of the city was without running water (Rodríguez 
and Cruzat 1906). Both the Ministro del Interior (Minister of State) and the Ministro de Guerra 
(Minister of War), the two most important ministers in the cabinet, arrived to Valparaíso three 
days later only to find that Mr. Larraín, the region´s Intendente (intendant, representative of the 
government in the region), had everything under control. He had declared martial law and 
ordered the distribution of food and drinking water. From an office in a tent in the main Plaza he 
organized the distribution of resources, removal of corpses and the demolition of buildings with 
risk of collapse (Rodríguez and Cruzat 1906). The intendant had also assigned Admiral Gómez -
Carreño to the task of maintaining order. Known later as “the sheriff of Valparaíso,” Gómez-
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Carreño was in charge of all police, army and navy forces in the city, including the municipal 
police (Rodríguez and Cruzat 1906). Larraín and Gómez-Carreño were ruthless; according to 
official records, fifteen people were executed for looting, their bodies left on exhibition for 
people to fear (Rodríguez and Cruzat, 1884). As the days passed, the state’s authority only grew 
stronger. Occupying a tent next to the Intendant in the Plaza, the Minister of State installed an 
emergency telegraph and reestablished communications with Santiago; the Minister of War 
declared a “state of siege” and took control of the military and police forces in the area and the 
(incoming) President himself met with the neighbors to hear their complaints.
30
 In this context, 
the Mayor, Mr. Enrique Bermudez, was relegated to minor tasks like the cleaning of the streets 
and transportation of food (Sepulveda 2009). Most historians have declined to judge if the 
techniques used were correct or not, but authorities did take control of Valparaíso rather 
promptly and most historical records praise them for this (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) August 25, 
1906; Rodríguez and Cruzat 1906). Moreover, in these congratulatory recounts, it was the 
national authorities that were highlighted as saviors of the city and not local politicians.  
This omission is very telling in the context of the parliamentary republic because since the 
Ley de Comuna Autonoma, (Law of Autonomous Municipalities) of 1891, the central 
government had little to say in local politics of the country.
31
 Under this law, it was the 
municipality’s duty to collect internal taxes, organize security and manage elections. The 
national government had veto power over some issues, but for the most part the city government 
designed and decided what to do with no intervention of Congress or the presidency (Silva 
1990). This situation was maintained until the end of the parliamentary period (1925). But the 
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 Both President Riesco, in the last days of his term, and President Montt, soon to start his rule, went to 
Valparaíso to meet with the most important residents.  
31
 In Chile, a municipalidad is the government of a comuna, and comuna refers to the district not the community in 
itself. Thus municipality is a better translation than community for this law.   
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aftermath of the Valparaíso earthquake did made an impact on the balance of power in 
Valparaíso, and set a precedent for the state regaining some power over city politics throughout 
Chile. Not only did the state lead emergency management, but it also gained the right to decide 
what to do with the city afterwards. As I have argued before, under the pressure of destruction 
and calamity, a position of laissez faire is very difficult to maintain. Someone has to do 
something or everyone’s future (and present) is in danger. And in Chile, from 1906 on this 
someone would be the state.  As I will show below, Valparaíso’s reconstruction plan was led by 
the central government, setting the foundation for the development of Chile’s regulatory national 
state in terms of city planning.  
The Reconstruction Board 
In the beginning, it seemed that things were business as usual.  Two days after the quake, a 
group of vecinos (elite neighbors) started to organize, help and plan for reconstruction (El 
Mercurio (Valparaíso) Aug 23; Aug 26 1906). The (incoming) President Montt was invited to 
this meeting when he arrived to Valparaíso, by the end of the week. At this gathering the 
neighbors remarked that the state should deal with the broader national problem, but that they 
expected to decide for themselves what to do in the city. As it had typically been for the past fifty 
years, they believed that it was their prerogative to determine what the needs of the city were. As 
resident Francisco Valdéz clearly expressed: “We wish to deal ourselves with this problem that 
directly affects our interest and our own lives. We are perfectly capable of studying the issue and 
presenting a bill that would save the city.” (CGV 1909: 141). Still, they knew the state was a 
necessary ally to achieve this, particularly because they needed significant sums of money (CGV 
1909: 120).  As expressed in further meetings of this group, the General Committee of Neighbors 
(Comision General de Vecinos or “CGV”) viewed Valparaíso’s destruction as an opportunity to 
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design the city they dreamed of, following the ideas of the “beautiful city” movement (Paez 
2009). They had always wanted a city of boulevards and “now, the supporters of wider streets 
have much increased” –claimed newspaper El Mercurio- “including everyone who felt buildings 
dangling over their heads” (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Sept 11, 1906). They truly wanted to 
transform the city, so the proposition of the elite neighbors was radical; the government should 
expropriate all the neighborhood of El Almendral (564,000 square meters) and the commission 
would design a completely new area, with new avenues, streets and plazas (CGV 1909). Once 
presented in the papers, the plan was wholeheartedly supported by most of the Valparaíso elite, 
as editorials of El Mercurio show (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) August 25, 1906). However, their 
desires where not going to be fulfilled as they hoped. First, the state had its own agenda with the 
reconstruction of the fiscal port; and second, the property-owners of El Almendral opposed the 
plan.   
As I mentioned above, during the parliamentary republic, the state had no power in urban 
planning in Valparaíso, but there was one exception: the port. The harbor was the state’s primary 
source of revenue (import tax), consequently, during the period the state had a marked preference 
for Valparaíso’s shore to be used by the port, which created some tension with the city (Booth 
2002). This strain had been clear since at least 1861, when different projects had begun to be 
discussed. In 1901, the government had hired Dutch engineer Jacob Krauss to lead a commission 
to propose an extension of the port, but by August 1906 the project had been postponed and no 
final decision had been made on the design (Cavieres 2011; Paez 2009). With the destruction of 
the port and most of the city in 1906, the situation was no longer avoidable. Something had to be 
done. One of the problems that the design of a new port had faced previously was that most 
projects meant to reclaim terrain from the city in order to build a safer harbor; this was expensive 
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and also against most neighbors’ wishes (Paez 2009). Now, the disaster had taken care of the 
economic part:  “the earthquake offers us some compensation at least. We are now in a position 
to build a harbor with more ease, safety and economy.” (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Ago 31, 
1906). The disaster had allowed people to start thinking about things from scratch, and all of the 
possibilities were open, even to build the city following a completely different growth strategy 
than before. For example, the Minister of War proposed a project to the government to discuss a 
new inner harbor directly in El Almendral (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Sept 5, 1906). For the 
central government, the port was a priority (Congreso Nacional de Chile, Sesiones 
Extraordinarias 1906: 12). Valparaíso was doing its best to continue to function, and the Aduana 
(customs house) was working again a few days after the disaster. But concerns about the 
destruction of the fiscal crane were growing (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Nov 16, 1906; Oct 26, 
1906; ZigZag Dic, 1906). This does not mean that the central government necessarily wanted an 
inner harbor in El Almendral, but the rebuilding of the port was in the state’s best interest, and 
some long-term solution had to be reached.   
The government, then, created a new commission to evaluate the ideas for a new harbor 
formed by engineers from Krauss’ team (Krauss himself was in Europe) and other government 
officials. The truth was, the commission had been working since August 25th, the very same day 
that the president arrived to Valparaíso to meet with the neighbors (decree 3,444 is from August 
23th). Conclusively, reconstruction of the city center and the new port were being discussed in 
parallel, with the CGV planning a new design for Valparaíso’s center while the engineers’ 
commission was discussing a new harbor in almost exactly the same spot (El Mercurio was 
completely aware of this problem; in its November 30 edition they expanded on this issue in the 
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article “La Reconstrucción y las Obras del Puerto”).
32
 The General Commission of Neighbors 
was conscious of this, and expressly opposed an inner harbor (it was discussed at meetings on 
both August 28th and Sept 1st), claiming “it was not convenient or desirable” to expand the port 
towards the city (CGV 1906: 124).  For them, the earthquake had changed things “but it had not 
changed the need for wide avenues, streets and plazas in the plano. On the contrary, it has made 
it clearer the need for them.” (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Sept 29, 1906). On their parts, the 
engineers of the port commission thought that the interest of the neighbors in maintaining most 
of the city´s flat lands for houses and commerce should not be taken into account and that the 
natural development of Valparaíso’s residential spaces was to the north (Paez 2008).  
In addition, the CGV and the Port’s commission were not the only groups the state had to 
deal with in deciding what to do in Valparaíso. There was a third actor: the owners of the land in 
the neighborhood of El Almendral. One would think that they were represented in the CGV, but 
they were not. The CGV was composed of only elite neighbors, and most of them did not even 
own land in that area. The landowners then also organized themselves. And they did not want to 
receive money for their houses, not for a new El Almendral and not for an inner harbor; what 
they wanted was to rebuild them in the same place. Millionaires, they argued, had property 
elsewhere and saw their land in El Almendral as a playground. But for the owners of factories 
and shops, El Almendral was home. Finally, a group of homeowners took their complaints to 
Santiago. President Montt received them and heard their arguments; they directly asked him not 
to expropriate El Almendral as the CGV desired (La Union, 1906; Sepulveda 2009). And the 
President listened.  
                                                          
32
 Some people, like Nicanor Marambio and Alejandro Bertrand seemed to have flirted with both groups. But for 
the most part, the work was being done in parallel. 
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By October 1906 the government had decided on a new strategy.  The President sent a law 
for the reconstruction of Valparaíso to Congress, and asked for special sessions of the cameras in 
order to discuss it (Law 1876). During the discussion of the law the CGV’s plan was debated at 
length, but a plan presented by the Municipality and the one presented by the small owners of El 
Almendral were also debated. Different opinions were presented, without a clear position by the 
parties. For some, the reconstruction of El Almendral was no more than a charity project for 
Valparaíso’s neighbors and money would be better spent repairing public buildings across the 
country (Congreso Nacional de Chile, Sesiones Extraordinarias 1906). For others, to recover 
Valparaíso was crucial for the recovery of the economy and the state should help as much as 
possible (Congreso Nacional de Chile, Sesiones Extraordinarias 1906: 167). Finally, the law 
contemplated the creation of a Junta de Reconstrucción (Reconstruction Board), with executive 
powers, to be in charge of designing the new city plan and supervising the necessary public 
works. The presidential mandate to the Board was to redesign the city center in order to make it 
cleaner and more beautiful, as the CGV wanted. But for this, the President asked the Board to 
maintain the old city map “as much as possible” (JR 1909, 10), following the wishes of the small 
land owners. And even though the law did not include a reference to a new harbor per se, the 
president explicitly addressed this issue in his letter to the Board and the message he sent to 
Congress. It was imperative, he claimed, to “consider the increasing needs of import and export 
commerce of the first port of the republic” (Ministerio del Interior Oct 12, 1906). So here we see 
that by creating the Reconstruction Board, the state positioned itself as mediator between these 
different groups, recovering some of the autonomy that it had lost during this period.   
As Martland (2006; 2007) has pointed out before me, the Reconstruction Board had 
unprecedented freedom of action and this meant an increased role of the state in city politics; it 
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was “a creature for the central government, but its powers were still local.” (Martland 2007). It 
was created by the central government and was in charge of several tasks that had previously 
been in the hands of the city; large-scale public works, local regulations and zoning. It was 
dominated by presidential appointees (all except the Mayor and the Intendant) and subject to 
direct presidential approval. However, Martland misses several points. The fact that the Board 
was “a creature of the central government” did not mean that the President had managed to do 
everything exactly as he wished. By looking closely at the inner workings of the Board we see 
that the president did not take over the city in one fell swoop. Certainly, the municipal 
government was completely overruled by the Board. Not only the Valparaíso reconstruction law 
(Law 1887) clearly stated that the Municipality was relegated as a consulting body, but also, the 
municipal government was forced to share the cost of reconstruction, even with no say in it. And 
from 1910 to 1917 this expense ate up most of the city’s revenue, and eventually, the central 
government took control of tax collection in the city in order to be sure that the funds would be 
available for this task (Martland 2007). At the Board, the proposal for the new city map by the 
Director of Public Works of the Municipality, Abelardo Arriagada (La Union Oct 7, 1906), was 
never even discussed. Also, the law established that the principles stated by the regulations for 
the transformation of Valparaíso (active since 1876, by municipal decree) did not necessarily 
apply to the new design. It was, on all fronts, the end of municipal power in the city center.  
However, the elite neighbors (CGV) were not so easily cut out of the process as the 
municipality. By looking at the minutes of the Board we see that its dynamics were very 
particular. Certainly, the President appointed the participants, but he had appointed only two 
engineers who were public servants (and from Santiago): Alejandro Bertrand, geographer from 
the Commission of Frontiers, and Domingo Santa Maria, director of the national railroad system. 
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The other members where three elite neighbors of Valparaíso who represented the three major 
political parties of the country and who had participated in the CGV, Francisco Valdés Vergara 
(Liberal, President of the CGV and arguably the most influential person in Valparaíso at the 
time), Alejo Barrios (a National who had been suggested by Valdés) and Santiago Lyon Santa 
Maria (Conservative, president of Chile’s major shipping company). However, this does not 
mean that the Board was not an arm of the executive, only that it was a contested place, 
particularly between the central state and the vecinos (elite neighbors).   
This tension materialized in the fights for the design of the new city map. The neighbors 
wanted carte blanche to design a new, more beautiful Valparaíso, but the state wanted to spend 
the smallest amount of money possible, and to improve the port. Property owners wanted their 
terrains back untouched. As the months went by, several city maps for reconstructing El 
Almendral were proposed. The one that received the most support from Valparaíso’s elite was 
the city map presented by the CGV, but there was also the Municipality’s new city map and the 
property owner’s map. After discussing these plans, both in Congress and at the Board, the plan 
that was approved was the final design by presidentially nominated engineer Bertrand (JR 1909, 
16) (presented in El Mercurio, Jan 6, 1906). The new city map took into consideration most of 
the presidential mandate. It maintained the old city map as much as possible, transforming it but 
not creating a new one from scratch. Streets were wider and straighter, which would mean some 
expropriations. But not all of El Almendral would be expropriated. The needs of the Public 
Treasury were taken into account, since the plan was cheaper, and the desire of property owners 
to maintain their terrains as much as possible was also heard. By January 18, the new city map 
was approved by decree by President Montt. I will argue then that it was the new city map, more 
than the creation of the Board, that shows that the state had increased its power in the city.  
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Fuente: Paez 2009   
Illustration 4: Different plans for Valparaíso´s plano.  
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However, it must be pointed out that the state did not manage to expropriate part of El 
Almendral to expand the port. This was a huge loss for the President and a win for the neighbors. 
Overall, Chile was still an oligarchy, and the earthquake shows this in all its clarity. The fact that 
most money spent on reconstruction was employed solely in El Almendral, leaving the problems 
of the rest of the country behind, is proof enough of this. Still, a new permanent General 
Commission of Ports was created to deal with the problem of Valparaíso’s harbor, and through 
this new institution the state continued its fight for an expanded port, something that was 
achieved in 1910 (more in Chapter 4).  
Overall, Valparaíso’s reconstruction plan was an experiment in urban planning, one that 
influenced further reconstruction plans through the rest of the century. From then on, it was 
always the state that was pointed to as responsible for making things right after a catastrophe. It 
shows that the path that had started in 1822 continued to develop, and that earthquakes were no 
longer seen as providence, but rather something that was in the hands of society to manage. Still, 
the law for the reconstruction of Valparaíso had absolutely no seismic provisions; it was not 
about making Valparaíso safer, but instead more beautiful and more hygienic. This shows that a 
risk perspective still had not emerged, even if attributions of responsibility had changed.             
Class Conflict  
A second issue I want to highlight in terms of the effects of this catastrophe on the state is 
class conflict. As mentioned before, the parliamentary republic has been recorded in Chilean 
history as a period of political stability. But parliament represented variation only among Chilean 
elite, not among the broader Chilean population. And outside these boundaries, tension was 
brewing. This is why for this earthquake I posit a different analysis than for the next two. For 
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1939 and 1960 I will analyze the political debates and discussions about what to do with 
reconstruction between different political parties. But in 1906 this is not only irrelevant but very 
difficult to do, since parties and political alliances changed all the time and even governments 
were in constant flux. The President filled his cabinets with people from all parties and they were 
short lived (for example, after the earthquake President Montt had eleven different cabinets in 
four years of government). Therefore, in order to approach the issue from the national level I will 
expand on how the relationship between the political elite and “the people” was disturbed 
because of the earthquake. Truthfully, the elite did not even consider the working classes as 
anything more than a threat to social order, and this view was not changed by the quake. But for 
the workers, the earthquake was an important moment of organization, solidarity and reflection 
on the role of the state.   
At the beginning of the twentieth century, emerging middle and working classes were taking 
shape in Chile, and people were pushing for social change (Collier and Sater, 2004). This change 
was directly related to the discussion of the role that the state should have in society and what 
interests it should defend. Historians have not linked this process to the earthquake, but to the 
changes in industrialization, urbanization and social movements that took hold after the 1900s. 
Fernandez (2003) shows that by the end of the parliamentary period, different groups of the 
population started to see the state as something different: something they could demand from, 
and eventually use for their own benefit. He calls this a process “social statetization” (Fernandez 
2003:145), and argues that it was the product of a “class consciousness” that socialists, worker’s 
organizations, schools and intellectuals managed to create through education and indoctrination 
(Fernandez 2003).  I will not dispute that the work of socialists and incipient unions was crucial 
for the development of a new relationship with the state. But, I will argue that even more 
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important was the fact that middle classes, workers and poor Chileans started to come into direct 
contact with the state, something that the hacienda system had not allowed. I will argue that the 
earthquake was crucial in this process, because the issues of humanitarian help, labor and 
housing connected the people to the state in new ways.     
Sadly, very few historians have approached the earthquake from the point of view of the 
working poor, even thought about the one third of Valparaíso lived crowded in conventillos 
(slums) in the hills (Urbina 2011). One notable exception is historian J. Zavala (2012) who has 
examined the “orders from the plaza” in detail, and shown that decisions as to who was executed 
or lashed depended largely on their looks, which in all likelihood means that innocent people 
were also shot. He also shows that orders to clean the streets and start to rebuild houses literally 
meant forced labor; those who refused were taken to the plaza and Captain Gomez-Carreño 
would decide on their punishment. Furthermore, “local authorities attempted to halt public 
movement in the city by requiring workers to carry a paper with them that described the type of 
work they were doing” (Zavala 2012: 50). This permit allowed “the plaza” to control their 
movements and it shows how the state forcefully took control of the city and its citizens as much 
as was possible.  
Not surprisingly, this situation was troubling for the workers. According to the workers’ 
newspaper La Reforma,
33
 from Santiago, most associations of workers, artisans and other groups 
reported to be “in complete ruin,” having lost many of their members. Working class 
neighborhoods are described as “camps of misery and desolation” (La Reforma Aug 17, 1906). 
                                                          
33
 La Reforma was the newspaper of the small Partido Democrata (Democrat party), which had been a scion from 
the Radical Party since 1887. The fundamental idea was to represent the workers, but eventually it became one 
more player in the parliamentary game. Still, by 1906 the Democrats included a number of future socialists as well 
as Luis Emilio Recabarren, founder of the Chilean Communist Party. He had been elected Diputado (deputy) in the 
1906 election by the Democrats, but never took office because he refused to swear to serve God.   
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And, more importantly for this dissertation, as the days pass we see in La Reforma a process of 
class solidarity and one of incipient “social statization.” In terms of class solidarity, it is clear 
that the earthquake was a boost for the organization of the proletariat in Santiago; they gathered 
clothes, food, and helped each other. And this was organized by workers unions and feminist 
groups that interpreted the events from a class conflict perspective (see: Zavala 2012). People 
had gathered on the plazas and avenues to find shelter, and the police was sent to disperse them. 
La Reforma complained that the police were once more the armed forces of the elite and of no 
help to the people. This line of thinking led directly to the idea that the state should do something 
to help workers in their dire situation. In fact, the directors of La Reforma met with the mayor of 
Santiago in order to demand that the state put a stop to the repression of the workers and they 
specifically asked to control the food prices in the city. After people start arriving from 
Valparaíso to Santiago looking for shelter, writers in La Reforma criticized the lack of support 
from state authorities for those in need and started to print the stories of forced labor that arrived 
from the port (La Reforma Aug 26, 1906; Aug 29, 1906). This lead to articles strongly criticizing 
the state and telling people that authority preferred to “squash and tyrannize” than do their duty. 
Overall, we see that articles from La Reforma arguing that it was the state’s responsibility to 
assist those in need and claim that the state should represent not only the elite but all citizens (La 
Reforma, Aug 23, 1906).  
The elite did not agree at all. They thought that the working class was actually the group least 
harmed by the quake, primarily because they had less to lose and were more accustomed to 
suffering (El Mercurio (Valparaíso) Sept 2, 1906; La Lira Chilena, Sept 1906). Second, because 
wages had increased in Valparaíso for the lack of workers (El Mercurio (Santiago) Sept 1, 1906). 
Workers housing was a real issue in recently urbanized Chile, and after the earthquake it became 
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much worse. As a result, many workers left Valparaíso for Santiago or for the northern cities. 
This generated a lack of workers in Valparaíso, with an increasing demand for reconstruction. As 
a consequence, data shows that wages for construction workers in the city grew considerably, 
which created a problem for finding workers for other industries (MOP 1907). According to 
DeShazo (1983), who has studied Chilean labor movement in detail, the earthquake increased the 
demand for workers in Valparaíso to the point that the city did not feel the effects of the 1907 
(global) crisis, at least not in the employment rate (DeShazo 1983: 44). “Labor quite naturally 
responded to this situation with demands for higher wages, and required labor unions to carry out 
the strikes that were often necessary to achieve them” (DeShazo 1983: 98).   
La Reforma answered these claims strongly with different articles, particularly because the 
topic of how to distribute foreign aid was being discussed. One of the articles specifically asked 
the workers if “would we always be marionettes?” The ire of the workers facing not only a lack 
of response from the state to their pleas but also repression in the face of calamity reached a 
boiling point at the Velada Funebre (mournful wake) organized by the Democrats to give a 
posthumous tribute to the memory of the victims of the disaster (La Reforma Sept 9, 1906). For 
the workers, the real disaster was the state’s reaction to their problems; not only providing no 
help at all but also “tyrannizing” and forcing them to work with no pay converting them into 
“slaves.” (La Reforma, Aug 26, 1906). Of course, this was the same state as that which existed 
before the quake; a state without social policies or any subsidiary role. But it took the earthquake 
to make this clear and to show them what their circumstances really were.    
In summary, the effect of the earthquake on the lower strata of society was seldom recorded 
by historians or mainstream newspapers at the time. But a closer look to sources available show 
us first that these groups suffered greatly from the destruction, but also, paradoxically, that their 
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position was also somehow improved. First, as Zavala (2012) has shown, the earthquake led to 
increased working class solidarity, but also, as the elite was quick to figure out, the need for 
workers to rebuild Valparaíso gave them a new source of power. As a consequence, the state 
responded with the creation of the Bureau of Worker’s statistics, created as a direct response to 
the changes brought about by the earthquake (MOP 1907). This small office is very significant 
for the analysis because it shows that the state had made the determination to intervene in the 
relationship between the patron and workers. The name suggests that the office was only in 
charge of recording data related to the labor situation, but in reality it aspired to mediate between 
capital and labor in order to improve the conditions of the working classes and maintain peace 
for the patrones (MOP 2007; Mac-Clure 2012). I will expand on the creation of this office in the 
next chapter. For now, it is enough to say that the creation of this office signaled that from the 
point of view of the state (or at least some of its officers) as well, the role of the state in society 
had to change. And for this, the earthquake was a crucial moment.    
Summary of the 1906 Earthquake  
The 1906 earthquake disrupted a period of relative economic and political stability in Chile, 
the parliamentary (oligarchic) republic. The event affected Chile’s most important source of 
revenue, Valparaíso, and these circumstances forced the state to intervene in the reconstruction 
of the city despite the fact that this was against the laissez faire politics that characterized the 
period. Furthermore, the state chose to intervene in a way that increased its power in the area by 
creating a Reconstruction Board with enormous power subject only to the presidency, and 
bypassing the municipality (and Parliament). Some authors have already pointed out that this 
Board is a precedent of the development of Chile’s regulatory state (Martland 2006, 2007) but 
the argument here is that the Board itself was a contested place, where elite neighbors still 
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retained enormous power. On this Board, several new plans for the city were discussed, analyzed 
and considered. Every one of these plans meant a great change for the city, and finally, it was the 
plan of civil servant Bertrand that was chosen. This plan was a conciliatory map that took into 
account the desires of the neighbors, the National Treasury and the property owners of the 
Almendral. It is the map, I argue, that shows the depth of the state’s intervention in city politics 
after the quake. This power was not supreme, but it was significant, particularly in the context of 
the parliamentary republic and the law of autonomous municipalities. However, the new city 
plan design by the Board did not consider the port, and this was the real interest of the state.  The 
earthquake, then, constitutes a window in on the workings of politics in the parliamentary 
republic. And, at the same time, it is evidence of just how this structure was altered by the event. 
The state set a precedent for intervention in local business, and it also made great strides in terms 
of autonomy from the elites.  
Taking all of this into account, it is not possible to claim that the earthquake per se was a 
critical juncture for the state, even if it was fundamental to understanding relevant changes in the 
future.  Political alliances and the role of the state in society did not change in any significant 
way. The only aspect that I have highlighted is how –outside of formal politics- the relationship 
between workers and the state was influenced by the earthquake. With destruction, power 
relations in the parliamentary republic became clearer, including their inequalities and injustices. 
For the workers, the earthquake was a critical moment for strengthening ties and organizing 
(maybe even a critical juncture for the worker’s movement). But, more importantly for the 
objectives of this dissertation, it was a moment where criticisms of the role of the state in society 
took more solid form. And this was an important development that will have significance for the 
next historical period.  
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At the city level it is much clearer how this event constituted a critical juncture. Destruction 
forces communities to make important decisions, and some things could be started from scratch. 
Valparaíso could be redesigned, modernized and made more beautiful thanks to the fact that the 
earthquake had delivered almost a blank page on which to start anew. I will argue that this is 
always the case for cities that suffer disasters of such magnitude. It is not that cities always 
bounce back better, but that they never bounce back to be exactly the same as they were before. 
At the city level, catastrophe means making decisions, whether we want to or not.  I will expand 
on this in the next cases.  
Finally, it is important to note that by 1906 attributions of responsibility after catastrophe 
have completely shifted from Providence to natural forces. Religious explanations have 
disappeared from politics, even if they still remain in some private circles. A sign of this is the 
creation of a National Seismological Center (which will be discussed in next chapter) and the 
completion of several scientific studies to understand why Valparaíso’s center suffered so much 
with the quake. What we see from reconstruction plans is how this view has reverberated in the 
state, which is now seen as responsible for “returning to normal.” Decisions made after this event 
clearly show how a risk perspective is starting to develop, even if prevention is not yet seen as 
possible. By the next catastrophe, only thirty years later, this paradigm will be more fully 
developed and demands on the state will be much greater than they were in 1906.   
The Big Earthquake of 1939 
After 1906, the Chilean state did not have to wait very long to be faced with a new challenge. 
On January 1939, only a month after assuming office as Chile’s President, Pedro Aguirre-Cerda 
was traveling through the night over destroyed roads to assess the destruction caused by yet 
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another earthquake. All communications were down; telephone, telegraph and electricity services 
were interrupted and roads and railways had been destroyed. What he found when he arrived to 
Chillán was distressing; only 15 of Chillán’s 4,000 buildings were standing (Reyes 1984; Super 
1975).
34
 The city was a pile of ruins, streets had disappeared, and death was everywhere. Chillán 
was little more than “a huge urban tomb” (El Mercurio January 20, 1939). On the evening of 
Tuesday, January 24, 1939, the 8.3 magnitude movement had been felt from Santiago to 
Temuco. According to witnesses, it was as if the earth had stopped. No warning, no slowing 
motions to prompt everyone to go outside. As a result, this earthquake caused the highest death 
toll of any earthquake in Chilean history: 5,648 casualties (official, other sources claim numbers 
as high as 20,000). This was due not only to the intensity of the shook, but also because 
urbanization had grown in the country, from 49 percent in 1930 to 52 percent in 1949. With 
bigger cities, the possibility of a major catastrophe had increased significantly. In fact, 
throughout Chile, more than a dozen cities had suffered the same fate as Chillán and people had 
been trapped in the falling buildings, sometimes in their sleep (Hoy, February 2, 1939). But 
Chillán, capital of the Ñuble province, had suffered the most.  
Once in Chillán, the President organized rescue efforts and the arrival of provisions. He put 
the military in charge of public order, including burials, police, evacuations, and clean-up 
operations.  He also ordered the workers at state agencies such as the state railway and the state 
airline to clean what was left of the city.  Public services were provided in the main plaza and 
people were sleeping outdoors. By order of the President, the military took control of the area for 
months, even supervising who entered and who left the area. Families who could were allowed 
to leave to other regions and injured people were sent to Santiago, but no one could go into the 
                                                          
34
 Some accounts say 7, others say 30. Any number illustrates the point that Chillán was completely destroyed.  
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area for weeks (Super 1975). And this was just the beginning. Within a few days, doctors in 
makeshift hospitals were treating minor injuries in plazas, roads were being cleared and trains 
were running again (Super 1975). Within three months, the President had managed to pass a law 
that would not only look to recover of the areas most affected but that also changed the path of 
the whole country’s economic and political system. If 1906 marked a critical juncture for 
Valparaíso, then 1939 was certainly a moment of critical juncture for the whole country; it was a 
point of inflection, where the state assumed a whole new role for looking after economic 
development.  
President Pedro Aguirre-Cerda was a left-wing politician, governing with the Frente Popular 
(Popular Front, or FP), a moderate leftist coalition of the Radical, Democratic, Socialist and 
Communist Party. “A diminutive, dark skinned son of rural middle class parents,” Aguirre-Cerda 
had been a school teacher (Fernandez 1938). His victory marked the first time that exclusively 
non-elitist groups had elected a President of Chile. And it had not been easy. In fact, by the time 
of the quake some right-wing groups were still questioning the validity of his recently won 
election (Super 1975). It had been luck, really, that had put him where he was. If not for the 
massacre of some young “national socialists” a few months before the election, and the 
subsequent support of this section of voters, Aguirre-Cerda would not have been elected. And 
now, the earthquake would become his second stroke of luck because it would allow him to do 
what he had campaigned to do: change the role of the Chilean state in society.   
By the time of Aguirre-Cerda’s victory, the Chilean state was quite different than it was in 
1906. A revolution in 1925 had reinstated a presidential system, and social initiatives in the areas 
of housing, work, health and education were underway. But still, laissez faire was not officially 
over. The Chilean state did not involve itself in industry, or economic development, beyond mild 
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“welfarism.” Aguirre-Cerda wanted to change this (Aguirre- Cerda 1933; 1929); for him the 
improvement of living conditions in the country was intimately tied to the development of 
industry, and therefore he thought that this task should be a principal responsibility of the state. 
In his presidential program, he gave a prominent place to his economic reform which would 
create economic planning at the state level (Aguirre 1939b). 
This idea had started to have some appeal even outside the more leftist circles. The Great 
Depression had changed things for the country, and many people were realizing that they could 
not live on the income from nitrates alone. According to a report of the League of Nations, Chile 
was the country most affected by the Great Depression (Meller 1996); because Chile’s economy 
was based on selling the products of mining, Chile had become overly dependent on external 
factors. But by 1938 GDP had recovered to pre-crisis levels, although GDP per capita was still 
low (Meller 1996). According to Chilean economist Patricio Meller, the Great Depression set the 
stage for subsequent desertion of laissez-faire and the development strategy based only on the 
exploitation of natural resources. Thus, Chile started with an import substitution industrialization 
program before the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean´s (ECLAC) 
recommendation to do so.  But even if the Great Depression was the great instigator, authors 
agree that the trigger for further change was certainly the earthquake (Sutil et al. 2001). Because 
of the Great Depression, there was a certain consensus that national production should be 
augmented, but there was certainly no agreement on how, or what the role of the state was going 
to be in this process. The industrialization program that Aguirre-Cerda promoted was the answer 
that had won the election, barely.  But it took the earthquake for more people to realize that this 




The CORFO and Change in Political Development  
When he returned to Santiago, President Aguirre-Cerda began his campaign for aid to 
earthquake victims. But unlike prior disasters during this period, this time he was not going to 
kindly ask for charitable donations from citizens. In his address to Congress after the quake, 
Aguirre-Cerda was clear: “the government does not want to go to the devastated areas as a mere 
moneylender” (Aguirre-Cerda 1939: 11). He took the opportunity provided by the disaster to put 
into action his idea of how the Chilean state should operate, designing new institutions to 
accompany an ambitious economic program. According to Aguirre-Cerda “the cataclysm has 
confirmed to the government the lack of foresight in certain fundamental problems of public 
interest” (Aguirre Cerda 1939:6).  One month after the earthquake, the President proposed the 
creation of a state agency in charge of the reconstruction to Congress, the Corporación de 
Reconstrucción y Auxilio (Reconstruction and Assistantship Corporation, CRA), and another in 
charge of industrial recovery, the Corporación de Produccion y Fomento (Production and 
Development Corporation, CORFO). The President had a six-year plan and he asked for the 
authority to collect and spend 2.5 billion pesos over and above regular national revenue; 1 billion 
to reconstruction and relief, 1 billion to the project for economic development, and 0.5 billion to 
new housing for urban workers. Part of this amount was to be derived from new and increased 
taxes, part from loans (Aguirre-Cerda 1939).    
The conservative right was “momentarily dumfounded” (Super 1975). What Aguirre was 
proposing was a complete change from the way the country had been run so far.  When they 
recovered, the right presented no argument against the creation of the CRA, but they refused 
CORFO, calling it “the most inept affront that one could commit against the economy of a 
country” (Camara de Diputados, Sesiones Extraordinarias, March 10
th
, 1939: 598). Even though 
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CORFO was presented as part of the reconstruction program, the Finance Minister, Mr. 
Wachholtz, was clear to point out that the objective was to promote economic development 
through import substitution industrialization “because we cannot conceive of asking for loans if 
we are not creating the means to pay them later” (Camara de Diputados, Sesiones 
Extraordinarias, March 1, 1939: 587). The right argued that this was not related to the 
earthquake, they knew perfectly well that Aguirre-Cerda had sought to transform the Chilean 
state before the quake. Also, the sum was extravagant, nearly equaling the country’s entire 
budget for one year (Super 1975). Besides, concluded the opposition’s argument, by requesting 
funds for yet unspecified projects the President was asking Congress to give up its constitutional 
authority to oversee government spending (El Diario Ilustrado, February 2, 1939; El Mercurio 
February 4, 1939). And since the opposition had the majority in Congress, that should have been 
the end of the discussion. But the government circumvented the opposition, arguing that to 
stimulate economic recovery it was necessary to make the loans requested for reconstruction, and 
that the United States favored the plan to guarantee these loans (Super 1975). Minister 
Wachholtz also conferred privately with senators and deputies, but the finance committee 
rejected his bill.  
Thus, Aguirre-Cerda sought the help he needed in his voters. He organized a second tour in 
the earthquake-torn provinces, pleading for popular support for his bill. “I have promised” –he 
said while on route- “not just to bury your dead, not just to help the wounded, but also to 
immediately deal with the reconstruction of the destroyed cities, to revive life and labor, to save 
agriculture and industry.” (La Nación January 31, 1939). Also, the Aguirre-Cerda administration 
started a huge campaign to paint the conservatives as responsible for all of the delay in solutions 
to the earthquake problems. “The people” – argued a loyal deputy- “had already approved these 
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measures in a democratic election, when they elected their leader” (Camara de Diputados, 
Sesiones Extraordinarias 1939:723). Large crowds would gather at each train stop to hear 
Aguirre-Cerda talk and berate right-wing politicians for prolonging their miseries (Super 1975).  
In the press, the message was echoed. “Of all the countries in the world” –claimed a cartoon- 
“Chile is the only one that has not helped Chile” (TOPAZE 1939). All the while, in Santiago, the 
Conservative Party published a “manifesto” against the bill, vowing to deny the President such 
powers and accusing him of playing with the future of the country for political purposes (El 
Mercurio Feb 4, 1939). Then, they proposed a new bill that contemplated only the emergency 
money and the creation of the CRA, to rebuild the most affected areas. It was a project that not 
only cost one third of the money required to fund the original proposal, but that also maintained 
economic development as it was, independent of the state’s actions (El Diario Ilustrado Feb 15, 
1939, La Nación Feb 15, 1939). Socialist and Communist representatives, not so happy with 
Aguirre-Cerda’s bill, also presented a project. Socialists were not happy with the increase of 
sales tax in the bill, and instead supported higher taxes on industrialists.  When their bill was 
presented to Congress, there were already seven different proposals submitted by different 
groups of representatives being discussed (La Nación February 20, 1939). This was a true 
political juncture for the country; new routes were being considered, and the possibilities were 
wide open.   
Aguirre-Cerda was not going to go down and lose his opportunity. “We need 2.5 billion 
pesos, and we will have them” he told the newspaper, La Nación (Feb 7, 1939). So Aguirre-
Cerda went on yet another tour of the devastated area to plead for popular approval for his bill. 
In his speeches he claimed, “I am not a revolutionary in the sense that most people use the 
expression, of producing violent transformations; but yes, I am a revolutionary when I try to 
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change old conceptions or practices that do not respond to the justice that should reign in 
democracy” (Aguirre-Cerda 1940:4). 
Meanwhile, in Santiago, Minister Wachholtz used his constitutional authority to retire all 
projects from discussion (including his own). And then, he submitted a new bill, with some 
concessions to the right-wing point of view. Under the new arrangement the state did not have 
direct control over any of the agencies, instead they would be created as corporations with a 
boards of directors that included the heads of some industrial organizations. Still, they would be 
state-led and the state would hold 100 percent of the shares. This addressed one of the most 
important fears of the right; that Aguirre-Cerda was going to use CORFO as a political tool for 
the Popular Front (Super 1975). Also, some proposed tax increases were scaled back; 
specifically a 10 percent tax on homemade manufactured goods was cut out of the project. Also, 
Aguirre-Cerda managed to assuage socialists by promising offices in the new corporations 
(Super 1975). But it was not enough; they needed at least some right-wing votes to approve the 
project. On the other side, the right was making sure the bill was never going to see the light of 
day; they approved it in the Finance Committee in order to make sure that the executive could 
not retire it as it had done with the former bills. What followed was a massive, sometimes 
violent, fight between the Popular Front supporters and conservative supporters. In the chamber, 
they passed the majority of the reconstruction articles and then defeated all those related to the 
development corporation. More than once, the discussion grew so heated that debaters had to be 
pulled apart before a brawl broke out on the chamber floor (Super 1975).  As a deputy of the 
opposition put it: “the tragedy has put to the test not only our economic capacity but also our 
aptitudes for democratic life” (Camara de Diputados, Sesiones Extraordinarias 1940: 686).  
118 
 
Finally, when it was time for the deputy chamber to vote on the government bill it was 
approved by the vote of opposition deputy Armando Martin, representing the district of Chillán 
(La Nación March 9, 1939). This meant that Aguirre-Cerda’s best strategy had been to travel to 
the disaster area and convince people that whoever was against it was not with them. Thus, he 
used the same strategy for the approval of the bill in the Senate chamber. While the bill went 
back and forth between the senate and the chamber of deputies, he organized massive rallies in 
Santiago and addressed the multitudes repeating the same speech: economic expansion was vital 
for the reconstruction program and any hopes of economic self-sufficiency. But the fight in the 
Senate left it clear that the right was not going to relent. The Finance commission of the Senate 
also criticized the “mixing” of reconstruction and development of the economy in one project, 
calling it a “vice” (Senado, Sesiones Extraordinarias 1940: 413). In the end, they managed to 
deny the President his four special appointees on CORFO’ s board of directors, and added a 
clause that specified that legislative consent was required for any of CORFO’s expansion 
projects (Super 1975). But finally, not without a fight from Aguirre-Cerda who tried to veto the 
changes, CORFO was approved with these new dispositions. The crucial votes were, once again, 
made by the Senators who represented the most affected area.
35
   
Over the years, CORFO has been crucial in the development of the Chilean economy.  The 
corporation would adhere to “a middle road between laissez-faire attitudes and state socialism” 
(Super 1975: 186), acting as financier and entrepreneur, but also researcher, advisor and provider 
of basic services (more in Chapter 4).  Most of these achievements will occur after the Front’s 
years in power. During Aguirre-Cerda’s presidency, reconstruction and recovery understandably 
monopolized CORFO’s work. To achieve this, it started with several “immediate action plans” in 
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 Francisco Urrejola and Rafael Luis Gumucio. Senators for Ñuble, Concepción and Arauco.  
119 
 
a number of areas, including the electrification of the country.
36
 A new path forward had been 
set, one which focused on the national planning and coordination of investment as vital to 
consistent economic growth as well as establishing the right of the state to be a part of financial 
ventures (Bulnes 1943). Economists, political scientists and historians agree that CORFO 
represented a true paradigmatic change for Chile, a critical juncture in which the path of the 
whole political system was set anew.  
A Rational Reconstruction of Chillán  
Another area where we see radical changes resulting from the 1939 earthquake is at the local 
level. Before 1939, Chillán was a classical Chilean city, with a decidedly provincial air. It was 
more like a big town than a city, with farms inside the city center and public transport by animal 
draught (Cerda 2010). Its architecture was a mix of neoclassical and colonial, with traditional 
one-floor terraced houses (continuous façade). Sadly, 97 percent of these houses and buildings 
were destroyed by the earthquake, according to official reports (Torrent 2013). For Chillán, this 
became a true critical juncture, because with almost all of its buildings on the ground there was 
no other option than to start all over again. And also because, almost immediately, there was a 
certain consensus that the new Chillán had to be built differently than the old, in a more 
“modern” and “rational” fashion that followed the principles of modern architecture. Modernism 
will take different forms in different places, but generally it refers to a type of architecture that 
reconciles the principles of architectural design with the rationality of the technological 
advancement of twentieth century. The deeper issue is that modern architecture is not just about 
the aesthetics of buildings; it is a way of thinking about the whole city. Modernism means that 
rationality is sought after in every endeavor, and that scientific logic should prevail even on the 
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most minimal issue. This is also intimately linked to planning, zoning and the use of space. 
Therefore this type of architecture and these ideas were, in Chile, not only driven by architects 
and engineers but also actively developed by the state. The events that prompted this 
development were the 1828 earthquake in Talca and the 1939 Chillán catastrophe (Aguirre 2004; 
Torrent 2013). After these earthquakes, the state organized reconstruction guided by the 
principles of Modernism.    
Where the reconstruction of Chillán is concerned, the advancement of modern architecture is 
important because it completely frames the discussion about what to do with the city. The idea 
that is repeated the most in the debates is not how to have a beautiful city, as was the case in 
1906, but rather a “functional” and “rational” city. This meant that the first discussion was not 
how to re-design Chillán but whether it was worth it to do so. For Luis Muñoz Maluschka, from 
the Chilean Ministry of Public Works, “urgencies need centralized action” (Pavez 2002). He 
thought that only urban centers with the possibility of surviving should receive direct help, and 
that the rest should have their population directed to other places (Pavez 2002). Others, like 
Carlos Charlin, an architect and known defender of modernism, argued, “it is necessary to build 
and organize urban centers that disappeared, but in a whole new way” (ZigZag 1939). What 
arose thereafter was an avalanche of plans for the new Chillán. Every magazine and newspaper 
in the country published at least one map of what should be done with the city (and/or other 
cities, like Concepción). The first of these maps appeared on February 6th, barely a month after 
the earthquake, and before anyone had officially requested one (La Hora, Feb 6, 1939). The plan 
proposed bigger avenues that crossed the city in diagonals, challenging the traditional square city 
map that Chileans cities had since the colonial times. This shows, first, that architects in Chile 
were eager for the opportunity to re-design a whole new city, and second, that architects did not 
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have to think much about what benefited Chillán, or even what the aspirations or desires of the 
people of Chillán were. Despite this omission they believed they knew, from theory, what would 
be best for the city. And they practically had a tabula rasa to design it. By March 16, there were 
at least four projects to reconstruct Chillán that gained some attention, and another four for 
Concepción (ZigZag, March 16, 1939). On top of that, in Santiago a group of architects had 
contacted famous French architect Le Corbusier (Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris) to design  
new city maps for Chillán and Concepción. The story in the press was the following: Le 
Corbusier offers to design new city maps for free. In truth, he had been asked in 1938 if he was 
available to do the zoning city map of Santiago. This was under negotiation, apparently, when 
disaster struck and “Le Corbusists” saw a new opportunity for their idol to do more. And it was 
never a free offering, but rather one dependent on the fees arranged for the work in Santiago 
(Bannen et al. 2003). On the other side were the national architects who saw themselves as the 
appropriate people for the task. They were all modernists, but they believed that Le Corbusier 
was too theoretical and followed the teachings of other modernists, particularly Austrian Karl 
Brunner, who had defined the new zoning city map for Santiago. Among them was the President 
of the Urbanism Institute Rodolfo Oyarzún, who refused the request to bring Le Corbusier to 
Chile because he considered it an affront to the work that the state had done so far in urban 
planning, which followed the German school (Carvajal 2011).    
Also, the 1939 earthquake prompted the organization of a number of associations with 
interests in reconstructing the city. The Institute of Urbanism was in the press offering assistance 
with measuring the damage, reconstructing and designing maps to the President the very next 
day after the tragedy (La Nación, Jan 26, 1939). The Architects’ Association (Colegio de 
Arquitectos), also proposed an emergency plan to control the prices of materials, reconstruct 
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emergency houses and, also, design a city-zoning map for Chillán (El Mercurio, Jan 31, 1939). 
The Mayors of the Ñuble Province, who were concerned about all of these opinions from 
Santiago “which have provoked true alarm in the people, because they do not consider the reality 
of the future city” (Frente Popular March 21, 1939), formed a coalition to represent their 
interests. And finally, the Association of Owners of Chillán was formed on May 9th to make sure 
that the new Chillán did not destroy their property rights.  Thus, the discussion of the city map 
was a game of power. Who was going to decide what to do with Chillán?  
According to the arrangements of the new law, the recently created CRA was the 
organization in charge of reconstruction; this meant it would provide loans for repairs, build 
houses to be sold cheap, build emergency buildings for public offices and reconstruct public 
works in general. According to the reports from the government, during the first year after the 
quake the corporation completed the first part of this task, completing the emergency buildings 
for state offices and making loans to people who needed them (Aguirre-Cerda 1940). This is to 
say that while all of the discussion was taking place, the state was doing its own planning. At the 
CRA, modernism was also the major issue. If for architects modernism meant an opportunity to 
build a whole city from scratch, for the state it meant cheaper, faster and safer houses. 
Reconstruction then, ends up in the hands of a group of young architects hired by the Ministry of 
Public Works and led by the aforementioned Muñoz Maluschka, with a commission formed by 
the president of the Institute of Urbanism, the president of the National Architects’ Association, 
and the president of the National Engineers’ Association to serve as a consulting body.  In the 
end, modern architecture would lead the reconstruction of Chillán, but not in the hands of 
renowned architects, foreign or nationals, but instead by their disciples (some of them in the 
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process of receiving their degrees) that worked for the Chilean state. In their views, the main 
issue was not architectural styles but urban planning.  
The area where reconstruction efforts and the discussion surrounding the new city map were 
concentrated was Chillán’s downtown, a square of around twelve blocks, with four big avenues 
surrounding it (Cerda 2010). Owners in the area were impatient; they needed to know what the 
new edification lines and streets would be in order to start rebuilding their homes and businesses 
(La Discusión, April 1, 1939). And the problem would not be easily solved. The state presented 
two different city-zoning maps for this area in 1939, and both were rejected by the community. 
First, the new city map proposed the creation of new diagonal avenues, streets and parks and, 
overall, a whole new city. The second project maintained the blocks but widened some streets 
and contemplated a major monumental boulevard from the train station to the main square. But 
this city map did not happen either. What the architects were worried about was convincing the 
people of Chillán that modernism was better than old neoclassic and colonial structures. And in 
this they succeeded. But they could not convince them to give up their property rights in order to 
see these new avenues and plazas in the city. In fact, according to the Chillán newspaper La 
Discusión, the first time that Muñoz Maluska addressed the city council and the neighbors, in 
April 1939, he had no answers to the issue of expropriations of land and eminent domain. Would 
the state pay? How would the price be determined? (La Discusión April 13
th
, 1939). Specifically, 
the plans were rejected by the Association of Owners of Chillán. In colorful articles neighbors 
would express their wishes to maintain the original city map (La Discusión March 31, 1939), 
highlighting the right of owners to have a say in the future of their properties and calling 





In fact, most of the architects and urban planners that had proposed new city maps for the 
city had not even been in Chillán since the earthquake (Hidalgo 2011). Public servants in the 
area tried to calm down the issue by explaining the advantages of the new plan, and asking for 
faith in the knowledge of the people that were in charge of the new Chillán (La Discusión, May 
7, 1939). But the owners would not relent, and started to lobby to make their point: property 
rights should be respected (La Discusión Mayo 14, 1939). Many complained that the city map 
was “Prussian”, in other words, authoritarian from the central government (La Discusión Jun 14, 
1939).    
Illustration 5: Different plans for Chillán   
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Once more, like in 1906, the state was forced to mediate between the interests of different 
groups in reconstruction, and once more property won some battles over ingenuity.  The second 
city map presented by Muñoz Maluschka relented on most issues but it still meant some serious 
expropriations. In his view, Muñoz Maluschka believed that people should accept that their city 
was dead and contemplate its future together, leaving aside “mean individual interests” (La 
Discusión, May 19). For him, sentimentalisms like “the love for the land, the little house, the 
growing tree” should not be taken into account by a rational state (Pavez 1993). Still, this second 
time, Muñoz Maluschka got a better response from the population (La Discusión, 19 May 1939). 
But in the end the great quantity of expropriations proved to be a dead end. The Municipality, 
which had been completely cut out of the process of designing the city maps but still had to 
approve them, sided with the neighbors, that is, the owners of land in downtown Chillán.   
The city map that went through was the third one designed by Luis Muñoz Maluschka, 
whose major characteristic was to maintain most of the original plan, with its streets and plazas 
and parks, with only minor arrangements. Slowly, most streets were marked again where they 
were, just as plazas and the avenues in the perimeter. Nevertheless, the new plan was indeed 
modern and contemplated a complete planning of a new Chillán. Buildings were now built under 
the rules of modernism, with construction codes, resistance measurements and safety controls. 
They were now made of reinforced concrete, without romanticism, decorations or stylish 
facades, they were pure geometry, pure functional rationality.  Furthermore, zoning was a reality 
and activities were restricted to areas of the city; a new “Barrio Administrativo” surrounding the 
main plaza, a commercial area, with continuous façade of two or three floors, and a residential 
area, in the rest of the urban area (Torrent 2014). This zoning of the activities that took place in 
urban space was crucial in the view that Munoz Malushka had impulse from the part of the state 
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(Pavez 1993); it involved detailed descriptions of neighborhoods and the types of activities that 
should be developed in each one.  
Summary of the 1939 Earthquake  
The 1939 earthquake happened at a moment in Chilean history when considerable people 
were impatient for the state to take a more active role in the economy. These ideas had allowed 
Pedro Aguirre-Cerda to become President, but he had barely won the election and was in a bad 
position to fulfill his dream when disaster struck. After the quake, political equilibriums shifted. 
As a consequence, he managed to gain the votes of conservative senators in the most affected 
areas in order to create two new state corporations: CORFO and CRA. These organizations 
signified a complete change of route for the Chilean state; its new role was to function as the 
primary industrialist in the country. For this reason, I consider the 1939 earthquake a true 
political juncture for the Chilean state. After all, a new state emerged, establishing a new 
relationship with society. In the next period of Chilean history, the state will lead 
industrialization in the country and will attempt to have a role in economic planning, something 
the country had never seen before. It is true that this had been the intent of President Aguirre-
Cerda since before the earthquake; but it is also true that it was made possible by of the window 
of fluidity that the earthquake unlocked. New options were opened, discussed and exercised.  
Also, at the city level, we see again that destruction opened up opportunities for Chillán to 
renew itself. In this case the goal was to build a more “rational” Chillán, but there is a clear 
parallel with the case of Valparaíso: debris demands that decisions be made. And these decisions 
have not been, in any of the cases discussed here, to rebuild the city exactly the way it was 
before. Several plans were considered, even the abandonment of Chillán for a new location. 
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Finally, it was the zoning plan developed by the Minister of Public Works that was decreed to 
govern the city’s redevelopment. But, as in the case of Valparaíso in 1906, this was not managed 
in one fell swoop. On the contrary, it was the result of much negotiation and debate between the 
state and the neighbors and property owners of Chillán. For these reasons, I argue that at the 
local level catastrophe always mean a critical juncture, a moment of contestation where new 
possibilities are open and change finds the space to take hold.  
Also, we see that –as in 1906- the state has a prominent role in deciding what is to be done in 
the city. We can see this yet again when analyzing the final city map that was followed in 
Chillán; its main features were decided by the central Office of Public Works. Still, it is also true 
that the state (led by Muñoz- Maluschka) could not do exactly as it pleased. The catastrophe was 
a moment of negotiation, even contestation, where the state had to communicate with society 
more acutely than it did in normal times. But overall, we have seen once again that the state finds 
a place to expand its power in the local sphere after catastrophe.  
Finally, in terms of a risk perspective, we see that the state is not only considered responsible 
for reconstruction but also for taking preventive measures to avoid further disasters. This is 
evidenced by the CRA’s demand that Chillán, and all other cities under reconstruction, have a 
legally binding zoning plan in order to plan for the future (more in the next chapter).  
The Cataclysm Of 1960 
As we have seen from the previous two cases, during the twentieth century Chile suffered 
some of the worst catastrophes in the history of the world. But it was in May 1960 when the 
earth truly shook with all its force. First, on May 21st, it was the run of Concepción, arguably the 
city that has suffered the most earthquakes in the history of Chile. It was the holiday that 
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commemorates the Naval Combat of Iquique, and also the day the President of Chile gives his or 
her annual address to congress. The first quake came at 6:00 a.m. It lasted 35 seconds, with a 
magnitude of 8.3, and destroyed one third of Concepción’s buildings. During the same day, two 
more earthquakes, of magnitude 7.3 and 7.8, destroyed the rest (Rudolph 1960). However, this 
event is not remembered for those earthquakes but rather for the one that struck the next day. 
According to USGS it was geologically the strongest earthquake ever recorded (9.2 Ms), and one 
of the longest ever (ten minutes). That Sunday morning, people in Valdivia were anxious trying 
to communicate with friends and family in Concepción. The radio in Valdivia claimed that the 
city was entirely ruined, announcing every few minutes: “it is shaking again in Concepción!” 
(Castro 2007). At 3:00 p.m. there was another strong shock, and people worried, “Concepción 
again?” But no, since the day before epicenters were moving southward (Lomnitz 1970). Fifteen 
minutes later the earth started to shake again, this time with a loud underground noise, like a 
river of stones. And then came hell. It is not difficult to imagine how it was, considering the state 
of the zone afterward. Large areas of Valdivia sank as much as 13 feet, the earth opened in huge 
cracks swallowing everything from people to cars, whole villages were erased completely and 
landslides blocked rivers creating dangerous new lakes. It was, according to testimonies, “like an 
infernal underground lightening that destroyed everything in its path” (Olave 1961: 15).  And 
that was not all; ten to twenty minutes after the shock ended the ocean started to retreat, only to 
then return to shore in the form of a 39-foot wave. Then the ocean retreated again, only to come 
back two more times and stronger, destroying everything in its wake. According to testimonies in 
the fishing town of Corral, there were sixteen destructive waves. Overall, no catastrophe before 
had affected such a large amount of Chilean territory; 542,216 square miles containing one-third 
of the Chilean population and 65 percent of arable land (WB 1961) had been impacted. The 
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cities of Valdivia, Puerto Montt and Temuco were completely destroyed by the second day of 
shocks. The waves devastated everything south of Concepción, both in the mainland and on the 
islands. On Chiloé Island waves damaged four fifths of the buildings (Rudolph 1960). At least 
3,000 lives were lost and 300,000 people were left homeless and exposed to the hardship of a 
southern winter with its heavy rain (WB 1961). According to the government´s report, damage 
amounted to US$400 million and economic activity had been heavily disrupted. Three thousand 
people were dead and half the arable land of the country was destroyed. It was, by anyone’s 
standards, a true cataclysm.  
Luckily, because the location of the epicenter of the worst shock was Valdivia, a mid-sized 
city 530 miles south of Santiago, the disaster left the government in good standing to organize 
emergency and reconstruction. Also, President Jorge Alessandri had been in office almost two 
years before disaster struck, considerably more time that President Montt or President Aguirre-
Cerda. He was an engineer who had avoided partisan politics for years, in order to become the 
chief executive of the Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio (Chamber of Commerce 
and Production). Because he had no political affiliation he was considered “independent,” but for 
all intended purposes he represented the interests of the ruling economic class (Dominguez 
1981). In 1958 he was elected with the support of the right-wing parties in a tight election. 
Because no candidate had secured an overall majority of the popular vote, the choice of president 
fell to Congress, which chose Alessandri, who had a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals 
behind him. 
After decades of leftist rule, the Jorge Alessandri’s government meant a reorientation of 
political economy for Chile. The major problem of the last ten years had been inflation, and this 
topic dominated Chilean political debate. For Chilean economists of the left, the reasons for 
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economic problems were in the roots of social structure; the hacienda system was still in place, 
the distribution of income was skewed and, above all, Chile was dependent on mining (copper) 
(Dominguez 1981). But for the right and Chile’s dominant class, the problem was that since 
1939 the state had excessively intervened in industrial activities. This was the view sustained by 
presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri, who believed that: “the state is not efficient as a 
producer. It should limit its activities to assisting and stimulating the private sector” (quoted in 
Stallings 1978:65). He believed there was a need to reduce the intervention of the state in order 
to increase efficiency so that private parties could regain the initiative for economic development 
that had been taken away from them by the state (Dominguez 1981). Hence, when in office, 
Alessandri’s first political measures had been the creation of a “stabilization program,” with the 
help of the World Bank and other international organizations (WB 1961). This plan involved two 
areas of action. First, it involved reducing state intervention in the economy; and second, it 
increased the efficiency of the state bureaucracy in order to reduce taxes. The objective was to 
control inflation and balance the state budget. Also, with Alessandri came “The CEOs”, the 
executives of industrial and commercial enterprises who were supposed to introduce their 
managerial expertise in government and provide for the efficiency of the private sector. This new 
team implemented these policies, and others, like the reduction of state expenditure and taxes, 
restrictions to wage increases in the public sector and the introduction of a new monetary unit 
(the escudo).  
But after the earthquake, reconstruction and relief soon surpassed other issues, and in the 
1961 parliamentary elections President Alessandri saw massive losses. This forced him to 
change his strategy. First, he had to get more political, nominating some allied Radicals in his 
cabinet, abandoning the CEOs and moving his government to the left. And second, he had to 
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take a step back in his stabilization plan, including creating new taxes to pay for reconstruction, 
involving the state in economic planning, and even the eventual devaluing the currency. Hence, 
by the end of his tenure as President, Alessandri had completely changed his original strategy. 
He had a ten-year plan for the economy where the state had a leading role, he had added new 
offices for the state to manage reconstruction, and he had even started with Agrarian Reform 
(albeit tiny). As I will show next, this was not a product of the government’s convictions, but a 
direct result of the catastrophe, combined with the external pressure of the United State of 
America and the international offices that had funded reconstruction.  
Project for Reconstruction and Economic Recovery  
After the earthquake, the Chilean economy was on the verge of collapse; currency had been 
devalued and thousands of new homes were needed to accommodate earthquake victims and also 
previously existing poor families. In this context, one of the first actions of the government was 
to use the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (constitutional 2 percent) a mechanism 
created after the 1939 earthquake to manage precisely this type of emergencies (more in Chapter 
4). The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund allows the President to use up to 2 percent of the 
nation’s budget on emergency management. Then, two months after the disaster, the government 
sent a project to address the reconstruction in the southern regions to Congress. The bill included 
proposals to organize reconstruction and also for providing the funds for this goal. It did not 
contemplate the creation of any new institution because “this would produce more perturbation 
than benefit” (Alessandri 1960b: 1162), and it was not linked to a national development program 
because the President felt that this should be two separate projects (as the right had argued in 
1939: “both things should be discussed separately”). Furthermore, when addressing Congress to 
present the bill, the President argued that in economic terms it was imperative to continue with 
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the economic program sustained by the government before the quake (Alessandri 1960b). 
Alessandri had been criticized before for focusing only on stabilizing finances and not attending 
to economic development, but for him “this came from the conviction that [stability] is 
indispensable to create the conditions that will stimulate economic development and then the 
welfare of its citizens.” (Alessandri 1960b:39). Instead of creating new institutions, the project 
contemplated the modification of the attributions of some government organizations, like the 
Development Corporation, CORFO, and the Housing Corporation (the continuation of the 
Reconstruction Corporation of 1939). It also contemplated the creation of a committee for 
reconstruction (COPERE). Truthfully, this was more of a way to hide state growth than actually 
to avoid it. But it was also a way to control the effect of the quake in state bureaucracy.  To pay 
for reconstruction, the project contemplated the request of exterior loans but also internal taxes. 
Among other things, the project proposed a 1 percent increase in income tax for all workers.  
But the project could not be approved as President Alessandri designed it. After twenty 
consecutive meetings, the commission that revised the bill in Parliament had some major 
criticisms. First, they claimed to agree with the executive in that no new organization was needed 
and that it was better to strengthen existing institutions. But the commission proposed much 
greater changes to present state bureaucracy; they completely changed the project to include a 
restructuring of the Ministry of Economy (now to be called Ministry of Economy, Development 
and Reconstruction). It was not only a change of name, but also a change of attributions and a 
change of the role that the ministry would have in the Chilean economy. New attributions were 
not only related to reconstruction, but also included that the ministry lead economic development 
in the country. Now, the bill proposed, it should have an active role in planning. Thus, 
Parliament’s proposal was a direct critique of the government’s plan to discuss reconstruction 
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and development as separate issues. The same discussions were also taking place in the Senate, 
which concluded “it would be a mistake to deal with this problem in isolation, without paying 
attention to its connection with the rest of the country’s situation” (Actas del Congreso Nacional 
de Chile, 1960). Created after the 1939 earthquake, CORFO had been leading the country’s 
development in recent years, but in all that time it had not written an official national plan of 
development. In 1959, because of pressures from the World Bank, the president had asked 
CORFO to draft of a national plan, but it had not been done. Now, parliament was demanding 
the new Ministry serve this function.   
A second point of dispute was the issue of taxes. Leftist representatives felt that a rise in 
income tax would be a shock for workers, especially considering that their wages had been 
frozen in the last years as part of the stabilization program. Instead, they claimed, we should tax 
industry or at least, as some deputy fervently expressed, have a progressive rise in income tax, in 
a way that it did not affected workers. Mr. Vergara, the Minister of Finance, addressed Congress 
again, in the name of the President, and simply demanded the reinstitution of the increase of 
taxes that had been cut by the commission. Fervently, he argued that “we should lead by 
example, and demonstrate our capacity to raise money to help our countrymen in disgrace. A 
country that is not moved by the misfortune of several of its members is not a country that 
deserves external help” (Actas del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 1960: 2138). From the point of 
view of the executive, these taxes were needed to show the commitment of Chilean people to the 
earthquake’s initiative, and to “save face” when asking for money abroad. In the end, the 
government won this dispute and the tax was put into effect (Law 14.171).   
In terms of reconstruction, the new ten-year plan meant that the Housing Corporation 
(CORVI) dictated the norms for the implementation of a housing plan (CORVI was a 
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corporation created after the Corporation of Assistantship and Reconstruction of 1939). This was 
a national housing plan that Alessandri had announced before the earthquake (Alessandri 1960a), 
so there was no special plan for the areas most affected by the earthquake, only an increase in the 
amount of housing (El Correo, Aug 16, 1960). The plan was written by CORFO, and was based 
on the idea that private companies should build the housing, and the state’s role was to promote 
and plan this building (Hidalgo 1999). So, in summary, CORFO was in charge of national and 
regional planning, and the Ministry of Public Works (through CORVI) was in charge of city 
planning. They created regional offices in the regions affected by the earthquakes and gave 
contracts to consulting firms to design regional development city maps for areas such as Chiloé 
Island (Dominguez 1981). All of these institutions were governed by a new committee, the only 
new organization allowed by Alessandri. Named the Committee of Economic Cooperation and 
Reconstruction (Comité de Cooperación Económica y Reconstrucción, COPERE), it was in 
charge of organizing the different actors implementing reconstruction plans on the ground.  This 
committee was led by the Minister of Economics, Development and Reconstruction together 
with the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister of Public Works, the Minister of Mining and 
Agriculture; in addition, the Vice President and the CEO of CORFO, the Vice President of 
CORVI and the Director of Budgets also had seats on the committee.           
The Ten-Year Development Program  
From the beginning, the response to this earthquake was different than either of its two 
predecessors. The Chilean government once more reacted quickly, and once more used the 
military to maintain order, but this time the government had another ally: the United States of 
America. The day after the quake, fifty American planes brought food, medicine and hospital 
supplies to the most affected areas; it was one of the largest emergency relief operations ever 
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undertaken by the US in peacetime (U.S Dep. of State, 1961). But that was not all; the United 
States also contributed U$ 20 million to the costs of urgent issues (President Eisenhower’s 
grant). Certainly, it was not the first time that foreign countries had helped with donations to get 
through the emergency, but it was the first time that this help had arrived so fast, and that so 
much had come from the same country (for comparison, the country that helped the most after 




This dependency on foreign financing made the Chilean government very vulnerable to the 
pressures of international lending institutions and the United States. Foreign debt grew from 569 
million in 1958 to 1896 million in 1964 (Dominguez 1981). And this pressure, more than the 
pressure from Congress and the creation of the new Ministry, forced the Chilean government to 
accept the idea of development planning in spite of its initial strong liberal ideology (Dominguez 
1981). Embassy officials informed Alessandri´s administration “words alone would not be 
enough to obtain funds from the United States. Steps toward economic development and reforms 
that would eventually have positive effects on the social system will be necessary (Taffet 
2001:97). Conservative Alessandri, of course, was not supportive of this idea, but he desperately 
needed US funding.    
This contribution meant the beginning of a number of programs to assist the Chilean 
government in meeting the costs of reconstruction. First, “Operation Amigos” organized the 
major airlift operation to Valdivia and included two whole emergency hospitals in the city. This 
operation was valued at 4.8 US million. Then the previously mentioned grant of 20 million from 
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 Delays in the allocation of these funds resulted in an awkward situation. By 1961 Eisenhower´s presidential grant 
was at work in Chile, but none of the $100 million earthquake relief loan had reached the country. Those funds 
were allocated in April 1961. (King, 1998) 
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President Eisenhower became effective in 1961.  But more importantly, the U.S. authorized US$ 
100 million to help Chile in August 1961, under the Latin American Development Act. Unlike 
previous processes of reconstruction, this rebuilding effort featured new actors: international 
agencies. These loans were not like the loans from private banks used in the pass; this time, 
money came with strings attached. In some cases, loans were attached to specific “development 
projects,” in others to conditions to be imposed on the government. And the influence of these 
agencies was not small. In fact, they completely changed ideologies held by the government. As 
mentioned before, President Alessandri and his team of “CEOs” wanted to return to liberalism as 
much as possible. But first they needed to control inflation, and to help achieve this they had 
requested the economic and technical help of several international agencies, such as the IFM and 
the WB. When disaster struck, the Minister of the Finance (the same Roberto Vergara who later 
advocated for the reconstruction law in parliament) had just arrived from the U.S. where he had 
discussed the external funding required by the policies and measures of stabilization with the 
World Bank, and the World Bank had countered with the issue of planning. Even before the 
Alliance for Progress, the U.S. wanted its loans to be assured and this assurance was to be 
supported with both careful planning of the projects to be undertaken as well as by the plan for 
economic development of the country. Chile had resisted and, in fact, things were going 
decidedly in the other direction. For example, during the first years of the Alessandri 
administration CORFO had stopped investing in direct production activities and was instead 
providing credit (Dominguez 1981). But after the earthquake, a report of the WB cheerfully 
concluded:   
 “one of the most significant recent developments in Chile was the change in 
official attitude toward long-term programing of investment. The need for an 
137 
 
orderly approach to the manifold problems of reconstruction and development led 
the public authorities to initiate a ten year-development program” (WB 1961: ii).  
Despite the fact that Alessandri and his “CEOs” wanted to reduce the state as much as possible, 
the earthquake had made that impossible. First, reconstruction and recovery demanded that the 
state take charge. As Alessandri himself concluded in his 1961 presidential address to Congress, 
the difficult circumstances of the earthquakes in the southern regions now made it imperative to 
establish coordinated efforts to promote economic growth (Alessandri 1961). But also, the 
amount and kind of information requested by the international agencies implied more state 
control, not less (as Dominguez has noted before me).   
 The reluctant program covered the period from 1961-70, and envisioned investments 
totaling US $10 billion. Although the program had been prepared by CORFO a year before, it 
lacked official recognition until after the earthquake when “an orderly approach was much 
needed”. And, when gaining the favor of the WB was absolutely necessary. Then, the President 
addressed Congress, arguing: “we cannot limit ourselves in repairing the damage without giving 
due attention to economic recovery at the highest levels” (Alessandri 1961b: 33). This, he now 
claimed, required planning and coordinated action (Alessandri 1961b: 56). Officially called the 
National Program of Economic Development and Reconstruction (Programa Nacional de 
Desarrollo Económico y Reconstruccion), the program included a Housing Plan that was 
supposed to build 530,000 homes, of which 75.5 percent were to be funded by the government. 
This included homes for earthquake survivors but also for people who were in need of housing 
before the event. Overall, this project laid the foundations for economic expansion that was later 
138 
 
supported by the Alliance for Progress, and other countries adopted similar projects in years to 
come.
38
   
Overall, the United States was never entirely happy with Alessandri’s response to their 
demands. They felt that Alessandri was not entirely supportive of his own programs, even though 
he wanted U.S. funding (Taffet 2001). “There is no evidence,” the embassy of the U.S. in 
Santiago wrote, “that the Alessandri administration intended to really get down and grapple with 
most of Chile’s basic problems” (Taffet 2001:97). They felt that “true reforms” such as land 
reform and tax reform were not taking place fast enough. All the same, Alessandri felt that the 
U.S. had imposed too much on him, and claimed that the conditions forced upon him to receive 
the loan for reconstruction were “onerous and odious” (Korry to State Dep. 1967, on Taffet 
2001).  
A Safer Valdivia  
Valdivia is a city 530 miles south of Santiago, the capital. In 1960, when disaster hit, 
Valdivia was an industrial and shipping center, with two universities and footwear, beer and 
wood-processing factories. The map of the city was quadrilateral, in accordance with the 
principles of old colonial cities, and bound by several rivers. This means that Valdivia is settled 
in a river valley, close to the ocean, with large parts of it standing on artificial landfills. In this 
context, the earthquake dealt a severe blow to Valdivia’s economic base because the subsequent 
tsunami almost completely destroyed the area where factories were located, on Teja Island. 
Furthermore, in residential areas, between 60-80percent of houses were destroyed and the lower 
parts of the city were completely flooded (Castedo 2000).  
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 The plan was criticized by the recently created Alliance for Progress in 1962 because of its lack of social 
elements, particularly an agrarian reform (Committee of Nine, 1962).  In response, the Alessandri Government 
changed the economic plan to include plans in education and a tiny agrarian reform.  
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To make everything worse, the 1960 event did not finish when the earth calmed down; there 
were other challenges to be faced because of the landslides. The San Pedro River was obstructed, 
and this meant that the Riñihue Lake did not have a way to release its water. Catastrophe was 
looming again on the horizon because 4,800 cubic meters of water could course through the 
valley to the city at any moment. This situation prompted a huge operation known as “The 
Riñihuazo” where CORFO and other public offices un-obstructed the river and slowly evacuated 
the lake. But it took two months to achieve this task, and for those two months people in 
Valdivia had to be relocated to emergency camps in safer spaces. The Intendant declared a state 
of siege; the military took over the area and people had to carry special permits if they needed to 
be in the lower parts of the city. For people in Valdivia this was thought to be unnecessary and 
excessive on the part of the executive (El Correo Jun 3, 1960), but from the point of view of the 
government the situation was that dire.     
Then, unlike after other earthquakes, people were not discussing reconstruction plans as soon 
as they could after the disaster because they were still concerned with their own survival. 
Truthfully, after the earthquake of 1960 architects and authorities immediately started to dream 
of a new city, as had been the case in previous catastrophes of the same kind. On May 30
th
 the 
front page of the city newspaper, El Correo, read, “A better city will be re built” (El Correo, 
May 30, 1960). These were the words of Finance Minister upon his visit to the city, carrying the 
message of the President. Now, in this case a better city meant something different than it had in 
1906 and 1939; it was not about making Valdivia more beautiful or more “rational” but rather 
was about making it safer. A risk perspective was in full force; the new Valdivia should protect 
its citizens from the perils of the old one (El Correo May 30; Jun 3; Jun 4; Jun 8; Jun 30; Aug 
29, 1960; La Prensa Jun 3, 1960)). As El Correo newspaper demanded “not one wall should be 
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saved if it signifies imminent danger, or exposes the lives of the people.” (El Correo jun 30, 
1960). Academics and other scientists also started to analyze the effects of the earthquake 
immediately after it happened (La Prensa Jun 3, 1960; Jun 10, 1960). But when they noticed the 
problem with Riñihue Lake, this conversation stopped. From then on, all there was in the 
newspapers was discussion about when the city was going to be flooded. All around Chile people 
were alerted to the fate of Valdivia, and news channels talked of little else (Castedo 2000). 
Authorities were worried that people were not even helping with the removal of debris, or re-
opening their business because they were waiting to see what was going to happen with the 
“famous wave.” (El Correo, Jun 14, 1960). As the newspaper El Correo put it, “the city of 
Valdivia does not live, it only survives” (El Correo, July 1960). Finally, on July 3
rd
 the river 
started to carry water again, and on July 24
th
 the Riñihue was evacuating its waters normally at 
last. 
When people could finally return to the city, months after the event, there was little left to 
come back to. The river had not destroyed Valdivia but the parts of the city that were on artificial 
landfill were completely flooded, as well as Teja Island, where most of the factories were 
located. Now was the time to think about a new Valdivia, except that while the people of 
Valdivia were worrying about the Riñihue Lake, the state had approved a new map for the city, 
the “Emergency Zoning Plan” of 1960 (Fogle 1962; El Correo Aug 10, 1960). The guiding 
principle of the government’s plan was urban planning, “because it is needed to invest resources 
in useful actions,” according to Minister Vergara (El Correo, May 30 1960).  The paradigm for 
this planning was the reconstruction of Germany after the World Wars (El Correo, Jul 12, 1960; 
Jul 14, 1960). The planning was to be done by the office of Public Works in Santiago, together 
with CORVI (the Housing Office) and the planning process began in July 1960 (El Correo Jul 
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12, 1960). The emergency city map was based on the 1943 zoning plan, with the exception of 
those areas that were declared lost to the waters.
39
  A map of the new Valdivia city plan was 
presented in El Correo on June 15th. Changes must be made “where studies determine they 
should be,” claimed an editorial in El Correo de Valdivia, “not where some minority groups may 
want them to go” (El Correo May 30 1960, Jun 30, 1960).  The Municipality approved the plan 
in great haste (El Correo, Aug 10, 1960), but it took some time before it became effective, which 
delayed the start of several reconstruction projects (El Correo, Sept 17, 1960). With the delay, 
more people started attending the meetings at the mayor’s office between the municipality and 
the planners from the Ministry of Public Works. But in the end the zoning and regulatory plan 
from the central government prevailed.  
This does not mean that there were no alternative city maps to rebuild Valdivia from scratch 
nor that the map did not change at all. Alternatives were proposed, and changes were made. Most 
importantly, there was a city map from the Municipality’s city planning office that had the 
support of the International Development Bank. A month after the quake the New York Times 
reported that according to its special correspondent in Chile, “the earthquake-stricken provinces 
of southern Chile are coming to life again, with the ring of hammers, the rumble of bulldozers 
and the drift of smoke across the blue sky” (The New York Times Dec 4, 1960). Why was the 
New York Times so interested in the reconstruction in Valdivia that had a special reporter in the 
area? To start, reconstruction was being paid for in part with American money, but it was also 
people sent by the International Development Bank who were leading reconstruction efforts on 
the ground (IDB). Part of the emergency aid provided by the U.S. was directed at contracting 
U.S. consultants in city and regional planning to “act as advisors on planning in the earthquake 
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devastated areas of southern Chile” (Navarrete in Dominguez 1981). Even the president of IDB 
visited Valdivia within a month of the quake (El Correo, Jun 5 1960). The Ford Foundation also 
provided assistance with city planning for the housing projects financed by the IDB. These 
consultants assisted municipalities in building the new zoning and reconstruction city maps in 
different cities and towns (Valdivia, Concepción, Puerto Montt, Temuco, Corral, Coronel). But 
overall, the level of centralism in Chile frustrated the consultants because everything had to be 
reviewed by the office of Public Works in Santiago (Condon 1961; Friedman 1969). 
Interestingly, for at least one of the consultants this centralization of decision-making in Chile 
was (in part) the result of prior catastrophic experiences such as earthquakes (Stochr in Friedman 
1969), which is the idea of this dissertation.   
 
Illustration 6: Different plans for Valdivia   
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In Valdivia, the planner was a man by the name of Mr. Fogle. He had been charged with 
assisting in the implementation of a permanent office of planning in the Municipality and 
advising the municipal architects and the architects from the office of Public Works on their 
reconstruction and planning tasks. However, he found that: “due to the small staff and the grass 
roots nature of the project, it was necessary to assume responsibility and take direct actions 
which were not anticipated in the original concept of the job” (Fogle 1962: 6). As a result, he 
doubled his efforts and, together with the architects from the municipality, designed a new city 
map for Valdivia. The new Valdivia was designed with safety in mind, and as such, it was more 
and more terrain for expertise to say how it was going to be done.  The “Valdivia City Plan”, 
which took into consideration the 1960 emergency plan that created the framework within which 
the new municipality planners worked, was ready in 1961. It proposed not only a new city map 
but a new role for the city as a river port providing dock and transportation facilities. It also 
altered the road system inside the city to a significant degree in order to create an efficient 
transportation network (Fogle, 1961). This new city map certainly influenced what was going to 
happen with Valdivia. Though it never provided a legal framework, it did act as an enhanced 
version of the plan that was sometimes followed. For example, the dock in Las Mulatas was 
built, as were some of the new bridges, following the new city map. This was something that the 
people of Valdivia had wanted for a long time (El Correo Jun 3, 1960; Aug 17, 1960). But 
overall, the office of Public Works in Santiago won almost all of the battles, even though the 
planning office of the Municipality (with the help of American planners) were continuously 
lobbing to make their plan effective.  This city plan, approved by the municipality without much 
consultation with Valdivia’s neighbors, was in effect for years after the earthquake.  
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As we can see, changes in Valdivia after the earthquake were significant, and doors to 
different possibilities were opened. Furthermore, industry never fully recovered in the city; only 
56 of 86 industries reopened (Fogle 1962). New neighborhoods were created from scratch to 
build homes for the survivors as well as for those who had immigrated from nearby towns (as 
part of Alessandri’s housing plan). A new industrial area was also provided for by the new 
zoning plan, where surviving industries were relocated. The low floodable areas of the city that 
used to contain one fourth of the city’s population were practically abandoned (El Correo, Sep 
14, 1960). Finally, Valdivia was re-invented as a tourist destination, and is known as such to this 
day. Thus, we see that for Valdivia, the earthquake did mark a critical juncture. Decisions were 
made that resulted in critical changes for city planning and industry, and, in the end, turned 
Valdivia into a different city.  
Summary of the 1960 Earthquake  
The 1960 earthquake happened during the term of right-wing President Alessandri, who had 
been in power considerable more time than Montt or Aguirre-Cerda had been when disaster 
struck. For Alessandri, the earthquake meant being forced to change from a liberal economic 
policy to one in which the state played a central role. In fact, he was obliged to go beyond what 
his predecessors from the Popular Front had done and commence a plan for an agrarian reform. 
The reasons for this change were twofold. First, we see that the earthquake forced Alessandri’s 
hand and made him take an active role in reconstruction and development. Once more, we see 
that the earthquake has its own agenda, one that calls for a strong, centralized response to 
problems of security and destruction. Second, this case demonstrates the importance of the 
ideologies of money lenders in determining what kind of policies will be implemented in the 
country receiving aid. In this case, the United States demanded a development plan. But in a 
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different historical moment things could have been different. Today, the ideology of these 
international institutions tends to prefer open economies with fewer regulations. It is to be 
expected, then, that any intrusion today would have different results.       
At the city level, we have a slightly different story in the case of the 1960 disaster. This time, 
the state was able to impose its wishes more easily than in the past. This was in part due to the 
emergency situation presented by Riñihue Lake, one which allowed the state to plan when no 
one was paying any attention to the planning. However, alternative plans for the city were fully 
developed, most importantly by the planners sent by the World Bank. A new Valdivia emerged, 
demonstrating that –once more- at the city level destruction signifies a truly critical juncture.   
In terms of a risk perspective, we see that by 1960 this paradigm is fully developed. The 
reconstruction efforts in Valdivia were devoted to making it safer for future generations, and the 
state is seen as responsible for taking the correct measures to assure that this is the result.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have seen three cases where catastrophe has disrupted the existing 
political equilibrium and forced governments to make important, sometimes radical, decisions in 
order to bounce back from disaster. In all three cases, the catastrophe has meant that the state 
takes a different role in society than it held before the event. This is especially true for the 1939 
case, when President Aguirre-Cerda completely changed the role of the Chilean state by 
transforming it into a developer of industry and giving it a crucial role in economic planning. 
This was achieved by the creation of CORFO and the CRA, two new agencies in charge of 
recovery and reconstruction. But more importantly, these agencies allowed the state to plan the 
economy and give strength to a policy of imports substitution. Later, the 1960 earthquake was 
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also a critical juncture for Alessandri’s administration in the sense described by Pelling and Dill 
(2010). The catastrophe constituted a moment of crucial decision-making, where new options 
were not only opened and discussed but also chosen. Even if Alessandri was a reluctant 
participant in this process, the fact is that his government was forced to change its strategy, 
including the development strategy that it had set for the country. In that case, the path taken did 
not mean as much radical change as it had in 1939, but it certainly set the direction for the state 
for the decades to come (until the coup in 1973). Finally, with respect to the first disaster 
analyzed in 1906, it is not as clear that the earthquake did in fact constitute a critical juncture at 
the national level. There were certainly many changes following the disaster, but these were 
mainly at the city level. The state did take control of city politics, which constituted a major shift, 
but that shift was circumscribed to Valparaíso. The decisions made were certainly momentous 
and new options were opened, discussed and sometimes accepted. However, the effect of this 
critical juncture was limited to the city that had been the site of the catastrophe, even if the 
reconstruction plan of Valparaíso is believed to have set a new nationwide precedent of state 
intervention in urban planning. 
In fact, at the city level, we see that all three cases are examples of critical junctures for the 
affected cities and communities. I will argue that this is always the case when catastrophes are 
highly destructive of the physical environment. This destruction necessarily means that decisions 
must be made to “set things right.” Reinforcing mechanisms of path dependence are broken 
because it is cheaper to choose something different. Problems that may have existed before –for 
example, a lack of sewers- can become unbearable when combined with catastrophe, and this 
means that authorities must plan to solve them with an urgency that did not exist before. And in 
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this process of decision-making, different options are weighed, contemplated, discussed and 
debated; making these moments a truly critical juncture for cities and their residents.  
Taking all of these cases into account, one of the major conclusions of this chapter is that the 
effect of disaster in the political arena is largely explained by pre-disaster social and political 
conditions; in general, discussions that follow catastrophes were present in the pre-disaster 
moment. What happens with catastrophe is that a window of opportunity for true change is 
opened. In part, this window is brought about by destruction because debris and dirt force 
governments to do something. In other words, they are forced to make important decisions. And 
most of the time, these decisions mark the path that institutions will follow during throughout the 
subsequent period. But even if the disaster generates new problems, the debates stimulated by 
this destruction were present in the pre-disaster period.  Still, catastrophes can become a breaking 
point in the political status quo, increasing or changing these existing trends.  
On one hand, we see that these decisions tend to lean in the direction of greater state 
intervention in society. We have previously established that catastrophes are a qualitative jump 
above disasters. As such, they test the state in greater ways, and sometimes even threaten its very 
existence. Like wars, communities on their own cannot solve catastrophic events; they need a 
stronger power to protect them. Since wars and catastrophes are both a threat to the population, it 
is not far-fetched to expect a similar response from the state; particularly because the state’s 
basic role is to provide safety to the population. And in fact, this chapter shows that statement to 
be true. In general, disaster pushes for a centralized and strong response to emergency 
management. One clear way to look at this is by analyzing the city zoning maps that were 
created after a disaster; in all three cases the state played a leading role in deciding what to do in 
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the cities. Because streets had literally disappeared, the state could draw the new cities almost 
from scratch.  
On the other hand, another conclusion of this chapter is that the visions and philosophies of 
the primary wielders of power are imprinted in the decisions they make in emergency and 
reconstruction, although they cannot always do exactly as they wish. In this context of 
momentous decisions, the government has the upper hand in deciding what to do. As a 
consequence, the ideas, values and philosophies of these leaders are very relevant in determining 
what decisions are to be made. As mentioned in the previous chapter, ideas matter not only 
because they influence what solutions are considered but, more importantly, because they define 
what the problem is. However, it is also true that other political forces are at play. For example, 
the ideas of money-lenders seem to be crucial to define what is to be done. In the case presented 
here, money-lenders pushed for greater state intervention after catastrophe, but, as the political 
motivations of the lenders shift, the case could be completely different in another historical 
moment.  
It is also important to highlight that power-holders are not the only influential force regarding 
what is to be done in reconstruction; culture also plays a significant role. This is clear in the 
process of rebuilding cities and the most important values that inspire this process. In all three 
cases there is interest in constructing a better city, but this means something different in each 
case. In 1906, better meant a more beautiful and hygienic Valparaíso; in 1939, the idea was to 
build a “rational” Chillán, following the precepts of modern architecture. And in 1960, the 
objective was to redesign a safer Valdivia, including more full consideration of the risk 
perspective in the analysis. This shows once more that catastrophes are inserted in history, and 
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that this history determines how these events are interpreted, even if they are, at the same time, 
capable of changing this interpretation.    
Taking into account that the earthquake’s agenda pushes for a stronger state, but the visions 
and philosophies of leaders are also important and may go in a different direction, we found that 
when these two are complemented there is a stronger state-building effort. The earthquake acts 
as the perfect excuse for leaders to create a stronger state. As in the case of war, this means that 
the state acts as a racketeer, offering protection in exchange for more penetration in the 
population. In the cases where the leader does not want to increase state power, we still see some 
progress because, as mentioned before, the catastrophe has its own agenda.   
Finally, at the state level, it should be highlighted that when international agencies come on 
the scene they wield enormous power over what set of policies are implemented. In the case of 












Chapter 4 | INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES 
 
“The land is fertile and rich in minerals, but unfortunately, there is a price to pay: 
this shelf above the Pacific deeps in the direct line of one of the greatest 
earthquake belts in the world. The inhabitants of Chile, therefore, expect 
occasional earthquakes as we in Europe have come to expect occasional wars.”   
The Manchester Guardian, Jan 27, 1939: 10.  
Catastrophe makes states. That is the idea underlying this dissertation. At least in the 
Chilean case, I have shown that culturally and politically the state has had to adapt to enormous 
pressure generated by repeated catastrophes, and this has led to developments that are similar to 
what has been described to be the case of war in Western Europe. Specifically, I argue that these 
catastrophes have led to the development of new state capacities. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
cultural changes had been directly related to these catastrophes. And one of the most important 
consequences of these changes has been a social science view on disasters that sees the state as 
responsible for risk management and disaster prevention. As a consequence, the state is also 
responsible for fixing things when events go wrong and catastrophe happens. Then, in Chapter 3 
we have seen that, politically, the Chilean state has changed a lot in the period after catastrophes 
due to the fact that governments have to deal with destruction and recovery. These events have 
meant, in most cases, true critical junctures for the Chilean state. And finally, in this fourth 
chapter, I will show what the product of this process has been: new states capacities.  These 
capacities are embedded in the new institutions created after disasters, most of them existing 
until today to the benefit of Chilean society. They belong to different domains and there is 
considerable variation across cases. But, overall, they point out to increased state capacity after 
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disaster. And more importantly for this dissertation, these capacities are the direct result of 
catastrophe. 
THEORIZING CATASTROPHE AND STATE CAPACITIES 
 
It is widely recognized that state institutions exert considerable influence in many important 
outcomes, such as economic development (North 1981; Coatsworth 2008), democratic stability 
(Linz and Stepan 1996; O´Donnel 1993), conflict (Bhavnani 2006), among others (Soifer and 
vom Hau 2008; Hanson and Sigman 2013). In the field of disasters, we know that state capacities 
are closely related to the effect of catastrophes on growth; with countries with weaker institutions 
suffering significantly greater damage after catastrophes of similar magnitude (Rasmussen 2004; 
Toya and Skidmore 2007; Loayza, et al. 2012).  In this chapter, I will develop the issue of state 
building after catastrophe from this point of view: the development of state capacities. The 
definition of state building used here is based mostly in Tilly´s work. Accordingly to his theory, I 
defined state building as a process of increasing the capacity of states to interact constructively 
with their societies and to pursue its economic, political and social goals more effectively 
(Barkey and Parikh 1991). Hence, I see state capacities as the result of the process of state 
building, and as a measurement of state strength (Soifer 2008). A state that does not have state 
capacity is a weak state; one that manages to administer the territory effectively is a strong state 
(Migdal 1988).  
Unfortunately, state strength is a concept applied loosely in social sciences (Barkey and 
Parikh 1991). According to Hanson and Sigman (2011) there are no less than thirty-three 
different ways to measure the concept of state capacity in Political Science. Consequently, most 
agree that it is better to speak of state capacities, in plural, since the state has to achieve goals in 
different areas. Following Weber, there is a consensus that three are the base line: coercion, 
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extraction and administration (Hanson and Sigman 2013; Soifer 2008; Brautigam 2008). Hence, 
I conceptualize state capacity as a complex, multidimensional concept (Skocpol 1985) with these 
three dimensions to be analyzed in the following sections. By coercive capacity I refer to the 
state´s ability to protect the population from threats. Extraction refers to the ability of the state to 
impose upon the population it claims to rule, and administration capacity refers to the ability to 
provide services to its citizens.    
The effect is analog to what Tilly has shown for war-making, extraction, bureaucracies and 
their interactions to shape state-building. In fact, as I have shown in several parts of this project, 
war and catastrophes have many things in common, especially that they present a threat to the 
population and leave destruction in their wake. As a consequence, both constitute a test for a 
state that is seen as the ultimate provider of protection. In the case of disasters caused by natural 
agents specifically, the threat is permanent and inevitable; even if there is much to do in terms of 
managing the consequences. But, especially in the case of tsunamis, destruction of infrastructure 
is unavoidable. Furthermore, studies show that the risk of disasters that have never happened to a 
population (or have not happened in a long time) are harder to construct as a believable threat 
because people avoid thinking about events whose probability is below a certain threshold 
(Kreps 1984; Stallins 1995; Klinengber 2002). On the contrary, repetitive disasters such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes can be used consistently by the political system as a threat, especially 
in the period right after they have caused a catastrophe (Stallings 1995; Gill 2007). Furthermore, 
the logics of attribution of responsibility and guilt might work differently for different types of 
disasters, with greater political impact of those triggered by a natural agent (Stone 1997).  
The second link between wars and catastrophe is destruction. As I have argued previously, 
destruction of infrastructure is crucial to understand catastrophe’s effect in state-building. Like 
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with wars, reconstruction is a task for the state. Even if it is decided to externalize part of this 
task to private interests, reconstruction continues to be the state´s ultimate responsibility and it is 
to the state that people will bring their complaints. Reconstruction requires organization and 
money. And, just like wars, this means taxation and bureaucracies to organize reconstruction, as 
well as to collect and administrate this money. Also, preventing further catastrophe means to 
severely regulate and restrict freedom for the population. This means states need to penetrate 
their societies more and more, and in increasingly complex forms in order to ensure compliance 
of new regulations. And then, to organize both reconstruction and disaster prevention, we need 
strong and reliable state bureaucracies. As we saw in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of 
disaster state bureaucracies are created or strengthened (given new responsibilities) to deal with 
the aftermath of catastrophes; and extraction is needed to be able to fulfill these new state tasks, 
pay for the personnel, the materials, etc. As a result, catastrophes have an important effect on 
state capacities, disrupting the existing institutional equilibrium, particularly surrounding the 
state’s ability to extract revenue from society, the state’s legitimacy to establish standards 
(especially in areas related to housing but not limited thereto) and the possibilities for the 
creation of new state institutions.  
All of this will be dealt with in the next sections. For it, I have organized the exposition in 
four dimensions, following my definition of state capacities as multiple. First, I will discuss 
coercion capacity; then, I will continue with administrative capacity and taxation capacity. And, 
finally, I will add the dimension of state reach, trying to measure how far in the territory this 
increase in capacity has gone.     
COERCION CAPACITY 
Coercive capacity is central to describe any state, particularly in the Weberian tradition that 
defines a state as the organization that possesses the legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber 
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1918). In this tradition, coercion refers to the state´s ability to protect the population from 
external threats, to preserve its borders and maintain internal peace and to tame violence (Hanson 
and Sigman 2013).  Scholars have used a great range of variables to measure or indicate this 
aspect of state capacity. The most common ways of measuring coercion are military size, 
military expending and military personnel (Hanson and Sigman 2013). Other measurements refer 
to internal security, as the case of private security (Soifer 2012), lynching or “street justice” rates 
(Goldstein 2003; Godoy 2006) and violent crime rates (Soifer 2012). All these measurements try 
to grasp how much the state invests in security or whether it fails to provide it. None of these 
measurements are very helpful for this dissertation because they do not have a theoretical link 
with the management of catastrophe. Hence, I will try to show the effect of catastrophe on 
coercion using other variables.  
First, I will discuss how police forces in Chile have been shaped by catastrophe. Truthfully, 
the impact of catastrophe in growing rates of police officers and police stations is minor 
compared to other issues, such as worker strikes, but it still explains part of the history of police 
forces in the country. And certainly, it shows how, in the aftermath of disaster, the coercive 
power of the state finds a place to expand.  
And second, the main indicator of state coercion proposed here is very different from all 
other conceptualizations. I propose to look at seismic codes and regulations as a measurement of 
state capacity. Some may argue that these regulations are an example of the administrative 
capacity of the state. And for sure, there is a relationship between seismic codes and the 
development of new bureaucracies, but I choose to place this analysis in the coercive section 




Development of Police Forces as State Capacity 
The degree in which states can control crime is a sign of their capacity and determine their 
legitimacy. A state that fails to demonstrate its capacity in this regard can have its legitimacy 
undermined in the eyes of society (Shiu-Hing 2015). This is why crime rates have been used as a 
measurement of coercive capacity by some scholars (Soifer 2012). As the development of the 
military is a sign of increased security against external threats, the existing of an effective police 
force is a pre-condition for an increase in security against internal threats. This is why I argue 
that looking at the development of police forces is a proxy for measuring state strength. And 
also, the creation of new police departments and augment of personnel is a measurement of state 
growth. 
Earthquakes and Police Forces in Chile 
In Chile, right after independence there was an impulse to create a police system that 
wouldbenefit the nation, guarding institutional order. The first police bodies were created in 
1830 with two objectives; to control delinquency in cities and to repress rural bandits. At the 
beginning, they were subordinated to the central state and its regional representatives, the 
Intendants. But with the Law of Autonomous Municipalities in 1891, the police forces started to 
be dependent of communal power, in the hands of the mayor. The state continued to have police 
forces of its own in the most important cities, as were the Fiscal Police of Santiago, the Fiscal 
Police of Valparaíso and the Gendarmes, for the Araucanía (Miranda 2010). These fiscal police 
departments were specialized in the control of delinquency in cities, which has been linked with 
increased urbanization by some historians (Miranda 2010). But Bayley, who has studied police 
organization in seven European countries during their process of state building, suggests that 
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urbanization is not as important as political unrest as a trigger for changes in the police forces 
(Bayley 1975). In this case, the development is clearly also due to the increase in popular protest 
in the same period.  
Summarizing, by 1906 police forces were organized in a mixed system, with some under the 
rule of the state and some under the rule of local governments (municipalities). But there were 
already voices that asked for a centralized police. Therefore, a process started to make this 
happen. This process ended in 1927 when two centralized police forces were created, one 
militarized and one civilian (under the power of the government). In this development, the 
earthquake of 1906 was very important.  That year, the government re organized the Gendarmes 
into a new police that was national and not regional or constrained to the Araucanía.  
As was described in chapter three, Intendant Enrique Larraín took agile control of Valparaíso 
after the horrible disaster of 1906. He was able to do this because he put under his command all 
police and military forces in the region, including fiscal police and communal police. And after 
the emergency passed, the shortage of housing and the migration of people out of Valparaíso 
started to affect the police. People were leaving, but crime was growing. As a consequence, 
President Montt decided to increase both salaries and amount of police personnel in the country 
(Montt 1907). And also, in a speech to congress in 1907 he asked them to pass a law that would 
ensure “a fastest and more efficient police function”: to unite all police, including the gendarmes, 
in one body: the Regimiento de Carabineros (Regiment of Police). This regiment will have more 
resources and more personnel than all previous police bodies combined. The idea to unify police 
forces of the republic did not arise with the earthquake, it had been under discussion since the 
beginning of 1906, but it became a reality afterwards and in direct relationship with the need for 
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centralized police body in the city after the earthquake was remarked upon as having had great 
results. Truthfully, the biggest problem at the time was workers´ strikes, and this was the main 
objective of a stronger police force. But in his speeches to congress Montt linked this 
development to the earthquake (Montt 1907, 1908).  By 1908 this law was a reality and police 
personnel had augmented in every big city in Chile, including Valparaíso. Out of the 7,400 active 
policemen  in 1908, 1700 had been added since 1906 (a 23percent increase) (Montt, 1908).
40
  
Finally, in 1927 the decree consolidating the centralized Chilean Police Force (Carabineros de 
Chile) was in effect. This development had a strong effect in the size of the police too; for 
example, in 1908 a training facility was created, and the Escuela de Carabineros had its first 
official class in 1909.  
A similar effect occurred after the 1939 catastrophe in Chillán. President Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda also sent to congress a project to augment the number of police officers after the quake 
“since the catastrophe had demanded greater labors and more sacrifices” to the officers (Aguirre 
1939: 19). According to data provided to the author by Carabineros de Chile, by the end of 1939 
there were 774 new positions in the force, an increase of 3.7 percent (Graph 1). Of course, there 
is no way to know for certain if this increase happened before or after the earthquake, but since 
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 The final unification of police forces in one body, including the Gendarmes, will arrive in 1927.  
Graph 1:  Number of Police Force (Total): 1935-1941 
Source: Compiled by author with data from Carabineros de Chile. 
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the event happened in January 24, it is to be expected that most of the increase happened after 
the earthquake.  
Part of these “greater labors” that Aguirre-Cerda mentioned was the recognition of bodies. 
To do so, not only more detectives were sent to that work but also, a criminology lab was 
organized for this purpose (Decreto Supremo 2416) (Aguirre 1939). This lab was a step towards 
the professionalization of crime scene investigation in the country, and became a formal part of 
the police forces.  
In 1960 police forces were once again under pressure to respond to a major catastrophe. The 
earthquake “imposed to Carabineros a never seen before work of heroism, sacrifice and 
abnegation”, according to President Alessandri (Alessandri 1961). And the 1961 government´s 
public account claims that the earthquake caused the institution “considerable damage.” As a 
result, many of their offices had to be re-built, and in this process 42 new police stations were 
created in the country (Alessandri 1961). Also, for the first time in seven years the number of 
police officers augmented, with 432 new positions, an increase of 1.9 percent. 
      
Because one of the main problems the government faced while dealing with an emergency in 
Valdivia (530 miles from Santiago) was the lack of good communications, this became a main 
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Graph 2:  Number of Police Force (Total): 1956-1962 
Fuente: Carabineros de Chile, data sent to the author.  
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focus of reform. And this included the police forces; thus, the Police Air Brigade (Brigada Aereo 
Policial) was founded that year to help with the work in the affected areas, and was then used to 
combat crime in the whole country. This means that Police forces were allowed to have a whole 
new domain: the sky.   
Concluding, we can see that catastrophes have been good fuel for the increase of police 
capacity in the country. In each major event, police forces have increased its presence in the 
territory, helping the state to expand the reach of its control and broadcast its power to further 
territories.  It seems that, as Bayley (1975) has shown for Western Europe, periods of political 
turbulence are the principal factor associated with the rise of modern police systems. 
“Altogether, there is more evidence of an association between the development of police and 
political changes than with more subterranean social movements such as population growth, 
urbanization, industrialization, and criminality” (Bayley 1975:357). Also, Bayley has shown that 
usually policies and policing are bound together; he claims that in a general way there is an 
association between general growth of governments and expanded police. The Chilean case 
shows the same developments. For example, the National Identity Card was created in 1924, 
allowing police (and the state) a much more individualized control of the population.  
All things considered, earthquakes have been moments of political instability and prolonged 
popular discontent, and this seems to have led to greater police development, and with it, an 
increase in the coercive capacity of the state.   
Seismic Regulations as State Capacity  
One area in which disasters are known to have important consequences is hazards´ 
regulation. Accordingly, the twentieth century witnessed a spectacular rise in national activities 
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to deal with the environment, many of them created after disasters (Frank et al. 2000).  For 
example, after the Ohio flood of 1913 and the Great Mississippi flood of 1927 an extensive 
program on floods control affected the United States (Barry 1998). The Titanic´s disaster was 
followed by an increase emphasis on bulkhead construction, the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea was passed in 1914 and the United States government passed the Radio Act 
of 1912 (Eaton 1995). And in Chile, each earthquake has been both a test for old regulations, and 
a calling for new ones.  
There is no doubt that these new regulations restrict enormously the freedom of a population. 
In the case of seismic regulations, what is restricted is the liberty to choose where and how to 
live. And even if today we see building codes as normal, when they started people perceived 
them as extremely coercive. For example, Chillán´s newspaper La Discusión commented in an 
editorial in 1939 that “excessive regulation instead of benefiting progress, it holds it back” (La 
Discusión Jun 13, 1939). More recently, liberal economist Milton Friedman showed his concern 
that building and seismic codes were getting too coercive for individual initiative and 
commented that “building codes impose costs that you might not privately want to engage in 
(…) How those productive resources are used is determined not by the private interests of the 
individuals who dispose of them but by governmental mandates” (Levy 1992). This is why 
building codes are essentially coercion, even if its implementation also means an increase of 
administrative capacities; individual and collective rights are relinquished to (or captured by) the 





Seismic regulations in Chile 
As authors have shown, changes and improvements in the building techniques used in Chile 
had advanced almost exclusively thanks to earthquakes (Torrent 2013). As a result, Chile has 
today one of the most strict and exhaustive building codes in the world (APEC 2013). This is 
accompanied by a strong program of verification and enforcement of these regulations on the 
part of the state. These regulations are certainly a hindrance for innovation and make 
constructing in Chile more complicated and expensive. But both programs have been very 
effective in saving lives, as the evaluations of damage after the 2010 earthquake show (Cisternas 
2011; Cepal 2010; Betanzo 2010; Bitar 2010). This is extraordinary considering that the 
enforcement of rules is known to be low in Latin America (Levitsky and Murillo 2012), even if 
Chile is recognized as one of the stronger states in this regard. What this shows is the enormous 
power that the state has gained in both urban planning and even private plans of construction. In 
this section I will show how deep state control has gone in this area in Chile due to disasters.  
By 1906 there were no seismic codes in the country. In fact, there were no regulations on 
buildings at all. Some cities had protocols about zoning, the widening of the streets and such, but 
their intention was more to maintain a certain esthetics than anything relating to safety. An 
exception was Valparaíso that had implemented fire regulations since 1873. Unfortunately, this 
fire walls were death traps in the 1906 disaster (Martland 2009). But at least Valparaíso had 
some experience with safety regulations that other cities did not. After the 1906 catastrophe the 
new regulations made by the Reconstruction Board included some restrictions related to 
earthquakes; specifically, streets were now demanded to be wider in the city, which meant 
expropriating the front line of most properties. Still, these regulations did not apply to all Chile; 
it was a city regulation, albeit decided by an organization that depended on the central state.       
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However, after the 1906 earthquake the government decided to create the National 
Seismological Service (more in the next section) and his founder, Fernand Montessus de Ballore, 
from the beginninglobbied for regulations not only on city planning but also in construction; this 
is, the materials and techniques that were being used to construct edifications in the country. One 
of the first articles on the bulletin of the newly founded Seismological Service was about “The 
Art of Building in Earthquake Countries” (1907) and Montessus de Ballore started to teach a 
class on earthquake resistant construction in 1909 in the Engineering School of the University of 
Chile.  He later made a proposal for a law on seismic construction (based on the only available at 
the time, created in Italy in 1908). He was not alive to see this proposal become a regulation, but 
it happened in 1928 after several other small earthquakes hit the country.  
In 1928, a major earthquake hit Central Chile again causing damage from Valparaíso to 
Concepción (300 deaths were counted). This quake was small compared to that of 1906 and the 
one to come in 1939, but it led to some important institutional developments.  Specifically, the 
government created a committee to finally write a law for the regulation of construction with 
seismic standards. The General Law of Urban Construction and Development (Law 4563) 
prescribes the first building codes in the country, and one of the first to exist in the world that 
includes regulations for seismic-resistant buildings. A very exhaustive regulation, the law defines 
nine types of buildings and states for each a norm to be earthquake resistant. It includes a 
definition of materials, procedures of construction, acceptable loading, wind resistance and other 
restrictions. The law was meant to change forever the type of building that people constructed in 
the country, and so it did (Torrent 2013). Now, if you wanted to use brick, there were specific 
norms, restrictions on the width and height of the walls, depending on the depth of the 
foundations and other things. It did not make it impossible to use brick, but it did make it less 
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appealing. Much worst was the regulation if you wanted to use adobe, the traditional material in 
Chilean houses. With the law of Urban Construction, this type of traditional building was going 
to practically disappear from Chilean cities. The effect that this regulation had in the type of 
architecture in Chile has been noted by many authors (Torrent 2013). In fact, it was the opening 
door to modern architecture in the country (Eliash and Moreno, 1985), a type of architecture that 
is intimately related to construction laws for structural calculation, edification permits and urban 
development planning. It was promoted by the state through regulation and the creation by law 
of the Colegio de Arquitectos (Architects Association) that regulates the professional field (see 
Eliash and Moreno 1985; Aguirre 2004).   
The code was in fact and advancement in terms of safety, and reports after the 1939 
earthquake point out that the new buildings (constructed after the law had passed) were more 
resistant (only 20 percent of the new constructions suffered irreparable damage, compared to 67 
per cent of adobe construction). This led to the population accepting new restrictions more 
willingly, as a newspaper at the time explained: “The earthquake has acted as a tinkle of magic 
that, after shaking us cruelty and by surprise, has prompted an awareness of the efficacy of 
edicts, decrees and laws of all kinds, whose weight we usually accept only reluctantly” (La 
Nación Jan 27, 1939). The state report after the earthquake of 1939 in Chillán was clear: “The 
Law of Constructions has proved its efficiency when faced with the earthquake, therefore it must 
be incremented” (Torrent 2013) and indicated a series of reforms to be made, especially against 
the adobe constructions. Overall, the classical, most traditional way Chilean houses had been 
built for centuries was going to disappear under the hand of the state´s regulatory power. Old 
houses could still exist, of course, but earthquakes were doing their part in leaving only a few 
standing. Now everything new was to be built with concrete.  
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The only aspect the law was found lacking by the report was zoning. Buildings were in fact 
being built with new, seismic proof, regulations. But cities were still not being planned. The 
argument that to prevent major disasters the state should control the expansion and ordering of 
the cities had been present in the 1906 earthquake and the experiment in Valparaíso. But it had 
been more talk than doing. Proposals form the executive; the Architects association and the 
Institute of Urbanism were not being set into practice. But after the 1939 debacle there was again 
an opening for more regulation, and there was also a new institution to carry this trough: the 
Reconstruction and Assistantship Corporation (CRA). The debate after the earthquake was once 
again heated, and even the option of founding the cities in new places was at the table. The big 
arguments of architects and planners were all present in Chillán´s reconstruction. While after 
1906 a new technique had been imposed by the state, now it was going to be a new city ordering. 
Furthermore, the city was now at the center of a new economic order based on industrialization. 
Now, every commune had to have a zoning plan.   
This is how, by 1960, the worst earthquake in recorded history left less deaths and 
destruction than the 1939 disaster. In fact, the worst damage was done by the tsunami and not the 
quake (the same happened in 2010). It is thanks to regulations and technology, claimed El 
Mercurio´s editorial in the first anniversary of this event, what allows Chile to say to the earth: 
“it is true that you hit hard, but I have learned to be ready.” (El Mercurio (Santiago) May 21, 
1961).  
Later, the urgency created by the disastrous events in 1960 was reinforced by another 
earthquake in 1965, which was the most serious to hit the country since 1906 (Lomnitz, 2004).  
As a consequence of these two quakes, and looking at the long term, regulations to build anti-
seismic buildings were once more revised and brought up to the strongest standards of the time 
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(Norma Nch-433). After that, the state has revised the norm after every significant earthquake in 
the country, making sure it is up to date. This includes new norms in 1972, 1985 and after the 
2010 disaster. But the bulk of the regulation happened in the twentieth century, after that it has 
been more a problem of incorporating new materials and techniques. And, as mentioned before, 
the performance of this normative has been considered good, which also means that the state has 
been successful in enforcing it.   
Conclusively, albeit not a traditional measurement of state strength, the increase of seismic 
regulation can be seen as such because it forces the population to give up their freedom in order 
to obtain protection, in this case against nature´s forces. In the case of Chile, we see that this 
regulation has become more and more coercive after every major disaster, making the state 
stronger as a cause of the event.  
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 
Administrative capacity is the broadest of these three dimensions of state strength, and 
includes the ability to produce and deliver different public goods and services, the ability to 
regulate commercial activity, and to develop state policies (Hanson and Sigman 2013). Besides 
hazard regulation, disasters may also reveal other areas in which new regulation is much needed, 
or wanted. For example, disasters typically offer an opportunity to address long term material 
problems in local housing and infrastructure. It is not only that disaster creates problems by 
destroying infrastructure; also, we see that problems that were tolerable before the event become 
intolerable after disaster happens. For example, the need fornew public health standards may 
arise with greater clarity. And also, in some cases earthquake’s destruction simply gives a chance 
for institutions to rethink themselves from scratch, or for new institutions to emerge. This is 
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certainly what has happened in Chilean earthquakes. These new institutions are born in 
reconstruction process, in order to solve the problems generated by the disaster, but are 
maintained as permanent administrative resources for the state, even when emergency has 
passed. This makes the Chilean state stronger in everyday life. In fact, as I will show next, many 
of these institutions were planned as non-permanent, and ended up not only becoming 
permanent, but growing enormously until they become Ministry offices.   
1906 Catastrophe 
The aftermath of the sad night of 1906 was marked by the reconstruction of Valparaíso, as 
described in chapter three. A Board of Reconstruction was created to design and rebuild 
Valparaíso, which meant that the state would gain significant power in city politics. But this was 
not all, at the state level the catastrophe meant some important institutional development that 
increased the state´s administrative capacity. In the context of the period, thesenew institutions 
are very important steps in the way of state building.  
As it has been mentioned before, by 1906 Chile was in a parliamentary period that was 
closest to an oligarchy than a democracy. And this oligarchy believed in liberalism, this is, they 
believed that the state should stay out of as many issues as possible. The consensus among most 
historians is that government intervention remained low during the parliamentary period, and 
that social policies in the country developed only after the end of the period, in 1924. According 
to Urzua and Garcia´s study of Chilean bureaucracy, in this period, state´s administration is 
reduced to a minimum, and with few attributions (Urzua and Garcia 1971). Even so, this 
structure has strong capacity in the sense that it has been evaluated as doing very well, those few 
number of tasks that it should be doing. Mainly, to control mineral exports (Urzua and Garcia 
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1971; Fernandez 2003).  However, recently historians have shown that the roots of social 
policies in the country can be traced, albeit lightly, to the parliamentary republic (Mac-Clure 
2012; Yañez 2008).  As I will try to show next, the earthquake of 1906 was crucial for the 
development of some of these first initiatives of state intervention. And this is something that 
historians have failed to notice.  
National Seismological Service (Servicio Sismológico Nacional, CSN). The 1906 disaster was a 
push for the development of sciences in Chile. Discussions about the nature of the quake were 
heated, with different scientific and proto scientific theories fighting to become the dominant 
paradigm to interpret the event. In fact, the earthquake of 1906 had been predicted; a formal 
announcement had appeared in El Mercurio newspaper the days before written by a Navy officer 
who used the position of the stars as his method (also called Solectrics). These predictions lead 
to a series of new announcements of earthquakes in the days after the event. If the original 
announcement was lucky, the rest was not. But people were still spending the nights under the 
stars fearing the shocks that were being prognosticated to no avail (Giordano 2013).
41
 The 
problem was such that the government had to prohibit further announcements.  
With a firm commitment to develop a more scientific account of the earthquake, the 
government created a Scientific Commission for the Study of the Earthquake (Comisión 
Científica para el Estudio del Terremoto) with the aim of collecting all possible information 
about the earthquake. With this in mind, the commission travelled around Chile asking what had 
happened in different communities and what changes had been observed in the environment. But 
this commission could not fulfill their mission completely since information was scarce and 
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 For more on this story and how the officer managed to get his prediction right see the interesting little book by 
astronomer José Luis Giordano. (2013). La predicción del terremoto de 1906 ¿ciencia o fantasía?  Editorial 
Académica Española.  
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witnesses’ accounts were dissimilar even in the same cities (Valderrama 2013). As a 
consequence, the government decided to found the Servicio Sismológico de Chile (Chilean 
Seismological Service) that opened in 1908 (National Seismological Center of today). This 
center was dependent of the Minister of Public Instruction (later, Ministry of Education) and was 
the first of its kind in Latin America.  
The government hired seismologist Fernand de Montesuss de Ballore, a French nobleman 
and pioneer of seismology. He developed the SSC, installing one of the best seismological 
networks at the time and advocating for what he called “the art of building in seismic countries.” 
Before he arrived to Chile Montessus de Ballore was already well known as a seismologist; he 
had published twenty-three articles on the historical seismicity of different regions of the world; 
had been participating in international meetings and kept abundant correspondence with the best 
seismologists around the world. Once in Chile, he installed the first seismological station in the 
country, started in 1908 with a station in Santa Lucía Hill. Later, stations were constructed in 
Tacna, Copiapó, Osorno, among other places (Valderrama 2013).     
Also, Montessus de Ballore carried out an impressive academic work with worldwide 
earthquake data. In fact, the first issue of the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 
published, in the first page, a map of the distribution of seismological stations in Chile by 
Montessus de Ballore. Likewise, the observations about Chilean earthquakes were published in 
the newly created Bulletin of the Chilean Seismological Service. The bulletin covered all kind of 
geological issues: the lack of periodicity of Chilean earthquakes, the development of seismology 
in Japan, and the seismic folklore of Chileans and other cultures, among others.  
169 
 
In this Bulletin, Montessus de Ballore constantly rejected the idea that the planet or any force 
outside the earth´s crust could cause earthquakes. He thought that because measurements of 
earthquakes started as one more column in metrological reports seismology has been doomed to 
carry this “astronomical yoke”. But the “rational alliance to make”, in his opinion, was with 
geology. However, Chileans were disappointed by the fact that Montessus de Ballore’s method 
lacked any type of prediction of earthquakes. On the contrary, they believed that the astronomic 
theories sometimes got it right. At this point in history, the faith in science in Chile was at its 
highest; there were big expectations, and Montessus was not able to fulfill them. As a 
consequence, he suffered personal attacks in the press. But the state defended him and 
maintained him in his post.  Montessus answered calmly explaining that the state of scientific 
knowledge about earthquakes had not yet arrived to a profound understanding of the nature of 
the process, and therefore there could be no prediction but there could be prevention. And this is 
probably the most important legacy of Montessus de Ballore: his focus in seismic building.  
Today, the National Seismic Center still exists; its mission is to deliver seismic information 
to the National Office of Emergency (ONEMI) and to the Hydrographic and Oceanographic 
Service of the Chilean Navy (SHOA). In February 2011, after the 2010 disaster, the CSN set up 
65 seismological stations around the country, one of the most impressive seismographic 
networks in the world.   
National Bureau of Ports. (Junta Central De Obras de Puertos) As described in chapter three, 
after the earthquake of 1906 the destiny of the Port was not easily solved. For one side, the plan 
for reconstruction of Valparaíso that was finally approved did not include an inner harbor, or any 
harbor at all. On the other side, the commission of the port continued to session even before the 
construction of the city was underway; under the assumption that the Krauss Project had to be 
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built as it had been planned before the earthquake. This was not the only problem in the 
administration of ports in Chile, but it was certainly one of the most important ones (Falgade 
1906; Hernandez, 1926).  
The government, then, decided to create a National Bureau of Ports to design and present a 
national policy for ports that should start with Valparaíso and San Antonio. For Alberto Fagalde, 
director of the port´s board, the lack of a general guidance on ports from the national level was 
one of the causes of the lack of appropriate infrastructure (Falgade 1906). The new institution 
was approved on September 1910 (Law 2.390), in its 5th article it clearly states that the President 
can use whatever land he decides for the expansion of the ports. A little too late to take over the 
plain of Valparaíso, since by 1910 the new El Almendral was deep in its way. But still, the 
enlargement and betterment of the port reinforced the shift towards greater state involvement in 
the city (Martland 2003).   
However, the new bureau and its executive powers did built a new port in Valparaíso. And 
furthermore, to make sure the port was safe during further calamities, the refurbishing of the port 
included a huge renovation of Valparaíso´s hills, including paving of the streets and the 
construction of sanitary lines that would also help with heavy rains and avoid flooding the  port 
area (as it used to happen before the quake). With the National Bureau of Ports, the state finished 
taking control of the city and set the bases for urban planning in Chile in the years to come.  And 
also, the state had a new institution to administer ports in the whole country.  
The Bureau of Workers´ Statistics (Oficina De Estadísticas Del Trabajo). The 1906 
earthquake created new problems in Chile´s labor market and workers’ situation. For example, 
housing for workers was a real issue; and after the earthquake it became worse. As a result, many 
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workers left Valparaíso for Santiago or for the north.  This generated a lack of workers in 
Valparaíso, with an increasing demand for reconstruction. As a consequence, wages for 
construction workers in the city grew considerably, which created a problem to find workers for 
other industries (MOP 1907).  
To tackle this problem, the Ministry of Industry and Public Works (Ministerio de Industrias y 
Obras Publicas) created the Bureau of Workers´ Statistics. The decree that creates this office 
clearly states that “the need to start to produce statistics about workers became imperative after 
the catastrophe” (MOP 1907: 1). The new bureau was created by executive decree, with no 
involvement of parliament. It was a small office, only three people worked there during the first 
years (Mac-Clure 2012).  But it will become a crucial tool of the Chilean state, acquiring greater 
attributions in 1910 as the Bureau of Work (Oficina del Trabajo), and later becoming what is 
today the Ministry of Labor.   
Most historians of the period have not even noticed the creation of this bureau, and its 
importance for the development of social policies in the following decades. But Yañez (2008) 
has traced state social intervention in Chile directly to this office. According to the author, the 
creation of the office responded directly to the interest of the executive to interfere in the “social 
issue” (Yañez 2008: 24). The office was not in the agenda of any party, nor the workers’; it 
occupied no place in political debates at the time. Neither was it the product of formalizing a 
process that was already happening; statistics about workers and workers’ conditions were 
nonexistent until the creation of the office (Yañez 2008: 23). What Yañez´s study of the first 
years of this bureau shows is that the aim of the office was clear: to intervene in society, and to 
legitimize state intervention in the relationship between workers and their employers. And 
because of this, we can say that the office defines a new, direct, relationship between the worker 
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and the state that did not exist before the earthquake. In fact Yañez (2008) shows that there was a 
constant intent, on behalf of the office, to increase its authority from mere statistics to having the 
power to inspect factories and regulate negotiations between workers and factory owners. The 
first projects for the bureau included these attributions (MOP 1907: 6), but it was later refuted 
because of the opposition of several ministers. The work of inspecting workers’ conditions was 
in the hands of the municipalities, along with all regarded to hygiene and health. The problem 
was, of course, that municipal governments were formed by the most illustrious citizens of such 
city, including factory owners. For this reason, the creation of an Office of Labor Inspection had 
to wait a few more years, but it will exist after the consistent lobby of the Office of Worker´s 
statistics.  
The work of this office in the decades to come, especially during the decline of the nitrate´s 
boom, was crucial for the development of autonomy of the Chilean state (Yañez 2008). Also, it 
was crucial for the development of new social policies since reality does not exist until we 
measure it. The politics of knowledge and its control determine outcomes. And here is where the 
power of the new office resided, by measuring reality it made it visible. 
Summary  
As we can see from the previous section, the 1906 disaster was not immune to the effect of 
catastrophe, even if the government at the time of the Parliamentary Republic was mostly against 
any state growth. In fact, we see an increase in state capacity in different domains. For one side, I 
argue that the 1906 earthquake is the culmination of this process of paradigm change that I 
started to describe in Chapter 1 with the 1822 case. The creation of the National Seismological 
Center is reflection of this change. Also, we see that the states decides to organize a field that 
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was disordered and collapsed after the disaster; the administration of ports. It was not that new 
problems arise with the earthquake, but the same problems became unbearable. The solution 
then, was a stronger state. Finally, and most importantly, we have traced the development of the 
first social policies in the country to the earthquake, with the creation of the Bureau of Workers´ 
Statistics. It is true that the most important role of this bureau will come later, with its 
development into a Labor Office. But the creation of this office is intimately linked with the 
needs created by the earthquake. Overall, what this case shows us is that even when there is no 
political intention, destruction has its own agenda. Some problems have to be solved, and 
increasingly the answer to these problems will be the state.   
1939 Catastrophe. 
By 1939 Chile had a profoundly different state than in 1906. The parliamentary system had 
collapsed after 1925, giving place to a presidential system. Also, there were several changes in 
terms of public policies; the first housing policies were enacted in 1906, the first health policies 
in 1918 and public education was growing. However, historians agree that the role of the state in 
economic development was still nonexistent. The governments of Carlos Ibañez-del-Campo 
(1927-1931) and Arturo Alessandri (1925; 1932-1938) had attended the necessities of “the 
people” by creating a more charitable state, but not one that took control of the fate of the 
country, or even one that was responsible for their economic future. The “social laws” of 1925 
attended the most crucial needs of the proletariat- housing, health and education- but did not 
change an iota of the economic system of the country. In fact, the intervention of the state in any 
area of the economy or industry was either nonexistent or very low (Larrañaga 2010). The 
politics of liberalism had survived the revolution of 1925 even if the parliamentary system did 
not.   
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But by 1939, newly elected President Pedro Aguirre-Cerda had a completely different idea of 
the role the state should have in the economy (Fernandez, 1938; Super 1975). And he got elected 
because he promised to make the state accomplish this role. However, we know from Chapter 3 
that without the earthquake it is very difficult that he would have managed to fulfill this dream. 
The earthquake certainly opened an enormous window of opportunity, a political juncture where 
a whole new political path was set for the country. The change in terms of public administration 
was enormous. If in 1940 4.2 per cent of the population was working in public administration, by 
1955 this number grew to 5.4 per cent (Urzua 1971). And this change is reflected in the creation 
of two new state institutions: CORFO and the CRA. As I showed in Chapter 3, the conservative 
right presented no argument against the creation of the CRA because its role centered in 
reconstruction, but they refused CORFO because its focus was economic planning. After some 
significant political wrestling, both institutions were approved by congress (with the crucial vote 
of the conservative deputy that represented the district of Chillán, the most affected by the 
earthquake). The conservative right was not happy; they feared CORFO would mean a bigger 
state. And they were right. In fact, not even in their worst nightmares could they have imagined 
what CORFO would mean in terms of increasing the administrative capacity of the state in the 
years to come. And furthermore the CRA, that was supposed to be a momentary apparatus, 
ended up becoming the permanent Corporación de la Vivienda (Housing Corporation, or 
CORVI) and then absorbed by the new Ministry of Housing (1965).  
Reconstruction and Assistantship Corporation, CRA. The CRA, Reconstruction and 
Assistantship Corporation, was responsible for the assistance of victims and rebuilding of 
infrastructure of the zones directly affected by this natural disaster. This included designing the 
zoning plans for the cities destroyed, leaving municipalities as a consulting body. It also included 
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the administration of the loans for reconstruction and to declare eminent domain in every piece 
of land that was needed to fulfill the mandate of the corporation.    
Time will give more relevance to CORFO, but it was the CRA that was in charge of 
reconstruction in 1939. Depending directly of the Finance Ministry, that oversaw reconstruction, 
it is in this corporation that we see first the new role of the Chilean state; it was not only about 
making Chillán again, but about setting the foundations to make Chile again  (Carvajal 2011). 
The CRA was in charge of reconstructing houses, either by loaning money to the families 
affected or by constructing new buildings in the case of fiscal constructions. Its initial 
calculations pointed out that at least 30,000 new houses were needed in the area most affected 
(Behm, Política de la vivienda seguida por la Corporacion de Reconstrucción y Auxilio 1942). 
But furthermore, the CRA was giving the responsibility to reconstruct public infrastructure and 
to draw zoning plans for every city or town that needed to be totally or partially reconstructed. In 
this context, the CRA could expropriate, sell or buy whatever property that they saw fit (Law 
6334) (Behm 1942).  
The CRA is also a good example of what Tilly (1985) calls “displacement effect" and others 
have call “ratchet effect,” this is, that temporary increases in state power are thought as 
temporary but at the end never reversed. This effect is expected after wars or other “major 
disturbances” (Legrenzi 2004), and it has been confirmed by different studies. Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961) established that in the United Kingdom while in normal periods governments 
grow regularly, during wars the public resistance against government growth is lowered, in order 
to finance military expenditure. In this line, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995) showed that most 
European countries exhibited a relevant growth of governments after the World Wars; and that 
institutions created in this period are maintained in the post war period. The same has been found 
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by Higgs (1987) for the United States. Moreover, some of these authors have shown that “other 
major shocks in the economy” different than wars can also unleash these mechanisms (Peacock 
and Wiseman 1961; Legrenzi 2004; Higgs 1987). For example, Nomura (1995) has found 
evidence of a displacement effect in Japan after the oil crisis and Higgs (1987) in the case of the 
United States and the Great Depression.  
In this line, I am arguing that catastrophes are one of these moments in where an increase in 
the size of government is clear, and –as I have shown with this example- institutions have a 
tendency to endure even when emergency has passed. In the case of the CRA this is most 
extreme. The initial mandate of the CRA considered a limited range of zones and a sunset clause 
after six years. In fact, the conservative circles had agreed to the creation of the CRA from the 
beginning only because they assumed this was a temporary institution.  But after consecutive 
small quakes and fires, different updates to the law extended its mandate four times and 
expanded its operation area to almost every region of the country42. In 1953, it was still operating 
and was integrated into the newly created Corporación de la Vivienda (Housing Corporation, or 
CORVI), a state institution with the responsibility of administrating public housing in a stable 
way, as opposed to depending on natural disasters to provoke action (this later became the 
Housing Ministry) (See also: Carvajal 2011).  
From 1939 to 1953 the CRA created 6.759 new houses; 5.125 via loans and 1.454 through 
direct construction. Also, it constructed 2.113 emergency apartments that lasted for much more 
than the emergency phaseafter the disaster (Bravo 1959). Overall, the CRA changed the housing 
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 The Corporation operated first in the Provinces of Talca, Linares, Ñuble, Concepción, Biobío and Malleco. With 
time, the following areas were added: Coquimbo and Atacama and the Department of Petorca (earthquakes on 
1922, 1943 and 1945), Calbuco (fire on January 1943), Curacautin (fire of August 1943), Puerto Aysen (fire of 
February 1947), Peumo and Rengo (earthquake of 1945), Arica (tsunami of 1949), Castro (fires of 1936, 1937 and 
1938). In 1948, Law N 9.113 extended its mandate until December 31st, 1958 and change its name to simply 
Reconstruction Corporation. But in 1953, it was transformed into CORVI. 
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politics of the Chilean state, making it more inclusive and extensive. And as such, it increased 
the power of the state to deliver services to its citizens.  
Production Development Corporation, CORFO.  The Production Development Corporation 
was created in 1939 to help industrialization in the country. The law that created it established as 
its mission to “design a plan for national production development” (Law 6334). CORFO quickly 
became a central agent in Chilean economy, lending to private sector borrowers, serving as an 
investment bank, engaging in technological research and starting new, state-owned companies. 
In the first four years CORFO invested in 53 companies that focused in manufacturing, mining, 
agriculture and energy. In 23 out of these 53 CORFO held a majority of the voting shares. Also, 
its investments accounted for 30percent of the country´s total investment in machinery and 
equipment (Jones and Lluch 2015).  Similar developments will occur in Argentina in 1949 with 
the creation of the Ministry of Production and in Brazil with the Ministry of Industry in 1960. 
Thus, CORFO was a leading example of an agency to boost industrialization and development 
for Latin American countries.  
However, the first task of CORFO was to bring the economic areas affected by the quake 
back to life. Its focus was the implementation of several “Immediate Action Plans”; there was a 
plan for the mining industry and one for agriculture, and similar operations for commerce and 
transportation. Later, an Electric Energy Production Promotion Plan and an Industrial Promotion 
Plan were also implemented.  In the long term, CORFO served to execute important policies of 
the Popular´s Front agenda. For example, CORFO created the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad 
(National Electricity Company, ENDESA) and the Compañía de Aceros del Pacífico (Pacific 
Steel Company, CAP). In time CORFO developed numerous companies such as Laboratorio-
Chile (National Pharmaceutical), Industria Nacional de Neumáticos (tire industry, or INSA), 
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Chile-Films (films and movies) and Madeco (copper and steel products), among many others.
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So by creating CORFO, the state did not only increase its administrative capacity adding one 
new state agency, but the whole understanding of the role of the Chilean state in development 
changed its axis. Now, the state was the major industrialist in the country.  
The impact of this on state capacity was enormous. The amount of public employees rose by 
nearly one-sixth between 1937 and 1941 (Sater and Collier 2004). By 1952 this number had 
doubled compared with 1930´s capacity (234,781 people in 1930 versus 478,913 in 1957 were 
hired by the state´s bureaucracy (Hurtado 1966)). Also, the effect on the productive capacity of 
the country was impressive. The amount of people hired in the industrial sector changed from 15 
per cent of active population in 1930 to 18 per cent in 1952 (Hurtado 1966). The same effect can 
be seen in mining, where the production of nitrates no longer surpassed copper. If in 1930 12,000 
people were working on copper mines, in 1943 there were 21,000.  Not surprisingly, if by 1930 
the percentage of people living in rural areas still surpassed those living in cities (51,8percent), 
the 1940´s census shows that the relationship had changed and 51percent were living in cities 
(Hidalgo 2000). By 1960, 64percent of population will live in urban centers.   
With time, CORFO became the most important state-led organization in the country. Today 
CORFO’s focus is to promote investment, innovation, and cluster development in the country.  
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (“Constitutional 2percent”, Law 7.727). Lastly, a 
small but crucial constitutional reform was passed after this earthquake. It was enacted in 1943 
after another two small earthquakes caused minor damage. Known as “Constitutional 2percent" 
(Ley 7,727) the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund allows the president to dictate “decrees 
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of economic emergency” that allows the government to spend up to 2percent of the annual 
budget on emergency issues, needs derived from public calamities that cannot be postponed, or 
services that cannot be closed without causing damage to the country. After this law, the 
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund has been invoked after every major earthquake, as well 
as for fires, flooding and epidemics. Furthermore, other types of “public calamities” have been 
confronted with this money, such as unemployment (1965) or improvement of the public 
transportation system in Santiago (2008).   
Summary  
In this section I have shown from another perspective what I had already presented in 
Chapter 3. The 1939 was a momentous event in Chilean history. It presented a critical juncture 
for the government and Aguirre-Cerda used this opportunity to change the role that the Chilean 
state had in the economy. This change was reflected in two new institutions, the CRA and 
CORFO, both denoted greater involvement of the state in society, a significant increase in state 
bureaucracy and an increase in state capacities. For these reasons, they are a prime example of 
state building after catastrophe. Of course, there is no way to know if Aguirre-Cerda would have 
been able to create CORFO without the earthquake, but the fact remains that it was thanks to the 
earthquake that he did.  
Finally, in terms of the development of a risk management program, the creation of the 
“Constitutional 2percent” is an important step. It signals that the state is responsible for 
managing the consequences of any calamity that happens in the country. This, together with the 
creation of the first seismic regulations in 1928 (described in the previous section about seismic 
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codes), affirms what I have been arguing since Chapter 1; when everything goes wrong we look 
at the state for answers. It is this idea that contains the force for state building after catastrophe.  
1960 Catastrophe. 
By 1960 Chile was being ruled by a right wing government under the leadership of 
entrepreneur Jorge Alessandri. In this context, the state´s reaction to the catastrophe was to avoid 
a bigger state, at least formally. However, the earthquake and the United States´ conviction that 
Latin America should face a different future forced Alessandri´s hand. He was required to design 
a plan for reconstruction that included issues of development, recovery and, most of all, 
economic planning. Still, the development of new state bureaucracies was hidden as much as 
possible. The way to do this was to increase the capacity of already existing institutions, instead 
of creating new ones. Still, the restructuration of the Ministry of Economy contemplated an 
office of reconstruction that managed the whole plan and was in charge of controlling that the 
different offices did their parts. This also contemplated the creation of a committee for 
reconstruction with participation of different ministries. These two developments, along with 
new regulations and taxes, show that despite Alessandri´s reluctance to highlight the role of the 
state in society the Chilean state did gain state capacity during this period. In fact, very important 
developments followed catastrophe.    
Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
reconstruction project of 1960 contemplated the modification of the attributions of some 
government organizations and the creation of a committee for reconstruction (COPERE). 
Truthfully, this was more a way to hide state growth than actually avoid it. But it was also a way 
to control the effect of the quake in state bureaucracy. The main change was the creation of the 
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new Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction (Law 14,171). The changes at this 
office meant new attributions for the previously existing Ministry of Economy but its main 
immediate purpose was to alleviate the damage caused by the earthquake.  Furthermore, it was 
not only located in new offices, with a secretariat in charge of reconstruction; but also, the office 
assumed new tasks, especially coordinating economic recovery and reconstruction and the 
administration of the funds for such a task, especially those coming from the United States. And 
furthermore, it was in charge  of overseeing the development of the planning of the economy, the 
coordination of investments in the public sector and determining its priorities (Alessandri 1962).  
In terms of personnel, this meant that eight hundred more people were working in the ministry in 
1965 than 1959, a 76 per cent of increase (from 1,031 people in 1959 to 1,823 in 1965) (Urzúa 
1971).  
COPERE. As I mentioned in the previous topic, in 1960 the work of reconstruction and 
emergency management was overseen by a committee for reconstruction and economic planning 
called Comité de Programación Económica y de Reconstrucción, known as COPERE. This 
committee was formed by the Minister of Economics, Development and Reconstruction together 
with the Minister of the Treasury, Public Works, Mining and Agriculture; also, the Vice 
President and the CEO of CORFO, the Vice President of CORVI and the Director of Budgets. 
With an executive office depending of the new Ministry, COPERE was in charge of organizing 
reconstruction and managing the emergency.   
The COPERE was still functioning when, in 1965, another disaster happened: an earthquake 
in the northern regions of Chile. As a consequence, the committee decided to create a more 
formal agency that was named the Emergency Office of the Interior Ministry (Oficina de 
Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior, OEMI). It was the first step to change the way disasters 
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were being managed in the country. The creation of a more permanent office meant that the state 
was going to take official responsibility for managing catastrophe. But even so, at first, OEMI 
was mostly a warehouse to store materials needed to assist survivors of disaster. Still, this was a 
crucial shift towards a risk paradigm; the state was officially and permanently taking 
responsibility for disaster. A reflection of this is that the first National Plan of Emergencies was 
approved five years later, in 1970. This plan assigned tasks to all state offices, starting by the 
Minister of Interior that oversaw the OEMI. And finally, in March of 1974 the OEMI was 
officially recognized as a new state organization and was now the ONEMI, National Office of 
Emergencies; a technical office specialized in all matters of civil protection with the mission of 
preventing and solving the problems derived from disasters (DL 369). With the creation of 
ONEMI the change of paradigm towards a risk perspective was even more fully settled (ONEMI 
2004). An example of this is the institution of Operation DEYSE, an exercise of earthquake 
protection that is practiced in all schools in the country regularly. This office is currently going 
through a new process of redesign to make all protocols and technologies up to date, after the 
evaluation of the 2010 actions was not satisfactory. It should soon be called Office of Risk 
Management and Emergencies and it is designed to be part of a greater System of Risk 
Management in the country (this is explained further in Chapter 5, Epilogue).  
So we see that this is also a clear example of displacement effect (ratchet effect). As I explain 
in the case of the CRA, this means that once a new state institution is created it is very unlikely 
that it will disappear, what happens then is that bureaucracies re-invent themselves to continue to 
function. Today, this permanent office works for the benefit of Chilean society every day, 
maintaining a role of coordinator of different public offices in all kind of emergencies. Also, it is 
now in charge of risk management, including education and prevention of disasters. 
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The Earthquakes´ Law (Law 16,282). This law was passed in 1965, after a minor earthquake 
devastated the northern area of La Ligua (Magnitude 7.4). But since 1960 the idea of legally 
stating special powers to the state in emergency was being discussed. Law 16,282 addresses this 
issue. Known as “The Earthquakes Law” (Ley de Sismos), it establishes that the president should 
define the area to be designated “Zone of Catastrophe” (art. 1) and, in this area, it gives the 
President the attribution to rule by “exceptional decrees”. These norms have to be directly related 
to solve problems in the communities affected or to make help more efficient. Besides this, the 
law regulates commerce in the face of catastrophe, prohibiting any speculation with basic goods 
and services, and punishing anyone who hoards food or supplies (art. 4). The norm also defines 
who is a victim of the earthquake (damnificado) as anyone who has suffered considerable 
damage due to the disaster (art. 2). Under this rule, the president can even abolish taxes in the 
area, albeit momentarily (art. 3). Finally, it allows the government to make use of the army to 
manage the emergency and to form an emergency committee in the region that will take strategic 
decisions. This law has been used in every disaster in the country ever since.  
The National Telecommunications Office. The earthquake of 1960 showed Chileans the 
substantial communications problems of their country (Alessandri 1961). The affected area had 
been left completely isolated for days, there was no road to get to Valdivia, the port was unable 
to function and there was no airport close by. US airplanes had to use whatever was left of 
highways to bring help. And the situation could have become even worse if the Riñihue Lake 
had collapsed. The government even faced the responsibility to review some 8,000 miles of 
charts of maritime canals from the island of Chiloé to the Strait of Magellan, since islands had 
disappeared and others had appeared (Rudolph 1960). The need to improve long distance 
communication was clear after the quake and the whole system, heavily damaged, was 
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modernized. This is why after the event the government demanded a careful review of this issue 
to a commission, an advisory organism in charge of improving the telecommunication network 
(DFL 315). The plan of the commission consisted in connecting Santiago to the whole country 
(thus connecting the country together) with short wave connections from Arica, Iquique, 
Antofagasta, Puerto Montt and Coihaique. Also, new radio circuits were created from Puerto 
Montt-Ancud, Puerto Montt-Maullin, and Punta Arenas-Rio Gallegos (Alessandri 1961). This 
meant that by 1964 there were 55,104 more telephone lines in the country than in 1960 (Braun et 
al. 2000). Finally, by request of the commission, in 1964 CORFO created a National 
Telecommunications Office (Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Chile or ENTEL). The 
company begat its activities with a capital of US$ 5,000,000 and their first activity was 
materializing the commission’s plan.  This company made Chile a frontrunner in 
telecommunications in Latin America. It was the second of such public companies in the 
continent (only surpassed by Argentina, in 1948) and the first to initiate satellite communications 
in the continent in 1968 (Carvallo-Fernandini 2008). 
Summary.  
The 1960s earthquakes had important developments in terms of state capacity, even if it was 
against the President´s wishes. Changes were hidden as much as possible but they occurred 
nonetheless and had important consequences for the Chilean state.  One of the most important 
ones was the creation of the reconstruction committee, COPERE, which ended up becoming 
ONEMI, nowadays the Office of Risk Management and Emergencies of the Chilean State. Other 
institutions also followed, like the national commission for telecommunications that created the 
National Telecommunications Office. Also, the bill that created the “Constitutional 2percent” 
and the “Earthquakes Law” have become permanent tools for the state to manage all kind of 
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emergencies and calamities. Overall, we see that President Alessandri was forced to do much 
more than he wanted, and in the direction of state building.  
EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY 
There is probably nothing more central to state capacity than raising revenue. Some have 
even defined the boundaries of the state exclusively in terms of its ability to tax constituents 
(North 1981; Levi 1988). In the words of Historian Rudolf Braun, “financial means are the nerve 
of the state.” (Braun 1975: 243). Furthermore, he claims that “the right to impose and collect –
that is, to administer- taxes became one of the means by which seigniorial or patrimonial 
authority over people was transformed into authority over territory.” (Braun 1975: 243).  In other 
words, fiscal demands are the first sign of life of the modern state; it is what permits it to 
function and this is why it is in the heart of state building (Braun 1975; Ardant 1975; North 
1981; Levi 1988). Also, setting up taxes and collecting them are difficult operations and this 
difficulty has always weighed heavily upon the state (Ardant 1975). Because of this, taxation has 
important political consequences and it is also related to the development of new bureaucracies 
to deal with these challenges.    
Taxes are “regularly paid compulsory levies on private units to produce revenues to be spent 
for public purposes” (Braun 1975: 244). As such, they can also be considered as part of the 
state´s coercive capacity. The right to impose is a form of coercion because it takes away from 
the population the right to decide on what to spend their money. Instead, they are forced to give 
this money to the state who can decide how to use it and control how it is distributed. However, 
because of their central importance in forming the state, literature has considered taxes in its own 
dimension. This literature also considers that different types of revenue vary significantly in 
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terms of their administrative complexity and their political implications (Liberman 2002). Some 
taxes try to regulate or influence the population (like taxes on tobacco), others regulate, 
intentionally or not, the distribution of wealth and income (tax on income) and some may have 
political, economic and social functions, defining the degree of political participation of the state 
in certain functions (Braun 1975). According to these authors, the revenue sources that are most 
likely to capture concepts related to state capacity include income, property and domestic 
consumption taxes. In other words, direct taxes. These taxes are not only administratively more 
complex to manage, but they require greater coercion from the population because it directly 
affects their budget.  
Fiscal Aftershocks in Chile 
In colonial Chile, earthquakes were used politically to claim mercy from the King of Spain, 
who more than once waived the colony for paying taxes to help Chileans to finance 
reconstruction. This shows how, from the beginning, earthquakes have had important political 
and economic impacts in the country (taxes were still collected; but they were used to pay for 
reconstruction of churches and public buildings instead of sending them to Spain). However, 
with time, the responsibility of governments facing catastrophic earthquakes has changed 
greatly, and also the logic of the “fiscal aftershocks.” In Colonial Chile, creole government was 
concerned only with reconstructing the “symbols of power;” churches and public buildings. 
Now, as we have seen through this dissertation, the state is seen as responsible for organizing 
reconstruction and recovery for all citizens, even private buildings. Also, if in Colonial Chile 
catastrophes were used as an excuse to avoid taxes to the Crown, republican Chile has seen 
something different. After each earthquake, the state has gained power by increasing taxation on 
the population. Most of these taxes were initially thought of as momentary, and yet, they became 
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permanent. This ratchet effect that we have seen also happens with other institutional 
developments, as has been explicitly described by Tilly about taxes created by war. Once a new 
tax is created it is very unlikely that its creation will be reversed once the crisis is over.  “When 
public revenues and expenditures rose abruptly during war” –claims Tilly- “ they set a new, 
higher floor beneath which peacetime revenues and expenditures do not sink” (Tilly 1985:180). 
War making, claims Tilly, not only provides the main stimulus to collect more taxes at a specific 
moment in time, they also set a new standard for acceptable taxation that remains after war is 
over. This is what Peacock and Wiseman showed in their already mentioned 1961 book about the 
United Kingdom, “people will accept, in a period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising 
revenue that in quieter times would have thought intolerable” (Peacock and Wiseman 1961: 26). 
More recently, Legrenzi (2004) has also shown that, for European countries, society usually 
tolerates a fairly stable government taxation, but during wars “and other major social 
disturbances” these conceptions change. Also, these authors show that expenditure may fall 
when the crisis is over, but taxes are not likely to return to old levels. Conclusively, we know 
that wars are moments that destroy established conceptions of tolerable taxes, and generate a 
displacement effect that increases revenue in the long term.   
As I will show next, in our catastrophic examples we see the same effect. First, catastrophes 
are moments of “disturbance” for the political equilibrium that defines taxes. After each major 
event in the history of Chile new taxes were created, a clear example of state growth. Also, the 
state has never taken a step back after developing new taxes to pay for the institutions that 
manage catastrophe. On the contrary, taxes that were initially declared “reconstruction taxes” -
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this is, momentary taxes- were not repelled when the deadline came but instead parliament voted 
to maintain them in the long term.
44
    
1906 Catastrophe.  
During Chile´s parliamentary republic, there was almost no direct tax to the population. 
After the incorporation of Atacama region and its nitrate mines most of other taxes had been 
eliminated. Public Treasury kept growing because of the steady influx of money from the nitrate 
mines that signified 50percent of Chile´s income (export tax). Not even the haciendas paid any 
property tax, even though agriculture was still the principal economic activity in the rest of the 
country (Fernandez 2003). Also, whatever tax that remained had been transferred to the 
municipalities in 1891 by the Law of the Autonomous Municipality. Municipalities, then, levied 
property and other (albeit small) internal taxes. This included tax on alcohol (1892), tobacco 
(1896), sealed paper (1898) and cars (1903).  The first direct contributions at the national level 
were created in 1915 (Fernandez 2003).  
In this context, it is remarkable that the reconstruction law of Valparaíso (Law 1887) 
authorized the city government to increase property taxes, and ordered the National Treasury to 
collect these taxes in the name of the city. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the final renewal plan and 
its new city map was not the expensive expropiation of all El Almendral that the neighbours 
asked, but it was still an expensive plan. Streets had to be widened, new plazas were going to be 
created, and all of this meant some expropriations as well as materials forthe reconstruction of 
these spaces. According to the new law, the money forthese tasks wouldbe obtained by four 
means. First, by the National Treasury, by the way of a loan to be used in the reconstruction of 
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public buildings and to pay for expropriations (defined by the Reconstruction Board). Second, by 
the property owners, who had to pay fifty percent of the money needed to rebuild their street 
front, or choose expropriation of their terrains. Third, by the sale of expropriated terrains that 
were not needed for new streets, plazas or public buildings. And finally, reconstruction had to be 
paid by the Municipality of Valparaíso. For this purpose, the municiaplity was allowed to 
increase property tax up to 0.5 percent. This money was used to pay the loans, loans that the state 
had signed to be used in Valparaíso. Therefore, the state was considered a creditor of the 
municipality. For this reason, when reconstruction of El Almendral was already underway, the 
tax was reaffirmed; the municipality was allowed to increase property tax once more (0.3 
percent), and double the tax on industrial and professional activities in the city. But furthermore, 
it was decided that the taxes would pass directly to the state, as a way to assure the municipal 
government was going to fulfill their part of the deal. So basically, the municipality paid for city 
works, but it had no authority to decide what this city works were going to be. As I showed 
previously, after the 1906 catastrophe the state took over city planning, and now we see that it 
also took over city taxes. The effect, albeit momentary, can be seen in Chart 2.  







percent of tax income 
that is direct taxes 
1905 154419 132882 3 0.002 
1906 181606 149289 0 0.000 
1907 196299 157999 3 0.002 
1908 193085 157170 71 0.045 
1909 175063 151350 32 0.021 
1910 194704 171604 4 0.002 
1911 194832 185359 7 0.003 
1912 236383 196253 0 0.000 





In conclusion, the taxes developed after the 1906 catastrophe were minor but significant in 
the context of the parliamentary republic. Since in this period taxes to citizens were almost null 
in the country, the increase in property taxes demanded by the state to pay for reconstruction is 
an important development. It shows how there is a relationship between catastrophe and 
extraction. But by 1906 the state was not yet seen as responsible for reconstructing private 
houses; only streets, plazas and public buildings. In the case of Valparaíso´s earthquake the 
novelty is that this meant a complete redesign of the city plan. But later, we will see that the 
amount of tasks that demand state intervention increases and the amount of extraction needed 
increases accordingly.  
1939 Catastrophe 
For center-left President Aguirre-Cerda it was clear that institutional developments such as 
CORFO should be paid by taxes. This was his conviction even before the earthquake. 
Consequently, when disaster happened and he proposed a bill to pay for the new institutional 
developments it was decided that reconstruction was going to be paid in that way. Hence, the 
same law that created the CRA and CORFO defined tax increases to finance them. The position 
of the government was that to pay for reconstruction only through international debt was not 
convenient, because the country will only be carrying debt for many years to come. Instead, they 
argued that “this situation must be considered as provoked by a state of war and, as such, must be 
financed with the resources of all citizens and those who reside in the territory.” (La Nacion  Jan 
30, 1939).  
Consequently, the founding of CORFO contemplated a general increase in Income taxes that 
considered: a two percent increase on income from property (2°categoría), 2 percent on Industry 
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and Commerce (3° categoría), two percent on Mining and Metallurgic (4° categoría) and 1 
percent on additional sources of income (5° and 6° categoría).
45
 Additionally, the inheritance tax 
was increased by 50 percent and the law also created new taxes on agriculture and a new patent 
for mining activities (amparo). As a newspaper at the time put it: “one can say that there will be 
an additional tax, more or less strong, to simply every economic activity in the nation” (La 
Nacion February 2, 1939).  
This tax increase was defined as temporary, but in 1948 when the tax should have been 
repealed a new law extended the period until 1958. In 1958, a new law made most of these taxes 
permanent. We can see the effect in Chart 3, where it shows that the percentage of income tax 
corresponding to direct taxes grew from 16.69 percent in 1939 to 20.51 in 1940.  
Chart 3: Structure of fiscal income in millions of 1995 Chilean pesos   
 Fiscal 
income 
Tax Income Direct taxes percent of tax 
income from direct 
taxes 
1938 452453 365780 61041 16.69 
1939 494542 394826 56600 14.34 
1940 500487 364025 74676 20.51 
1941 533032 377864 73530 19.46 
1942 488109 320378 71362 22.27 
1943 591135 355827 80630 22.66 
Source: Made by the author with data from Braun et al. (2000).  
 
However, the Great Depression affected greatly the amount of taxes that the state could 
collect with this reform (see table 4, total tax income actually decreased) and taxation was still 
not enough. Hence, the law also authorized the President to ask for international loans of up to 
two thousand million pesos. This money was to be shared by the CRA and CORFO with 50 
percent each. Congress also allowed the executive to ask for internal loans of up to 500 million 
pesos for the construction of housing for people affected by the earthquake. 
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Conclusively, the 1939 earthquake had as a consequence a significant increase of direct 
taxes. As we saw in Chapter 3, this was achieved with significant political struggle. But at the 
end, the executive´s plan prevailed in most points. Once again, we see a clear link between 
taxation and the development of new bureaucracies to deal with reconstruction and recovery. 
Like with wars, the amount of taxes that is considered acceptable changes because of the 
“moment of disruption.”  
1960 Catastrophe  
The 1960 catastrophe affected Chile in a completely different political scenario than in 1939. 
Unlike President Aguirre-Cerda, right-wing President Alessandri was not inclined to increase 
domestic taxes (Collier and Sater 2004). However, he was forced by the emergency to do so. To 
pay for reconstruction, the same law that restructured the Ministry of Economy and 
Reconstruction included a tax reform (Law 14171). Overall, The World Bank estimated that the 
reform would collect 185 million of escudos over a five year period which meant 100 million 
dollars extra for the Chilean state (WB 1961). This was an impressive sum (as a comparison, 
copper mines produced 160 million dollars of profit in total). Unfortunately, it was not enough, 
so congress authorized the government to ask for loans up to 500 more US million dollars in 
international and national loans. Also, up to four fifths of the money that was going to be used to 
celebrate Chile´s 150 years of independence was used for reconstruction (Alessandri 1961). 
The reconstruction law (Law 14171) was very complex and included several regulations. 
Firstly, the law declared what was the area of the country that was going to be considered as 
“affected by the catastrophe.” Secondly, it allowed the state to ask for internal and external loans, 
and to be guarantor of any loan subscribed by CORFO or the municipalities in the affected area 
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(with approval). Thirdly, the law permitted the President to modify the National Budget of 1960 
in order to use money for emergency management and reconstruction. Also, it demanded that the 
National Budget included a “Reconstruction” item in the following two years. Fourthly, it 
demanded that institutions in charge of retirements and pensions (prevision) to offer loans to 
their clients in the affected area for up to one thousand escudos.   
Fifthly, in terms of the tax reform, several changes were made. President Alessandri 
concentrated efforts on avoiding evasion: the national tax office grew considerably, creating new 
offices in other regions, and increased its attributions to include an office of tax prosecution. 
Also, some parts of the system by which tax was calculated were changed. For example, 
Agriculture tax was now calculated using air pictures to really measure the extension of the 
plantations and not by estimates. Finally, against the President’s wishes, the law presented to 
Congress by the executive raised several taxes: both the tax on Industry and Commerce and the 
tax on Mining and Metallurgical activities were raised by 20 percent; property tax was raised by 
23 percent for the year of 1960; several luxury items were now taxed with an increase of 10-15 
percent, for example, jewelry, pianos, air conditioners, photo machines, yachts, among others; 
there was also a new tax on nonalcoholic drinks (15 percent) and alcoholic drinks (20 percent); 
new tariffs for automobile plaques, specially pickups; an increase of 100 percent in “public 
entertainments” (with the expressed exemption of soccer games); among others. And finally, the 
most controversial change of all was the increase of 1percent in the Social Security Taxes, both 
in the public and private sector. This money went directly to the “Reconstruction Fund” 
administered by the Housing Corporation (CORVI) and CORFO. This corporation, in return, 
will use this money to create savings accounts for the workers, in order to help them obtain 
houses in the future. It was forced savings more than a tax, but in the meantime it felt very much 
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as a tax (and it was used for reconstruction in the south). Finally, the law also suspended some 
taxation in the most affected areas, especially fines related to unpaid property tax. It also allowed 
the President to declare uncollectable the property tax of a citizen whose house was severely 
affected by the quake.  
Chart 4 shows the effect of this tax reform. As we can see, the percentage of fiscal income 
that comes from tax increased from 65percent in 1959 to 95.5percent in 1961 and continued to 
rise in the following years. This was not only due to direct taxes, but mostly because of the new 
tax on copper, but the percentage of tax income that corresponds to direct taxes also increased 
from 19.16 percent in 1959 to 25.66 percent in 1961. Some of these taxes were only supposed to 
last three or five years, but as we have seen before, when the date for withdrawing the tax 
arrived, Congress passed a law to maintain them.   




Tax Income Direct taxes 
percent of tax 
income fromdirect 
taxes 
1959 1365837 888116 170199 19.16 
1960 1090931 1030657 230765 22.39 
1961 1144714 1093956 280679 25.66 
1962 1222321 1156053 282654 24.45 
1963 1200024 1137266 270356 23.77 
1964 1217544 1157575 319438 27.60 
Source: Braum et al.  
The taxes covered only about 20 percent of the money required for reconstruction, so 
Congress authorized President Alessandri to ask for the already mentioned 500 million US 
dollars in loans. At least 100 million of these loans were petitioned to the US, as described in 
Chapter 3. Consequently, eighteen months after the earthquake the external debt had increased 
by 150 US million dollars (IDA 1961).  
195 
 
Conclusively, the 1960s also saw an important rise in taxes. But this time, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, President Alessandri tried to hide state growth as much as possible. In his tax reform 
this is seen in the fact that he increased many taxes, but in a small way. Still, all cases show how 
the need for money to pay for reconstruction led to the development of new taxes increasing the 
capacity of the state to rule on its population.  
STATE REACH 
Finally, there is one more aspect of state capacity that is worth analyzing in this chapter. We 
must take into account that state capacity may be unevenly distributed in the territory, as it has 
been usually shown is the case for Latin America (O´Donnell 1993; Soifer 2015). This 
unevenness is related to the notion of state reach, the “actual penetration throughout the country 
and its capacity to govern society” (Yashar 2005: 6) or as Herbst has put it, the ability “to project 
power over distance” (Herbst 2000: 173). And not only power, but also the provision of public 
goods and the protection of legal rights can vary throughout the national territory (Soifer 2015). 
Unfortunately, the ability of states to broadcast their power into remote territories can be strongly 
constrained by rough physical geography, especially mountains (Boulding 1962; Lemke 1995).  
State reach is therefore subject to a “loss of strength gradient” (Boulding 1962) in which capacity 
is a negative function of distance from the state’s center.  
In the case of Chile, even by 1960, some towns had never seen a state official, much less 
public services, before the earthquake. This, in part, is due to the fact that difficult terrain 
dramatically increases the cost of transportation, communication, and the location of state 
services (Lemke 1995). This is why, following Herbst, I will argue that roads are vital to 
exercising formal authority, and therefore we can look at road density as a measurement of the 
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spatial reach of state agents and infrastructure (Herbst 2000; Soifer 2015). The increase of public 
roads is theoretically accompanied by an expanded bureaucracy; with roads come police offices 
(as shown in the previous section, new police stations were created in the territory after 
catastrophes), schools, medical centers, the post and most critically, phone lines. This is why, as 
Herbst (2000) has shown for the case of Africa, this increase of roads and transportation is a 
proxy for state reach.    
In colonial Chile, towns were extremely isolated from each other. Roads were incredibly 
scarce and travel took very long because of the mountainous geography. About 57.59percent of 
Chilean territory is mountains and the index of ruggedness is the strongest in the continent 
(Soifer 2015). This does not mean that the state was necessarily weak, but it does mean that 
roads were slow to develop.  In fact, until the advancement of railroads the easiest way to travel 
from town to town was by ship (Collier and Sater 2004). This situation changed slowly, and 
earthquakes have been one of the forces driving it. As I will show in this section, an accelerating 
building of roads and railroads has been a consequence of every catastrophic earthquake. Of 
course, some of this is due to the rebuilding of old roads, but data shows that this is certainly not 
all there is.  
1906 Catastrophe  
During the parliamentary republic, the dominant ideology was liberalism. If all 
parliamentarians were in agreement with one thing, this would be that the state should interfere 
in the economy as little as possible. However, the building of communicational infrastructure 
was one of the few things that was ideologically correct for the government to step upon. But by 
the beginning of the century this effort was not on roads, there were really only a few that were 
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not simply horse tracks. In fact, I could find no data on roads until later in the century. Still, by 
the end of 1906 an “Office of Bridges and Roads” was created in the Ministry of Public Works to 
improve the roads and clean up the one that united Santiago and Valparaíso that had been 
severely affected by the earthquake. To look at this reaching effort with some data, for this 
decade we have the alternative measurement of rail roads (Soifer 2015 has done the same).    
Chart 5 / Graph 3: Fiscal Rail Roads 1903-1912 
Fuente: Anuario Estadístico de la República de Chile, 1920. 
Data shows that before 1906 fiscal railroads were growing on a rate of 29 km per year, while 
the next 4 years this rate was 113 km per year.  Still, it is difficult to know exactly what the 
effect of the quake is. I have found no relationship with the reconstruction of Valparaíso; the 
plan did not involve the construction of new rail roads. What we do know is that the earthquake 
showed the state that there were important needs in terms of communications. And also, it might 
be important to point out that the official budget of the Republic for the years  1906 -1910 had 
the reconstruction of Valparaíso and the new railroads as one item (Humud 1969: 74).   
1939 Catastrophe 
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After the Chillán earthquake there was an extensive program of rebuilding roads, and the 
building of new roads as part of the reconstruction process. The numbers are telling. By 1940 
there were actually less roads available than in 1939, because of the effect of the quake. 
Newspaper La Nación protested that the earthquake had shown that in many places the roads that 
existed were the same that the conquistadores had built hundreds of years before, and are “no 
way near the contemporary standard and the needs of business and progress.” (La Nacion 
January 31, 1939 “El problema de la Reconstrucción”).  
Chart 6 / Graph 4: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 
Source: Braum at al.  
After the earthquake, kilometers of roads increased substantially, because it was one of the 
most important points of development determined by reconstruction. With these new roads, the 
government was able to reach new towns and cities with services.  
1960 Catastrophe  
This catastrophe in particular had the effect of showing Chileans the important deficit in 
communications that still existed in the country. Valdivia was completely isolated for more than 
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were left without connections to other cities for months (El Correo, Sept 22, 1960). 
Consequently, the mission sent to Washington DC to discuss funds for reconstruction negotiated 
a special development credit for a highway project.
46
 This was approved by the International 
Development Association in 1961. It consisted in the new construction of about 950 km of roads, 
the betterment of about 2,500 and paving of about 400, plus a bridge. All in the ten provinces of 
southern Chile most affected by the earthquake, and especially those who had been isolated by 
the effects of the quake (IDA 1961). The actual building of new roads due to this project is 
reflected in table X.   
Chart 7 / Graph 5: Fiscal Roads 1937-1945 
 Source:  Braum at all 
As we can see from the table, five years after the disaster there were 5,526 more kilometers 
of public roads in the country, much more than the International Developement Association 
project had contemplated. This shows the importance that it had for the government to expand its 
reach in the territory.  
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 As far as I have been able to gather this development credit is on top of the 100 million the Bank made in terms 















Earthquakes in Chile have presented themselves as moments of opportunity for state 
building. We see that in dealing with these disasters, new institutions were created and 
eventually became stable instruments of the state. This allowed the state to increase its ability to 
serve Chilean society.  Once this new institutional framework exists it functions to the benefit of 
the Chilean state not only in emergencies but also in everyday life. I argue that this happens 
because, like wars, catastrophes impose certain needs on states. Particularly, they impose the 
tasks of protection from nature and reconstruction after these protections fail. Like in the case of 
wars, this means that new state institutions must be created to solve these problems. In particular, 
these institutions are taxes and new bureaucracies to deal with the problems left by the 
catastrophe. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a connection that goes from disaster 
management to coercion an extraction, and this interaction has as a result state building, this is, 
the development of new state capacities.  
Also, I want to highlight that by the time of the 1960 earthquake the idea that the state is 
responsible for catastrophe is completely settled. This can be seen in the creation of the different 
agencies and laws to manage earthquakes, like the “constitutional 2percent” and the 
“earthquake´s law,” that are seen as permanent and designed as tools for the state to deal with 
new emergencies of this kind. As I have explained throughout this dissertation, we can clearly 
see a path that starts in 1822 with the decline of the religious explanation, an idea that is 
strengthened by 1835 and became consolidated from 1906 onwards. From then on we see that 
every earthquake has pushed for greater state involvement (as the section on seismic codes 
shows). In 1939 the state for the first time takes full responsibility for reconstruction. And 
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therefore, by 1960 the issue is completely established; earthquakes are manageable and it is the 
role of the state to do so. 
However, a complete risk management perspective that focuses on the social conditions that 
cause disaster, therefore in prevention, will not be completely established until the 21
st
 century. 
As I will show in the Epilogue, it is after 2010 that this view becomes the leading idea for 
managing earthquakes. However, by 1960-70s we can see this new change of paradigm already 
underway, as the creation of a National Office for Emergencies shows.   
Overall, I will conclude that disasters force societies to confront nature, and it is in this 
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“The forces of nature have hit our country hard. And once again they test our 
ability to face adversity and to get back on our feet. (…). Our history is full of 
natural disasters that test the will, determination and solidarity that characterizes 
us as a nation. But our history also records the strength and perseverance of our 
people. As we have done before when facing difficulties, I have no doubt that we 
will bounce forward once again.” 
- President Michelle Bachelet, after the Catastrophe of 2010 in Maule, Chile. 
 
I began this dissertation with a hypothesis: catastrophes and the process of dealing with their 
consequences can unleash mechanisms of state-building. I hope I have been able to show that 
this has been the case for the Chilean state during the twentieth century. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, after every major catastrophe of this century the state developed new 
capacities that continue even today for the benefit of Chilean society. These state capacities have 
been shaped as the direct result of catastrophe. However, in this concluding chapter, I will 
analyze the limitations of this argument and the possibility for the opposite relationship; this is, 
that catastrophes can lead to state failure. Certainly, the extreme case of this other possibility is 
Haiti, a state that completely collapsed after an earthquake in 2010. By contrast, a few months 
after Haiti, Chile suffered one of the worst catastrophes of its history, with the state once more 
coping with disaster and organizing reconstruction. What can account for one or the other case? 
The answer is in the pages of this dissertation; while Haiti is a weak state, Chile is a strong state, 
and this is in part due to its earthquake prone history. Strong states cannot only bear disaster 
better, but they also profit from catastrophe to gain strength. This has been the case of Chile, and 
the 2010 Maule disaster is yet another example of this.  
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In the following sections I will explore these issues further and use the comparison between 
Haiti and the 2010 Maule earthquake in Chile as a guide to expand on some of the main 
conclusions of this dissertation. The comparison will allow me to show how the consequences of 
both earthquakes lie on decisions taken in the past and not in the earthquake in itself. This is, that 
the catastrophe was man-made. More specifically, I will show that the crucial actor in creating 
the disaster is the state. In other words, that “state makes catastrophe.” Secondly, I will show that 
the opposite is also true, under the right conditions. The Maule 2010 earthquake in Chile is once 
more an example of state capacities developing after disaster, even under a regime that does not 
support state grow. On the contrary, the Haiti case shows that if a minimally strong state is not 
present before the event the result of catastrophe may very well be state collapse. Finally, I will 
explore the 2010 Maule earthquake in more depth to add some last conclusions about regimes 
and their politics of reconstruction.  
Haiti and Chile: A Tale of Two Earthquakes 
On January 12, 2010 a 7.0 Ms earthquake devastated Haiti, killing at least 230,000 people 
and leaving one third of the country´s population homeless (1.5 million people). The capital, 
Port-au-Prince, suffered widespread devastation; hospitals, churches and schools collapsed, roads 
were blocked with debris, and it seemed that all was reduced to rubble. Basic services were 
almost completely disrupted, including water and electricity. Damage was truly catastrophic 
(Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). After this event, Pierre Desarmes, a Haitian musician based 
in Chile, decided to bring his father, mother and two brothers to live with him in Santiago. What 
he could not have known is that disaster was going to strike again. On February 27 of the same 
year, another earthquake hit Chile, killing five hundred and leaving two million people homeless 
(12.6 percent of population). The southern cities of the Maule province were severely damaged, 
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and the coast was destroyed by a huge tsunami.  Pierre´s father, Joseph, told BBC network that 
“you can’t imagine how I felt; how powerless I felt” when he had to face a second disaster in less 
than a month. But he also described how in Haiti they got his family out of the ruins of his house, 
while in Chile he could not believe how buildings around him had sustained the shock (BBC 
2010). According to Pierre, Chile “it's a country that's prepared for earthquakes, it'll pass, it's not 
so bad” (NBC 2010).  
Furthermore, while Haiti´s earthquake lasted 35 seconds and was magnitude 7, Chile´s three 
minutes quake was 8.8 Ms. Since magnitude scales are logarithmic, this means that the Chilean 
quake was five hundred times more powerful than Haiti´s (USGS 2016). However, while the 
Haiti quake left more than three thousand casualties (out of six million people), in Chile there 
were only five hundred and fifty (out of sixteen million). Similarly, in Haiti the damage was 
reported to be US$8 billion, a total of 110 percent of the country´s annual economic production 
(Kovacs 2010); while in Chile the economic cost has been calculated to be US$30 billion, 
accounting for only 15 percent of the GDP of the country (Meyer 2014). Moreover, magnitude 7 
earthquakes such as the one in Haiti are not unknown in Chile, and never result in such tragic 
losses. Data from the Chilean National Seismic Center (CSN) shows that in the decade before 
2010 Chile had suffered two such earthquakes (7,7 and 7,8 Ms) with a total of 13 deaths (CSN 
2016). 
Many factors influence the amount of damage caused in each case. Geologists point out that 
the difference is in part due to the depth of the hypocenters; while Haiti´s was mere 8 miles deep, 
Chilean´s hypocenter was 22 miles in depth (USGS 2016). Also, the epicenter in the Haiti case 
was barely 15 miles away of the major urban center, Port-au-Prince (pop. 3 million), while the 
Chilean quake was 65 miles away from the closest city, Concepción (pop. 200,000) (USGS 
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2016). Another difference is regularity; Haiti is located in a region prone to earthquakes but the 
tectonic features of the Caribbean are complex; there had not been an earthquake that strong in 
two hundred years. On the contrary, Chile had suffered worst catastrophes in 1960, 1939 and 
1906. Still, no one argues that seismology can completely account for the major differences in 
terms of the impact, the fact remains that the Chilean earthquake was potentially much more 
destructive and nonetheless caused considerable less damage (Salazar and McNutt 2011). As I 
will attempt to show next, the real reason is historical.  
As we know, disasters are a man-made phenomenon, even when triggered by a natural 
hazard. This means that the effects will depend not only on the characteristics of the disaster 
agent but more importantly on the vulnerability of the communities affected. In this aspect, Chile 
and Haiti are completely different. While Haiti is a country extremely vulnerable to hazards, 
Chile is regarded as resilient and prepared to face the risks posed by natural agents. What 
accounts for this difference? Different reasons have been highlighted by researchers; but they all 
point out to state capacities.    
First, while Haiti is the poorest country of the continent, with 80percent of its 9 million 
residents existing in poverty, Chile is the richest country in Latin America (U$ 1,300 GDP per 
capita vs U$ 14,700 GDP per capita). As the literature has shown, this is a proxy for the level of 
vulnerability of their societies. There is ample consensus that development (usually measured as 
GDP per capita) is negatively related to the amount of damage and deaths of a disaster (Oliver-
Smith and Hoffman 1999; Albala-Bertrand 1993; Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007). More 
specifically, Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) find evidence of an inverted U relationship 
between levels of development and the effects of (socio-) natural disasters. To a certain point per 
capita, damages rise with increase per-capita GDP, after which a country is less affected by 
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disasters as it continues to develop (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). Conclusively, disasters 
affect more powerfully the economy of poorer countries than more developed ones (Raddatz 
2005; Mechler 2009; Loayza, et al. 2012; Noy 2009; Toya and Skidmore 2007). The reason this 
happens is that GDP is highly related with the quality of institutions of each country. In other 
words, it is related to state strength.  
In terms of state capacities, I have argued before in Chapter 4 that the existence of seismic 
codes is a proxy for state strength. In this sense, it is relevant that at the time of the quake, Haiti 
lacked a national building code, and many structures were shoddily constructed since there is 
widespread practice of self-building (Kovacs 2010). Taller structures were often built with 
unreinforced support and heavy floors, which meant that almost all collapsed when subjected to 
shaking. Also, few regulations in place did not have effective implementation or enforcement, 
especially since there was no organism in charge of controlling this (Canadian Red Cross 2015). 
This all meant that in Port-au-Prince most buildings suffered infrastructural damage, becoming 
real death traps for their inhabitants (97,294 were destroyed and 188,383 damaged). By looking 
at the evidence for Haiti it is clear that the lack of building codes is an indicator of state 
weakness. Furthermore, government structures were heavily damaged or completely destroyed, 
including the Presidential Palace, parliament building and the main prison. According to a Red 
Cross report 17 to 20 percent of federal employees were killed or injured and about a quarter of 
official buildings were destroyed (Canadian Red Cross 2015). This included several 
congressman and 150 U.N personnel (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). In this context, 
emergency activities were extremely difficult, especially because of the loss of personnel and 
infrastructure that should have been part of the rescue effort. In other words, the state not only 
collapsed as an institution, but was significantly destroyed even in terms of its materiality.    
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On the contrary, Chile is the richest country in Latin America, with the soundest economy and 
one of the lowest levels of poverty (7,8 percent). Coincidently, even though Chile is one of the 
most seismically active places in the world, experts acknowledge that the country is a relatively 
safe place. In Chile most houses were able to cope with the movement, including almost all 
multi-stored buildings and especially those constructed after the 1930´s regulations were in place 
(and its revisions in 1972, 1985 and 1990s). Reinforced masonry homes experienced little if any 
damage, and even no structural damage from the huge tsunami. Still, 81,444 houses were 
destroyed and 108,914 were damaged (a smaller net amount that Haiti). Experts agree that the 
country´s rigorous and enforced building codes played a major role in the performance of its 
built environment (Red Cross 2011; Kovacs 2010; Beittel and Margesson 2010; Salazar and 
McNutt 2011). As the commissioner for the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
argued: “Chile´s investment in resilient infrastructure, early warning systems and urban planning 
have ensured that casualties have been low on this occasion despite the intensity of the quake” 
(UNISDRAM 2015). Overall, it is clear that the amount of damage of an earthquake depends not 
only on the level of development but also the quality of institutions. GDP per capita is related to 
disaster damage because it is a proxy for human development. In this sense Chile and Haiti 
clearly differ, while Haiti ranks the worst Human Developed Index in the western hemisphere, 
Chile is fourth (IHD 2016).  
Concluding on this issue, development levels matter because they are related with governance 
capabilities, and together they determine vulnerabilities. This is the real difference between Haiti 
and Chile´s earthquake. While Chile is a strong state, Haiti is a weak state. And this is what 
explains why the earthquake “made” by each state had very different characteristics.  
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This also explains why in Haiti government collapsed while in Chile it was able to manage 
the shock. In the last five years Haiti had built a foundation for social stability; however, that 
stability was fragile, and the disaster tested its capacities. With the help of the international 
community, the Haitian government had made significant progress in recent years in order to 
become stronger in terms of state capacity, and the World Bank was even working to incorporate 
disaster risk management into Haiti´s overall development strategy. But this was in early stages 
and focused on hurricanes, the most common trigger of disaster in the island (Margesson and 
Taft-Morales 2010). Reports account that the earthquake caused a serious breakdown of social 
order and the World Bank noted that “the earthquake decimated the government´s operational 
capacities” (Kovacs 2010). Thus, some government officials continued to function in makeshift 
conditions and President Preval operated in a room at police headquarters from where he 
appealed for international assistance. In this context, U.S troops and UN personnel started 
working immediately after the quake to ease the burden of the government and organizing 
emergency response and the management of several governmental facilities, such as the airport 
and port in Port-au-Prince (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). A month after the quake, Haiti´s 
political stability remained fragile, but the United Nations was directing the on the ground 
response for security and humanitarian assistance, having increased the overall force levels with 
8,940 new troops (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). In the meantime, Haitian ministers tried 
to address issues such as long term housing, delivering of food and water to thousands of 
improvised camps. It was as much as they were able to do under the circumstances.  
Another panorama was present in Chile after the disaster. In fact, one of the firsts actions of 
the government was to announce that they will not be receiving international help until they 
could evaluate what the needs really were; “we do not need any help from other countries until 
209 
 
Onemi (National Emergencies Office) makes its own estimations of damage” claimed the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Instead, the Chilean National Emergencies Office led the relief 
operation and coordinated assistance. In addition, there were more than 16,000 Chilean military 
personnel providing help and securing public order (Beittel and Margesson 2010). Also, the 
government quickly worked to reestablish basic services and medical infrastructure and 
equipment in the affected areas. Still, after a few days, the Chilean government did request help 
from the international community, especially field hospitals, electric generators and mobile 
bridges, among others. But no aid agency has taken responsibilities away from the government 
but they were a complement to Chile´s rescue and relief efforts (Beittel and Margesson 2010). As 
a result, ten days after the disaster, 90 percent of homes in the worst area had regular power and 
water. Nonetheless, there were two aspects of the Chilean government response that were 
criticized in Chile. Faults in the government communications network were exposed; the 
government did not send a tsunami warning soon enough for people to escape, although most 
evacuated the coast anyway. The second issue is the speed with which the Chilean government 
deployed the military to repress crime in the disaster zone. But even with these early response 
problems, international reports gave the Chilean government’s response high marks (Beittel and 
Margesson 2010; Salazar and McNutt 2011).  
Differences are also clear in terms of reconstruction. A year after the earthquake 
reconstruction was still low in Haiti, thousands of people were homeless and only a small portion 
(20 percent) of debris had been cleared (Rodgers 2011). Two years after the disaster, only 43 
percent of reconstruction projects had been delivered (Goldberg 2012). According to the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) “the country´s political instability before and after the 
event contributed to this paralysis” (UNDP 2010). Even deciding which neighborhood should be 
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cleared first was a slow process. As many researchers have declared, the Haiti earthquake was a 
man-made disaster (Bellegrade-Smith 2011; Kovacs 2010). Of course, we know that all disasters 
are truly social in their origin. But the Haiti earthquake has especially been regarded as a social 
disaster because of the complete lack of preparedness of the Haitian state. According to 
Bellegrade-Smith “the government, as a primary institution, grew increasingly weaker over the 
span of two centuries.” (Bellegrade-Smith 2011: 265). This is why President Preval had been 
focusing his government on two objectives: first, creating and strengthening institutions, and 
second, to create jobs (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, Haiti). But experts 
have highlighted that after the earthquake “the very presence of 11,000 largely American NGOs 
–the highest such concentration in the world- impedes the proper development of state structures 
and the healthy evolution of national institutions and the growth of Haitian “agency” in the first 
place” (Bellegrade-Smith 2011: 266). This opinion is shared by other reports on the area, that 
claim that “aid” further undermined the possibility of change in the island. In this context, 
charity does not create jobs; on the contrary, it takes functions from those who need help and 
spends a considerable amount of money in supplies and imported personnel instead of 
reconstruction (Katz 2013). For example, only 6 percent of bilateral aid for reconstruction has 
gone through Haitian institutions and less than 1 percent through the government of Haiti 
(Provost 2012). Today the Haitian state is chronically underfunded, and more than 50 percent of 
the government budget coming from international aid (Canadian Red Cross 2015). Also, the 
cholera outbreak that began in October 2010 and killed at least 8.231 Haitians is believed to have 
been introduced to the island by the U.S Nations peace keeping force coming from Africa 
(Sontag 2012). Overall, it is clear that the catastrophe has not made the Haitian state stronger; on 
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the contrary, it can be argued that the effect of major destruction along with the takeover by 
international institutions has made it weaker.  
In Chile, we know that something in this line happened after the 1960s earthquake, when the 
World Bank and the International Development Bank forced the government to change its 
strategy in order to accommodate their demands. But even in 1960, the Chilean government did 
not let international aid offices to take over their core functions; recovery and reconstruction. 
This was possible because the state had been strong enough to survive such an enormous shock. 
In 2010, even though aid was received from some international NGOs and UN agencies, the 
reconstruction plan and recovery phase were very much in the hands of the Chilean state. 
President Piñera
47
 formed an emergency committee, appointing several government officials to 
oversee recovery at the national level (Salazar and McNutt 2011). This committee had three 
tasks: provide basic needs, ensure that everyone had a roof over their head, and find definite 
solutions for housing (Salazar and McNutt 2011). To pay for this work the President enacted a 
temporary tax increase on corporations to help fund reconstruction, and then made this increase 
permanent. Also, they were able to draw on the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 
(Constitutional 2 percent) to finance this reconstruction Plan. As we know from the previous 
chapter, this fund was created after the 1939 earthquake. Reconstruction even helped fuel 
economic growth in 2010 to 5.7 percent (Meyer 2014). Also, most commercial and industrial 
operations had insurance coverage that included earthquake damage (Kovacs 2010). Finally, the 
government launched a housing reconstruction program to cover private losses (Plan de 
Reconstrucción Terremoto y Maremoto del 27 de Febrero de 2010). According to a report 
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 By the time of the 2010 Maule Earthquake President Michelle Bachelet was finishing his mandate and President 
Piñera was already elected as her successor. He took over the post in March 11
th
 2016. Hence, while Bachelet was 
in charge of the emergency, Mr. Piñera organized reconstruction. Unlike Bachelet, who is a socialist, Mr. Piñera 
represented the right wing coalition.  
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published in 2014 by President Bachelet´s administration
48
 65 percent of families affected had 
received subsidies for rebuilding or renewing their homes (Forttes 2014). The rest had not 
applied or were out of bases for subsidies. Also, 90 percent of these projects had been finished 
by 2014, and an additional 9,8 percent were being built. These numbers have been considered 
good by authorities, even if the report also claims that there have been a lot of problems in the 
way these subsidies were designed (proof of this is the 35 percent of families affected that were 
invisible for the subsides and could not apply). But compared to Haiti, it is clear that the state 
was able to manage the challenges of reconstruction. (I will address the critiques to this process 
in the next section).   
Additionally, Chile keeps learning how to manage emergencies and has increased its 
capacities in this sense enormously. Like I showed in Chapter 4, this reconstruction process has 
also led to an increase in state capacity in terms of seismic regulations and a Risk Management 
Program. Every earthquake and catastrophe protocol in the country went through a complete 
upgrade after the chaotic response in 2010. The National Emergency Office (ONEMI) –created 
after a minor earthquake in 1971- has gone through a complete renovation process, modernizing 
its protocols and acquiring new functions and even a new name as the Risk Management Office. 
Also, in terms of technology, ONEMI has advanced enormously in the past six years in order to 
monitor possible hazards in the country and calculate risks. SHOA, the Hydrographic and 
Oceanographic Service of the Chilean Navy, has also gone through a complete renovation of 
protocols and personnel, after the fatal lack of coordination in 2010 that cost the lives of around 
300 people. SERNAGEOMIN, the National Geology and Mining Service, also developed new 
capacities with the strengthening of its Volcano Network. Also, since 2011 there is a 
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multisectored Platform for Risk Management that created a new policy for the management and 
prevention of emergencies (Política Nacional para la Gestión de Riesgos y Emergencias) and a 
new plan of action for the same objective (Plan Nacional para la Gestión de Riesgos y 
Emergencias). Finally, a law that concretizes this plan is in discussion at Parliament since 2011 
and it is expected to be ready later this year (2016).  This law contemplates a final renovation of 
the National Office of Emergencies (ONEMI), doubling its personnel and giving it the mandate 
to manage not only emergencies but also risk reduction, preparedness, education and resilience. 
Also, it contemplates the creation of a permanent National Council of Risk Management that will 
advise the Interior Minister on issues related with disaster management and the assignment of a 
risk manager in all Ministries and Municipalities in the country.  As a result of all these advances 
in Chile´s institutional framework, during a more recent 8.4 Ms earthquake in Coquimbo region, 
only 13 people died; evacuation was coordinated and highly effective; and no multi-stored 
building collapsed.  
What makes Haiti so Vulnerable and Chile so Resilient?  
After this account of the differences between the Haitian and Chilean disaster, we are still left 
with the question of what makes Haiti so vulnerable and Chile much more resilient. As I have 
repeatedly argued in this dissertation, disasters are not acts of God or destiny, but the foreseeable 
consequences of the social, economic and environmental characteristics of a society. In this 
sense, the 2010 earthquakes are events that started at least five hundred years earlier, when the 
colonization of both countries changed the patterns of urban settlement, construction materials 
and created dangerous and vulnerable conditions (Oliver-Smith 2010). But in the case of Chile, 
this was followed by the development of a stable republic and solid economy. And even though 
its history has been marked by several catastrophes, these have helped the state to become 
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stronger and better prepared for managing disasters in the future. On the contrary, Haiti’s history 
is marked by tragedy. Once declaring its independence, following a slave rebellion in 1791, Haiti 
has had a difficult time trying to consolidate a state, in part because the recurrent intervention of 
foreigner powers (Dubois 2012).  Thus, not even the recurrent existence of hurricanes had had a 
positive outcome in state building (from 2001 to 2007 tropical storms left more than 18,000 dead 
and 132,000 people homeless in Haiti).  
In the case of Chile, some economists had argued that it is the country´s liberal economy that 
protected it from the quake. According to Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens, Milton 
Friedman saved Chile. “Thanks largely to him” –he wrote-“the country has endured a tragedy 
that elsewhere would have been an apocalypse…It is not by chance that Chileans were living in 
houses of brick – and Haitians in houses of straw –when the wolf arrived to try blow them down” 
(Stephens 2010). By this he means is that the radical free market policies prescribed by Milton 
Friedman´s “Chicago Boys” in the 70s are the reason for Chile’s resilience. However, his theory 
lacks a basis in truth, not only because Friedman was ambivalent about building codes (Levi 
1992), but because building codes in the country started decades before that, when a strong state 
was being built (In fact, one of the last revisions of this code had been enacted during the 
socialist government of Salvador Allende, after a minor disaster in 1971).  
In conclusion, 2010 Maule earthquake is also an example of state building process. 
Especially in terms of new institutions for emergency management and risk reduction, but also 
because a tax reform was also enacted in this case (with the reluctance of the right-wing 
government). The law to finance reconstruction (Ley de Financiamiento de la Reconstrucción) 
contemplated a rise to the income tax of corporations (primera categoría) that went from 17 to 
20 percent in the first year and 18.5 percent for the next two years. However, as in previous 
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cases, a reform was passed in 2012 and the tax ended up being permanent. Also, a permanent rise 
in the tax on tobacco from 60 to 68 percent was enacted. On the contrary, in the case of Haiti, a 
weak state only became weaker after disaster struck. This is one of the most important 
conclusions of this dissertation; one that we can summarize as “if it does not kill you, it will 
make you stronger.” It takes a state has a modicum of capacities to be able to profit from 
catastrophe. If the state does not survive the event, it is highly unlikely that it will bounce back 
stronger out of the ordeal.   
In the next section, I will discuss the 2010 Maule earthquake in more depth, in order to 
understand better what this dissertation can tell us to study further disasters in the country.  
The 2010 Maule Earthquake in Historical Perspective.  
As we have seen in this dissertation, catastrophes are all extraordinary events, and as such, 
they interfere with ordinary life, most social functions and political life. Also, we have seen that, 
in Chile, this has led to different reconstruction processes; and each has been influenced by the 
characteristics of the epoch and the ideologies of the regime in place. Thus, the 1906 earthquake 
is a moment in history that allows us to better understand the parliamentary republic and its 
power relations. The 1939 earthquake is heavily influenced by President Aguirre-Cerda´s 
aspirations to set up import- substitution policies. And the 1960 is constrained by President 
Alessandri´s reluctance on economic planning. This makes every reconstruction process unique. 
However, there are some characteristics in common.  
First, in terms of the seismic capacity of the country, every disaster was followed by 
developments in building codes that made it less vulnerable to future earthquakes. In 1906 it was 
the creation of the National Seismological Service that inaugurated this path of risk management. 
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Then, in 1929 this was strengthened with the creation of the first mandatory building codes and 
the review of these rules after the 1939, 1960, 1972 and 1985 earthquakes. As a result, in 2010 
the country withstood the Maule earthquake very well. As I explained repeatedly in this 
dissertation, enforcing seismic codes is a reflection of the strength of the Chilean state, and a 
product of this earthquake-prone history. Thus, we see that the roots of resilience are historical.    
Second, in terms of the role of the state, we see a clear tendency to add more responsibility to 
it. As we saw in Chapter 2, in nineteenth century Chile catastrophes were still seen as not 
manageable. Therefore, there was nobody to blame, at least on the ground. But as we move on in 
history, the state got more and more responsibility in reconstruction and disaster prevention. In 
1906, this meant only rebuilding public spaces; in 1929 and 1939 we see that the state started to 
regulate private buildings, with the emergence of the first building codes. And furthermore, we 
see a state that decided and planned the renewal of cities and towns. By this decade, the state is 
seen as responsible for all planning and management of hazards´ consequences. By 1960 the 
state is taking full responsibility for emergency services, for organizing help for those in need, 
for the reconstruction of the cities and private houses, and even the reorganization of these cities; 
without much questioning of its authority. And this is how in 2010 the state is forced to take all 
responsibility for events, not only emergency management, recovery and reconstruction, but 
more specifically for the occurrence of the disaster per se. President Michelle Bachelet and other 
public officials had even had to face trial for their responsibility managing the disaster the night 
of the event. What we see is the final state of a paradigm change that started in 1822, in which 
responsibility is transferred from God and destiny, to society and specifically the state. As Moss 
has explained it, in the twentieth century the state is seen as the ultimate risk manager. In 
particular, he observes a dramatic increase in federal disaster relief in the United States, and an 
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expansion in environmental liability on behalf of the state (Moss 2002: 253). As a result, the 
federal government has emerged as pivotal manager of catastrophe´s risk. When everything else 
fails, we turn to the state for answers. In the case of Chile, a risk management perspective was 
not only in full force but it became institutionalized in the new responsibilities of ONEMI, 
renamed Office of Risk Management and Emergencies, the development of a Policy and a Plan 
for Risk Management and a Committee of experts on Risk Management and Emergencies.   
 In terms of emergency management, we can highlight that all previous earthquakes were 
managed in the field by the forces of police combined with the military. The evaluation of the 
military´s help has been controversial; rethinking about it sometime after, it is clear that abuses 
were committed, especially in 1906.  But even in 1960, population of Valdivia highly resented 
the imposition of military rule for so long (Castro 2007). In the case of 2010, as I mentioned 
earlier, one of the strongest critiques to President Bachelet´s management of the situation was 
her reticence to send the military to the zone. As a consequence, the first 72 hours post disaster 
were moments of strong anxiety for the population, since chaos and looting seemed to have been 
abundant. This ambivalence on the role of the military is something that the Chilean state has 
tried to fix with the new bill for Risk and Disaster Management that will clearly define their 
functions in catastrophe and place them as an integral part of the Committees for Emergency 
Management (COEs).  
In terms of reconstruction, we see some clear patterns in the three first catastrophes. First, 
there is an ideal of making things better that they were before. This is clearly seen in different 
iconographies of the epoch; resilience has become part of the Chilean imaginary (Illustration 7). 
The meaning of “better” is something that has depended on the epoch. In 1906 “better” meant a 
more attractive Valparaíso, following the precepts of the “beautiful city” movement. In 1939 the 
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emphasis was in building a “rational” Chillán, following the ideas of modern architecture. Then, 
in 1960 the idea was to build Valdivia safer, and we see in full display what has been called here 
a risk perspective. In 2010 it is not clear what better meant for the government, but I will propose 
that the leading idea was efficiency. The government argued that no government has rebuilt 
faster and more intensely that the government of President Sebastián Piñera. But the problems 
with efficiency are clear; speed is not a value but a means to do something. And the results of an 
efficient reconstruction plan are not always excellence and quality.  Nonetheless, it must be said 
that all reconstruction programs before the Maule earthquake were also criticized by the 
population. It seems that it is impossible to do it quick enough and good enough for people who 
have lost everything. This, I think, is expectable. But it does not mean that things cannot improve 
even more for next time.  
Illustration 7: Resilience in Chilean Imaginary 
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Another important similarity of all three reconstruction processes of the twentieth century is 
that they were led by a reconstruction agency. This agency was created with the specific purpose 
to organize and coordinate reconstruction and recovery. In 1906 this role was at the 
Reconstruction Board and the Port´s Board. In this case the new organization was not formally a 
new state institution but it was subject to presidential approval and was in fact created by the 
executive as it took over the process. In 1939 this agency was first the Corporation of 
Reconstruction and Assistance, CRA, that took over the construction of houses; and second, the 
Corporation for Development, CORFO, that led the recovery. In 1960 there was no new state 
corporation, but President Alessandri gave the responsibility to plan to COPERE, a committee of 
ministers and the president of CORFO, and the responsibility to oversee all the work to the 
newly created office of Reconstruction in the Ministry of Economy and Reconstruction. By 
2010, the particular response of the government was completely different, there was no 
reconstruction agency after the emergency committee was dissolved. The reconstruction process 
was entirely sectored, this is, each ministry had its reconstruction goals but there was no agency 
designing, organizing and overseeing the tasks. For scholars who have studied this process this is 
highlighted as the big mistake of President Piñera´s reconstruction plan (Sehnbruch and 
Sangueza 2016; Forttes 2014). The lack of a central office in charge of reconstruction meant that 
in the ground the efforts were highly uncoordinated, with sometimes two state offices duplicating 
their work, or interfering in the work of the other.     
Furthermore, in 2010 each state office had to work mostly with the same apparatus that had 
been in place before the earthquake (Sehnbruch and Sangueza 2016). With this I mean that they 
granted subsidies and benefits with the same criteria than before the earthquake. People had to 
claim to be victims of the quake and municipalities would go and check their houses, but 
220 
 
municipalities were overwhelmed with their own destruction and this process proved to be a 
failure (Forttes 2014; Sehnbruch and Sangueza 2016). Furthermore, even for those recognized as 
victims, the state´s resources available were very much the same as before the earthquake. This 
meant that if you were categorized as middle class, you had no access to this help (Forttes 2014; 
Sehnbruch and Sangueza 2016). These policies were characterized by two aspects: targeting and 
outsourcing of public services. Reconstruction largely responded to the same principles, which 
prove to be highly inadequate for reconstruction (Sehnbruch and Sangueza 2016).  The reason is 
that selectivity and targeting were based in a “poverty criteria”, but disasters not only affect this 
population, they produce new vulnerabilities. “if standard allocation mechanisms are used, these 
therefore do not take this new vulnerabilities into account.” (Sehnbruch and Sangueza 2016, p. 
3). Therefore, Chilean economists Sehnbruch and Sangueza (2016) consider that a system of 
social protection must be considered as an integral part of the new risk management strategy.  
Overall, we see that even though the 2010 earthquake was a test for the Chilean state, and the 
state was in good standing to pass this test, it is clear that this resilience and learning was more 
prominent when we talk about prevention and emergency management than when we analyze 
reconstruction and recovery. As the last report on reconstruction clearly stated, the Chilean 
legislation is strong in terms of emergency management but norms about reconstruction are 
mostly inexistent (Fortess 2014: 82). This is important because minor disasters happen 
constantly in the country, especially due to earthquakes. For example, by the time this 
dissertation was being written (2016) there were eight reconstruction processes active in the 
country (including the one after the 2010 earthquake). And the problem these processes face is 
that, in the absence of permanent norms for reconstruction, the state offices had to deal with 
these extraordinary processes using ordinary means. Unfortunately, this has proved to be 
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insufficient when dealing with catastrophe (or disasters). And in the absence of a policy for 
reconstruction that is permanent, what we have is reconstruction processes that are unique and 
shaped mostly by the ideas and ideologies of the government in place at the moment. In some 
cases this has meant that government pushes for a stronger and more involved state, like in 1939. 
In other cases, like 1960 and 2010, this has meant a less centralized response and a reluctance to 
increase state capacities, especially in terms of extractive capacity but not limited to this aspect. 
We can conclude once more that the consequences of disaster will depend not only on the 
characteristics of the event and the fact that it tests the state´s strength but also on the 
characteristics of the regime in place.    
Finally, I would like to highlight that all these disasters are a good representation of how is 
the state in a particular moment. As sociologists of disaster have argued repeatedly, disasters 
should be considered as part of a developmental process, constituted by it, and not as an 
exogenous event. All these processes of reconstruction then, tell as a lot about the societies they 
happened. And this is one of the most fruitful aspects of dealing with disasters in sociology; they 
are windows into the inner workings of societies. In the case of the 2010 earthquake, the tale is 
one of a state strong enough to survive a major catastrophe, in great part due to previous 
catastrophes. But it is also the tale of a right wing government that refuses to have another 
CORFO, and instead designs a plan that gives attributions to the different ministries without an 
agency for reconstruction. And finally, it is the tale of a strong civil society that demands to the 






In this chapter we have seen how the ideas developed in this dissertation give light to recent 
cases in disaster history. In particular, we have seen how the theory presented in this research has 
limitations that can be seen exemplified in the case of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Also, I have 
shown how the end of this story of repeated earthquakes in Chile can only be understood in 
historical perspective. It is because this history that the country was prepared to face an 





Conclusions | Catastrophe and the State  
 
Throughout this dissertation, I argue and show that catastrophes have increased the strength 
of the Chilean state. Then, I use this example to discuss a theory of catastrophes and the state that 
allows us to understand this relationship. Thus, theoretically, the conclusion of this dissertation is 
that “states make catastrophe and catastrophe makes states.” It is, as I have explained before, an 
expansion of bellicists’ ideas about war and states. I see catastrophes as similar to wars in many 
ways: first, they constitute a threat to the population; second, they leave destruction and victims 
after they happen and because of this, they call for the state to interfere. This is so because the 
basic role of the state is to control internal and external threats. As some other authors have 
shown, nature has always been part of this program of control, but in the face of catastrophe this 
relationship is much more clearly perceived. The cases presented here are testimony of this 
relationship and its limitations. This expansion of Tilly´s argument is an important contribution 
to sociology because it allows us to think about the relationship between threats and state 
building in a broader sense. For Historical Sociology, this opens a whole new area of studies: 
disasters. And certainly, the argument of this dissertation would be much enriched if work on 
more countries and places were added to the literature. For disaster studies, Tilly´s framework is 
a rich addition to its understanding of disasters, unfolding this relationship with the state more 
deeply and given it a framework in which to analyze it.  
As we saw in these cases, managing disasters was usually a trigger to create new state 
capacities. Disasters were a test; they challenged state power and at the same time generated a 
strong necessity for state intervention. In Tilly´s argument about wars we see the same 
relationship.  War made states and states made war, but which came first, states or wars? 
224 
 
Taxation or bureaucracies? Extraction or protection?
49
 Wars helped Western Europe to build the 
institutional basis of the modern state by requiring a degree of organization and efficiency that 
only strong political structures could provide. These structures, if nonexistent, had to be 
developed, sometimes in innovative ways.  In countries that could not develop this minimum 
institutional cohesion wars lead to chaos and defeat. But it is also true that those who managed to 
profit from wars already had that minimal institutional capacity, at least to some degree.  “Wars 
provided an opportunity to those political organizations that are able to capitalize on it” 
(Centeno, 1997). In the same way minimally strong states can profit from disasters, as racketeers. 
Governments can put out different types of agendas ahead, even things that were unthinkable 
before wars, like more taxes. But at the same time, weak states might just disappear into chaos.  
It can be argued, then, that more than a stimulant; wars and catastrophes are a test of state 
strength. Therefore, another conclusive finding of this dissertation is that we need a minimally 
strong state to survive catastrophe and manage the situation, and only then an increase in state 
strength is possible.   
Additionally, we must take into account temporality. Recent studies in the bellicist literature 
have made it clear that it is not just about what kind of war and what kind of states but also 
when. In other words, we know that timing matters. As some studies have shown, if warfare took 
place rather early, then the effect of war was different than when war came after a minimal state 
existed (Centeno 2000; Eartman 1997). Various authors also point out to cultural factors: 
available knowledge, ideas about governmental structures, examples to follow. All this should be 
taken into account to understand the emergence of modern states.  
                                                          
49
 As M.A. Centeno has put it: “wars can only make states if they are preceded by at least a modicum of political organization” 
Centeno 1997.   
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In this line, another important conclusion of this dissertation is that ideas do matter. As I 
showed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, ideas matter because they define problems, and as a 
consequence determine the solutions that are open to decision makers. In this sense, culture is 
very relevant when analyzing the consequence of disaster in the state. Only when a risk 
perspective on disaster has been developed, the state is seen as responsible for disaster 
prevention and management. But also, the ideology of the government in place defines strongly 
what happens after catastrophe. In 1906, the earthquake is a good reflection of the political and 
social relations in the parliamentary republic; in 1939 Pedro Aguirre-Cerda was able to put 
forward his politics of import substitution, and in 1960 and 2010 right wing presidents tried as 
much as possible to avoid state growth, since this was against their beliefs.  
Conclusively, what we see is that catastrophes’ effect on state development can work in at 
least two ways: imposing certain needs and being invoked to achieve political goals. These are 
the two mechanisms that explain the relationship between catastrophe and state building.  
Illustration 8: Mechanisms linking catastrophe and State Building  
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For one side, the catastrophe has its own agenda. Because of the tragedy, a strong state is 
needed; or as a minimum, a state that is able to manage the emergency and oversee and organize 
reconstruction. Also, the earthquake creates new needs in the areas of infrastructure, health, 
transportation, among others. And this is—certainly—a task for the state. The second mechanism 
is political; catastrophes are used by the government as an excuse for achieving goals.  If these 
ideas are predisposed to develop state capacities (that usually mean a bigger and more 
controlling state) then the effect of the earthquake will be major. An example of this is the 
creation of CORFO after the 1939 disaster that allowed President Aguirre-Cerda to start his 
policy of import substitution. If, on the contrary, the government in place is not prone to have a 
stronger state then the effect will be less prominent.  It must be pointed out that these 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. 
Also in terms of temporality, it has been pointed out that a very different international 
context is faced by states today, with external elements of state formation being predominant 
over internal dimensions. Leander (2004) has shown how the main reason why the bellicist 
argument does no longer hold is that contemporary state-building takes place in a globalized 
context. Globalization alters the effects of war in the central dynamic that Tilly describes; 
controlling capital today means access to international financial sources and is much less focused 
on taxation. Moreover, the policy preferences of moneylenders like the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank matter. As we saw in the 1960 case, the incorporation of these actors 
in the reconstruction process meant a real change in President Alessandri´s politics. However, in 
the 1960s the ideology of these moneylenders, under the Kennedy administration and the 
framework of the Alliance for Progress, was in line with a stronger state. Today, on the contrary, 
these institutions are more inclined toward privatization, deregulation and the reduction of 
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budget deficits. Because they have the money, these organizations have direct power to set those 
policies. In theory, this could still prompt state development, but in practice –as the Haiti case 
clearly shows- it has translated to a reduced capacity of the central state to buy support in their 
populations. This shows how the trajectories of state building are informed by external 
contingencies, especially those of global development. The result is that catastrophe and state 
making no longer have such a positive relationship.  
But this is not the only finding of this research; there are also important conclusions for a 
wider theory of disasters as events. One of the first of these conclusions is that vulnerability, 
because it depends on decisions taken before the catastrophic event, is historically produced. 
People and things can be vulnerable to natural hazards, in the sense that they are susceptible to 
damage and losses, but they can also develop capacities to sustain these events in a better way. 
Related to the notion of vulnerability is the idea of resilience, defined as the capability of a 
community or society to recover successfully from loss and damage. In a way, resilience is the 
opposite of vulnerability, since a resilient system is also one that can stand the threat of a natural 
hazard with less damage.  As we have seen in the examples of Haiti and Chile, state strength is 
related to both vulnerability and resilience. A strong state is less vulnerable (less damage) and 
more resilient (quicker and better recovery) than a weak state. This means that the impact of 
disaster depends on decisions and events made in the past; events that define that a state is weak 
or strong, capable of surviving a disaster or not. In other words, we can conclude that building 
state capacities is a way of risk management.  
Also, this dissertation shows that to study vulnerability and risk is not be the only fruitful 
approach for the Sociology of Disasters. It is true that disasters are socially constructed, but once 
they happen they offer us a privileged opportunity to see the inner forces of society at work. In 
228 
 
this case, I focused on the state, and this approach allowed us to understand better the political 
cleavages of different political moments in Chilean history, and the consequences that disaster 
brought to this political system.  
In terms of the contribution to sociological knowledge, this dissertation speaks to several 
areas in sociology; the Sociology of Disasters, Historical Sociology and the sociology of the 
state. First, this dissertation is a contribution to Disasters Studies, especially because it expands 
the focus of the Sociology of Disasters beyond the emergency period and into the consequences 
of catastrophes in the long term. Specifically, I show that it is fruitful to study catastrophes as 
events. For the sociology of risk, disasters are nothing more than the consequence of the 
foreseeable forces that constitute society. Without contradicting the core of this statement, I 
show that disasters are in fact more than that. Once they happen, they are the end of the world as 
we know it; they mark a before and after in history. This is why the event perspective should be 
recovered as an important theoretical tool for understanding disasters. They may not be objective 
events, as in external shocks, but they are focused occasions, and as such, they have 
consequences for social life. Disasters as events mean that disasters are moments of contingency, 
where instead of “returning to normal” a new normal arises. In this sense, we see that 
catastrophes are momentous occurrences, where horizons enlarge and decisions that are taken 
carry more weight than usual. Consequently, disasters are windows of opportunity for making 
changes. Because the catastrophe imposes certain needs, these decisions have frequently meant a 
stronger state.   
However, it is likely that only true catastrophes have this effect on the state. Some smaller 
disasters -that affect smaller areas or are diffuse events with no destruction of infrastructure- may 
be less related with the development of state capacities because they do not push the state in the 
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same way. Still, we may expect these changes to occur in the city or town level. As I showed in 
Chapter 3, for cities disasters mean critical junctures, moments when their communities are 
forced to rethink the way they have been living so far. But if the disaster only affected a city or 
small town it is likely that this will not have a great effect on the state.     
Beyond Chile´s seismic history.  
My analysis is based on historical methods, which proved to be very fruitful to understand 
the effect of catastrophe on the Chilean state. The careful examination of historical sources 
allowed me to capture the conflict and tension that arises after catastrophe, as well as the result 
of these political processes in terms of state capacities. On the other side, it remains to be 
clarified whether my findings can be generalized beyond the Chilean case. Undoubtedly, the 
downside of this method is that it takes a lot of time to search and analyze sources; this is the 
main reason this dissertation is, in a way, a one case study. True, there are five catastrophes 
analyzed in depth, but they all happened in the same country. Further analysis incorporating 
other cases, such as Japan or Turkey, would be very helpful to improve the theory and test it in 
other contexts. This, unfortunately, was beyond the possibilities of one dissertation.  
However, there are also some benefits of having done a comparative study across time but 
within one case. To start, the method allowed me to isolate variables that are not related to 
particular cultural differences. Also, the cases I have chosen are good not only because of their 
significance in Chilean history, but because they are theoretically relevant to understand the link 
between catastrophes and state-building. Finally, the method is adequate because it allows us to 
study the cases in depth and see how mechanisms are at work. The depth and richness of a case 




Finally, there are some open questions that this dissertation has pointed out for future 
research. Mainly, I think there is a question on the demands and organization of civil society. 
This research points out that demands on the state have been growing steadily with each new 
catastrophe, to the point that after the 2010 earthquake the state took full responsibility for 
rebuilding private houses, even in the countryside. Also, as I started to show with the examples, 
catastrophes have been moments where new civil organizations were created, such as the 
associations of property owners in both the Valparaiso and the Chillán earthquake. After the 
2010 Maule earthquake this topic has been very salient, and explains to a great extent what has 
been the approach of the Chilean case towards reconstruction. Additionally, it should be 
interesting to study social capital in the wake of disaster and how this influences whether a 
country, community or organization will be resilient enough to bounce back stronger, or not. 
This should also be a fruitful issue to approach in order to understand the responses of the state 
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